Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior

A New Theory and Empirics in the Post-WWII Era

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List of Abbreviations

CI	Confidence Interval
CINC	Composite Index of National Capabilities
COW	Correlates of War
GEE	Generalized Estimating Equation
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IR	International Relations
KGD	Klein, Goertz, and Diehl
LIV	Linear Instrumental Variable
ME-to-GDPpc	Military Expenditure-to-GDP per capita
MID	Militarized Interstate Dispute
PREG	Politically Relevant Ethnic Group
TD	Thompson and Dreyer
WWII	World War II

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Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior:
A New Theory and Empirics in the Post-WWII Era

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Abstract

Drawing on theories of nationalism and interstate rivalry, the thesis develops a new theory of *nationalistic rivalry*, i.e., a specific type of rivalry where dispute-prone states perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies due to a nationalist issue. Building on original data of nationalistic-rivalry dyads from 1946-2001, the thesis examines the validity of nationalistic rivalry theory through the combination of large-N statistical analysis and small-N case studies. It finds that nationalistic rivalry significantly increases the probability of revisionist foreign policy, and thwarts the effect of well-known conflict-mitigating factors.

The literature has found that nationalism is a major cause of conflict. However, it is little known whether nationalism in the context of interstate politics increases revisionist state behavior specifically. While revisionist states have often been nationalistic (e.g., Imperial Japan or Milosevic Serbia), nationalism is not always revisionistic (e.g., the UK at the time of the Falklands War). What conditions cause nationalism to be a force of revisionist behavior?

The thesis answers this question by explaining how nationalist politics could lead the state specifically to revisionist behavior. The major findings of the thesis are: (1) an ethnically heterogeneous society, political instability, and incongruence between ethnonational and state boundaries raise the likelihood of nationalistic rivalry; (2) nationalistic rivalry disproportionately increases revisionist behavior through the nationalist mobilization of society, in contrast to other rivalries and non-rivalries; (3) nationalism motivated by transborder ethnic groups is more revisionist-prone than nationalism framed by territorial statehood, only in dyads where the former targets the latter; (4) nuclear deterrence does not reduce the probability of revisionist war within nationalistic rivalry contrary to conventional nuclear deterrence theory; and (5) joint democracy, economic interdependence, and intergovernmental organizations do not decrease revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry.

Introduction

Of the Nation, by the Nation, for the Nation

The year of 2014 marked the 100th anniversary of the beginning of World War I. It was a year in which much more peaceful Europe faced the Ukraine crisis after the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych by the pro-European opposition group. Russia annexed Crimea, where the majority are ethnic Russians, after a referendum revealed that nearly 96% of the Crimean voters chose to unify with Russia (*BBC News*, March 16, 2014). Russia was also accused of militarily supporting ethnic Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine, which the Kremlin continuously denied. Why does nationalism sometimes result in these kinds of "revisionist" foreign policy? What are the causal mechanisms behind it? And how could it be prevented?

These questions deserve attention. To explain interstate conflict, material factors such as economy and military capabilities certainly matter, but focusing only on them limits our understanding of such conflict. Russia's nationalist policy over Ukraine provoked economic sanctions from Western countries, which damaged Russian economy. President Vladimir Putin stated "[t]he times we are facing are hard and difficult" (quoted in *BBC News*, December 4, 2014), and even admitted that the sanctions were a cause of the rouble's trouble in late 2014 (*BBC News*, December 18, 2014). Yet, now in February 2015 it remains unclear whether Russia will reach a rapprochement with the West over Ukraine any time soon. In the literature on ethnic conflict, it is widely recognized that nationalism as an ideational factor needs to be taken into consideration (Connor 1994b, chs.6, 8; Kaufman 2001; Kaufmann 2005; Varshney 2003), and

material and ideational factors are not mutually exclusive categories as the causes of conflict but constitute "complexly intertwined motives down the path toward conflict" (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, 324).[1] However, such recognition is much less popular in quantitative research on interstate conflict, which has been heavily influenced by realpolitik and/or rationalist models. This is unfortunate, given that as the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine indicates, nationalism – the political ideology which advocates national self-governance – often plays a significant role in interstate conflict as well.

This thesis intends to explain how nationalism enriches our understanding of states' conflict behavior. Its main implication is that nationalism shapes the biased perceptions of interstate relations, and such perceptions explain why states engage in persistent hostility and violent foreign policy, and how nationalism as an ideational factor influences the way material factors matter in interstate conflict. It does not intend to argue that nationalism drives irrational state behavior. Rather, nationalism biases *objectively* rational calculations by making actors *subjectively* believe that a decision based on such objectively biased calculations is rational.

It is commonly believed that nationalism is dangerous (Pettman 1998, 155). Conforming to this belief, the literature has found that nationalism is a major cause and powerful force of conflict. The rise of nationalism by ethnic groups increases the probability of ethnic or civil conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Kaufman 2001; Petersen 2002; Snyder 2000; Van Evera 1994; Wimmer and Min 2006); nationalism helps to mobilize people for warfare (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013;

[1] For a materialist approach to the study of ethnic conflict, see Fearon and Laitin (2003).

Cederman, Warren, and Sornette 2011; Kaufman 2001; Gagnon 1994/95; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Posen 1993; Snyder 2000); and nationalism increases interstate conflict (Mearsheimer 1990; Schrock-Jacobson 2012), particularly if transborder ethnic groups are involved (Miller 2007; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Van Evera 1994; Wimmer and Min 2006; Woodwell 2007).

However, it is little known whether nationalism motivates states to revise the status quo in interstate politics by military means, such as Russia's annexation of Crimea. International Relations theory suggests that such revisionist state behavior is the major source of instability in the interstate system (Schweller 1996). Nazi Germany and Milosevic Serbia were revisionistic and nationalistic at the same time, yet nationalism is not always revisionistic. For example, in the European Union, "the strongest feeling of belonging is to a nation" (European Commission 2010, 34),[2] yet the EU states enjoy positive peace. Thus, one's pursuit of nationalism does not have to conflict with another's. Once established, nation-states use "banal nationalism" to reproduce national identity, typically by national flags (Billig 1995), and it does not have to involve the threat or use of force against other states. Furthermore, nationalism may not necessarily be revisionistic even in a time of interstate conflict. Nationalism can solidify society and, thereby, facilitate self-defense as, for example, in the UK at the time of the Falklands War (see Billig 1995, 2-3).

As nationalism seeks political autonomy, it is apparent in the case of intrastate conflict that anti-government nationalist groups, such as secessionists, challenge the status quo of state governance, not always but occasionally by violent means

[2] According to a Eurobarometer survey report (European Commission 2010, 34), 94% of the respondents identify themselves by nationality, and this identity is the highest among the others (region = 91%, Europe = 74%, and the world = 64%).

(Cunningham 2013). On the other hand, in the case of interstate conflict, conflicting nations already have their own states (the most autonomous polity in the world), and it is less obvious how nationalism causes states to engage in conflict for the purpose of revision of interstate politics. Hence, this doctoral thesis aims to answer the following research question: What conditions make nationalism a force of revisionist behavior in interstate politics?

Existing Literature and the Contribution of the Thesis

The existing literature provides two causal mechanisms whereby nationalism leads to interstate conflict. First, domestic political instability causes elites to attract popular support in political competition, by using the nationalist discourse that they are the defender of the nation from an external threat (Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000; Gagnon 1994/95).[3] In this process, those elites purposively create an external threat in the interstate arena, thereby provoking interstate conflict.

This nationalist political competition explanation by itself is insufficient to explain the causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior specifically. For example, elites might describe the strong army of a neighboring state as an external threat which serves as the topic of nationalist discourse. Such discourse, however, can lead the society either to revisionist behavior such as preventive war or to non-revisionist behavior such as building up one's own army. Furthermore, if elites' motive for a nationalist rhetoric is to stay in power, it is also a plausible option for them to keep away from risky revisionist attempts which might cause a serious backlash from the

[3] The literature on diversionary use of force (e.g., Levy 1992; Davies 2002) is significantly relevant to the nationalist political competition explanation, but does not explicitly incorporate the theory of nationalism.

target state, and to use a nationalist rhetoric only towards domestic audiences. Some additional factor is necessary to theorize how nationalist political competition leads the state to revisionist behavior specifically.

Second, the incongruence between state borders and the nations defined by transstate ethnicity (hereafter "ethnonation-state incongruence")[4] can specifically explain nationalist revisionism (Miller 2007; Woodwell 2007; Carment and James 1995; Gokcek 2011; Huibregtse 2010; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Van Evera 1994, 12, 14-15, 17-18, 22; Wimmer and Min 2006, 874-875, 891).[5] Ethnonation-state incongruence leads national homeland states to engage in conflict with other states where their ethnic kin live, to change the status quo on behalf of these co-nationals. In extreme cases, the homeland states will engage in territorial revisionism to annex part of the territory of other states where the ethnic kin reside (e.g., Pakistan's irredentist claim over the Indian part of Kashmir), or to absorb the whole territory of a "divided" nation (e.g., China's unification claim over Taiwan).

The argument of ethnonation-state incongruence also has a limitation, however. It cannot explain the cases where nationalism causes states to engage in revisionist behavior without ethnonation-state incongruence. For example, in China, anti-Japan nationalist sentiments among the masses have pressured the government to assertively challenge Japan's control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, but there is no one residing in these islands. In other words, ethnonation-state incongruence is not a *necessary* condition for nationalism to cause revisionist behavior.

[4] "Ethnonation" here denotes that ethnicity rather than territorial statehood defines nationhood (see Smith 1991, 82-83). For detailed discussion on nations and ethnicity, see Chapter 1.

[5] For the effect of transstate ethnic groups on the probability of civil war, see Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch (2009); Cederman et al. (2013).

This thesis fills these gaps in the literature. To this end, it develops a new theory of *nationalistic rivalry*, which draws on social identity theory (Brewer 2001; Tajfel and Turner 1986) and interstate rivalry theory (Thompson and Dreyer 2012; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006). Social identity theory reveals the mechanisms whereby different group identities cause hostility between groups, but focuses on social groups in general rather than nations in the interstate system in particular. Interstate rivalry theory captures the situation of threat-competitor perception or conflict-proneness between states, but lacks the explanation of the relevance of nationalism with that situation. The theory of nationalistic rivalry incorporates and glues together these different research programs by using the concept of nationalism, thereby developing a novel perspective on how nationalism could breed nationalistically charged rivalry between states.

Nationalistic rivalry is defined as the situation where dispute-prone states perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies due to a nationalist issue. The nationalist issue here means an issue which makes one's desire to maintain the core of nationhood – national autonomy, unity, and identity (Smith 1991, 74) – incompatible with another's. Territorial disputes such as the above Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute between China and Japan are a typical example of such an issue: Japan's desire to keep national territorial integrity is incompatible with China's desire to annex the islands, part of Japan's territory, to achieve national territorial integrity.

Social identity theory suggests that when nations face this type of incompatibility, they see each other as a threat to their own nationhood and engage in competition to resolve the issue to one's advantage and at the expense of the other, thereby resulting in the exchange of hostility along the line of the national "self" and "other." The reciprocation of nationalistic hostility between states in turn increases the sense of the

righteous "self" and the threatening "other," thereby creating a feedback effect to sustain the mutual nationalistic hostility.

The thesis relates this process of reciprocal nationalistic hostility to interstate rivalry, the situation where states perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 25), or the one where states have experienced more than one militarized dispute with issue linkage (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006). Two implications of nationalism are pointed out for theorizing the conceptual relation between interstate rivalry and nationalistic hostility.

First, the above two different concepts of interstate rivalry (threat-competitor perception vs. serial militarized disputes) are both important to capture reciprocal nationalistic hostility. Given the aforementioned mechanism suggested by social identity theory, threat-competitor perception is a necessary condition for identifying reciprocal nationalistic hostility. In addition, if groups are dispute-prone, they are theoretically distinctive from those which are not.[6] Dispute-proneness indicates that identification between "self" and "other" is so salient that conflict rather than cooperation becomes routine. Therefore, if relations between nations are dispute-prone, it suggests a distinctive level of *national* identification from those which are not. In short, the concept of nationalism helps to merge the two rivalry concepts in a theoretically consistent way to capture mutual nationalistic hostility.

Second, a disputed issue in rivalry must be a nationalist one. The theory of nationalism suggests that the opposite of nationalism is internationalism, because nationalism divides the world by the unit of nations whereas internationalism transcends

[6] What constitutes "dispute-proneness" may not be so clear-cut. I rely on Klein, Goertz, and Diehl's (2006) data on this regard when I operationalize nationalistic rivalry in Chapter 2.

such division. Hence, drawing on this nationalism-internationalism binary, the thesis identifies a nationalist issue in the merged concept of interstate rivalry.

Figure I-1: Nationalistic rivalry in relation to the general rivalry datasets



These two implications of nationalism for the two rivalry concepts guide the operationalization of nationalistic rivalry. That is, the data of nationalistic-rivalry dyads are created based on the intersection between the two rivalry datasets (Thompson and Dryer 2012; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006) *and* the identification of a nationalist issue in this intersection – not all rivalries in the interaction have nationalist issues, as described in Appendix B. Thus, nationalistic-rivalry dyads are the subset of these two general rivalry datasets (see Figure I-1). In particular, the identification of nationalist issues is a novel contribution to existing rivalry datasets. The operational criterion deduced from the nationalism-internationalism binary finds that nationalist issues include not only irredentism and national unification movement but also non-ethnic territorial disputes, conflicting national identities, and state-sponsored insurgency warfare. Internationalist issues are found to be contending internationalist ideologies and competition for regional/global influence which does not have any transstate ethnic aspect. It is important to emphasize that these issues are not operational criteria for

identifying nationalistic rivalry but empirical cases found by the deductive criterion of the nationalism-internationalism binary.

By definition, states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are dispute-prone, but this characteristic does not make nationalistic rivalry tautological to explain revisionist behavior. States may engage in either revisionist or non-revisionist behavior in militarized disputes. In other words, the definition of nationalistic rivalry does not mean by itself that states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are more prone to revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry. It is necessary to explain how nationalistic rivalry leads states specifically to revisionist behavior, which is a task for my theory. It is possible to imagine that states without nationalistic rivalry also have revisionist aims. For example, as Thucydides (1997, 307) wrote in ancient times that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must," a powerful major power is likely to pursue revisionist foreign policy to change the status quo relative to a much weaker state. As rivals are competitors by definition, highly asymmetric revisionist warfare, such as the overthrow of the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States in early 2000s, is not the consequence of rivalry. It is necessary to investigate theoretically and empirically whether states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry.

The thesis theorizes that if states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more prone to revisionist behavior. Nationalistic rivalry creates domestic environments in which elites or masses mobilize nationalistic hostility against the rival state, and leads the state specifically to revisionist foreign policy for the sake of resolving the disputed nationalist issue to its own advantage at the expense of the rival. For example, China and Japan, two world-leading economies, have fuelled each other's nationalist outrage

through a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Anti-Japan nationalist sentiments among the masses have pressured the Chinese government to assertively challenge Japan's control of the islands, which Japan has perceived as a threat to its territorial integrity. In a crisis over the collision between a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese Coast Guard ships around the islands in 2010, the two states even sacrificed profitable economic interdependence for boosting their own nationalist cause.

India-Pakistan is another example of nationalistic rivalry, which has endured since their independence in 1947 up to today. Pakistani elites have believed that India intends to undo the partition and to annex Pakistan, although main Indian political leaders have stated that they have no such intention. Pakistan has also continued to hold an irredentist policy over Kashmir, which has continuously threatened the territorial integrity of India. Border skirmishes along the Line of Control in Kashmir have been almost routine events, while the hostility escalated to war four times so far. In particular, the Kargil War in 1999 under the shadow of nuclear deterrence was a risky adventure which might have resulted in nuclear war.

The theory of nationalistic rivalry does not intend to dismiss the existing explanations of nationalist political competition and ethnonation-state incongruence. Rather, these two explanations are integrated in the theoretical explanations and empirical analysis of nationalistic rivalry, and help to identify the causal mechanism between nationalism and revisionist behavior through nationalistic rivalry. Figure I-2 summarizes the relationships among nationalist political competition, ethnonation-state incongruence, and nationalistic rivalry, where the black objects are the main causal mechanism which the thesis identifies whilst the gray objects are what the existing literature indicates. The

existing literature argues that nationalist political competition causes interstate conflict but is unclear regarding whether it results in revisionist or non-revisionist behavior in conflict. The thesis argues that nationalist political competition causes nationalistic rivalry, thereby increasing revisionist behavior. Ethnonation-state incongruence is also incorporated as a cause of nationalistic rivalry, although it may not necessarily go through nationalistic rivalry to lead to revisionist behavior.

Figure I-2: Causal mechanism between nationalism and revisionist behavior



The black objects are the focus of this thesis
The gray objects are what the existing literature indicates

In addition to nationalist political competition and ethnonation-state incongruence, the thesis identifies the third cause of nationalistic rivalry, i.e., ethnically heterogeneous society. If states have a higher number of politically relevant ethnic groups, their society is more likely to be deeply divided. To maintain and increase state-led national unity and integrity, the government will promote nationalism as the glue to hold together diverse ethnic groups, which in turn creates a starker difference between the “self” and

the “other” in the arena of interstate politics. Thus, all other things being equal, the larger the number of politically relevant ethnic groups within states, the more likely they are to experience nationalistic rivalry.

Once these three factors cause nationalistic rivalry, nationalistic rivalry in turn provokes nationalist mobilization in society for revisionist attempts to resolve the disputed nationalist issue vis-à-vis the rival. While the nationalist political competition explanation provides the basics of this causal mechanism, the thesis significantly develops this explanation to specify how nationalist mobilization results in revisionist behavior specifically.

In terms of the dependent variable, peace always includes only non-revisionist behavior, because revisionist behavior is observable only if conflict exists. Meanwhile, one conflict situation may include both revisionist behavior and non-revisionist behavior or only either of them. For example, if a conflict were caused by an accident, both sides might not show any revisionist ambition, whereas if a conflict were provoked by two revisionist states, both conflict actors could resort to revisionist foreign policy. In short, conflict is a necessary but insufficient condition for revisionist behavior. Other factors determine the probability of states’ engaging in revisionist behavior in conflict, and nationalistic rivalry is expected to be a major one among such factors.

The thesis examines the validity and utility of nationalistic rivalry mainly by large-N statistical analyses but also complementarily through small-N case studies of India-Pakistan, Greece-Turkey, and China-Japan, using an original dataset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads from 1946-2001. Empirics strongly support the hypothesized causal mechanisms in Figure I-1.

Empirical analysis also allows for comparing the explanatory power of nationalistic

rivalry with that of other rivalries. Table I-1 summarizes the definition of nationalistic rivalry and that of other rivalries based on the two major rivalry datasets (Thompson and Dreyer 2012; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006),[7] and the nationalist causes and effects of these rivalries.

Table I-1: Comparison of nationalistic rivalry and other rivalries

	nationalistic rivalry	other rivalries by TD	other rivalries by KGD
definition	dyads in which dispute-prone states perceive each other as a threatening and competing enemy due to a nationalist issue	dyads in which states perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies but those which do not appear in the data of nationalistic rivalry	dyads in which states have experienced more than one militarized dispute with issue linkage but those which do not appear in the data of nationalistic rivalry
nationalist causes	ethnically heterogeneous society, nationalist political competition, ethnonation-state incongruence	ethnonation-state incongruence	ethnonation-state incongruence (not robust)
nationalist effects	a significant effect on the level of nationalist mobilization and the probability of revisionist behavior	none	none

TD: Thompson and Dreyer (2012)
KGD: Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006)

[7] In terms of Figure I-1, other rivalries identified by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) are the white area of the left circle, and those specified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) are that of the right circle.

First, as expected, nationalist political competition and ethnically heterogeneous society raise the probability of nationalistic rivalry but have no significant effect on that of other rivalries. Second, while ethnonation-state incongruence increases the probability of all types of rivalries, empirical models in Chapter 3 report that its effect is highest in the case of nationalistic rivalry. In addition, there are plausible reasons why ethnonation-state incongruence is associated with a higher likelihood of other rivalries. In the case of other rivalries identified by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), most of those other rivalries which are caused by ethnonation-state incongruence are actually potential nationalistic-rivalry dyads which do not meet the criterion of dispute-proneness. In the case of other rivalries specified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), ethnonation-state incongruence incorrectly "predicts" some of those rivalries in which ethnonation-state incongruence is irrelevant (e.g., the US-Canada rivalry over fishery rights). Finally, only nationalistic rivalry has a nationalist effect on the propensity of states for nationalist mobilization and revisionist behavior. In short, nationalistic rivalry is a theoretically and empirically distinctive subset of interstate rivalry for the explanation of the causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior.

In addition to the main causal mechanisms in Figure I-1, the thesis also considers the oft-used civic-ethnic dichotomy of nationalism. The civic-ethnic dichotomy has been not only analytically but also politically utilized to categorize nationalism into a benign, peace-loving one and a malign, conflict-provoking one (Brubaker 1999, 57). However, the thesis notes that a few nationalism studies reveal that the civic-ethnic dichotomy of nationalism is actually a flawed concept. To overcome this problem, it proposes the dichotomy of nationalism motivated by transstate ethnicity (hereafter, transstate-ethnic nationalism) and nationalism framed by territorial statehood (hereafter, state-territorial

nationalism). This dichotomy of nationalism is utilized in the context of nationalistic rivalry. It is found that transstate-ethnic nationalism is more revisionist-prone than state-territorial nationalism within nationalistic-rivalry dyads, *only if the former type of nationalism is targeted at the latter type of nationalism* (see Table I-2). If the two states in a dyad have the same type of nationalism, the type of nationalism does not significantly differentiate a revisionist propensity. This finding indicates that the simple dichotomy of nationalism is insufficient to capture the nuance of dyadic interactions.

Table I-2: Revisionist propensity of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in a dyadic context

		target	
		state-territorial	transstate-ethnic
actor	state-territorial	middle	low
	transstate-ethnic	high	middle

Objectives of the Thesis

Using the theory and data of nationalistic rivalry, the thesis has two goals. One goal is to theorize and empirically investigate the causal mechanism whereby states develop nationalistic rivalry and engage in revisionist behavior. As already noted, rather than dismissing the two existing explanations of nationalist conflict (i.e., nationalist political competition and ethnonation-state incongruence), the thesis incorporates them in the above causal mechanism. Both nationalist political competition and ethnonation-state incongruence explanations suggest how nationalistic rivalry sets on and how nationalistic rivalry results in revisionist behavior.

As already mentioned, these two factors increase the probability of nationalistic

rivalry. Once nationalistic rivalry is established, the logic of nationalist political competition leads specifically to revisionist behavior through the nationalist mobilization of society. Irredentism or national unification movements are also found to be one of the major nationalist issues which enable such nationalist mobilization under the condition of nationalistic rivalry. Thus, the thesis advances an understanding of the causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior, thereby contributing to the literature on nationalist conflict. This literature has devoted more attention to intrastate conflict than interstate conflict, and the thesis amends this tendency by showing how nationalism influences state behavior in significant ways.

The other goal is to investigate the possibility of mitigating the effect of nationalistic rivalry to increase the probability of revisionist behavior. To this end, it examines theories on nuclear deterrence and liberal peace. Nuclear deterrence and liberal peace are the most well-established conflict-mitigating factors, respectively based on realism and on liberalism, in the literature on interstate conflict (e.g., Rauchhaus 2009). Hence, it is imperative to investigate whether these factors reduce a revisionist propensity in nationalistic-rivalry dyads.

Nuclear deterrence theory expects that the mutual possession of nuclear weapons (so-called “nuclear symmetry”) should reduce revisionist war. Yet, the thesis argues that nationalistic rivalry biases the objective cost-benefit calculation of nuclear deterrence by false optimism that one’s own nation is strong and the rival’s nation is easy to defeat, thereby thwarting the effect of nuclear deterrence. Empirical analysis finds that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on the probability of revisionist war within nationalistic rivalry, whereas there is no observation of revisionist war outside the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads, meaning that nuclear symmetry predicts the

absence of revisionist war perfectly outside nationalistic rivalry.

Liberal peace also fails to demonstrate its theoretical expectation. Both the rationalist and constructivist underpinnings of the theory are reexamined by adding the variable of nationalistic rivalry. The thesis argues that nationalistic hostility between states compromises the pacifying effect of three liberal peace factors – joint democracy, economic interdependence, and intergovernmental organizations – in the case of nationalistic rivalry. It is empirically found that these liberal peace factors have no significant effect on the probability of revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry, whereas in the observations of other rivalries or non-rivalries, no coherent evidence is found that nationalistic hostility thwarts the pacifying effect of the liberal peace factors. In particular, joint democracy, the most robust predictor of peace in liberal peace theory, loses its statistically significant pacifying effect only in the case of nationalistic rivalry.

In short, the theory of nationalistic rivalry suggests how existing understandings of nuclear deterrence and liberal peace can be altered once the dyadic conflictual situation of nationalistic rivalry is taken into consideration. Thus, as mentioned before, it is important to consider nationalism as a significant explanatory factor in explaining not only ethnic conflict but also interstate conflict.

Implications of the Thesis

In addition to the aforementioned arguments of the thesis, the general theoretical and empirical focus of this thesis has implications for other sets of the literature on interstate conflict. First, the large-N statistical analysis of the causation between nationalistic rivalry and revisionist behavior provides further explanations and empirics for the literature on revisionist states (Davidson 2006; Johnston 2003; Schweller 1994). While

this literature has offered significant insight into the cause of security dilemmas as will be discussed in Chapter 1, it has rarely provided a general theory to explain the origin of revisionist states (Davidson 2006, 11). Davidson (2006) exceptionally presents such a theory, yet it assumes that the presence of nationalists in domestic politics by definition increases the probability of revisionist foreign policy, rather than explaining why nationalists prefer revisionist to non-revisionist behavior (30). In addition, the literature has heavily relied on case studies for empirical evidence. There has been no systematic empirical investigation of the causes of revisionist foreign policy. In short, the statistical findings of the thesis complement the current status of the literature on revisionist states.

Second, the quantitative research design of nationalism and revisionist behavior in this thesis also suggests what the literature on quantitative studies of interstate conflict lacks now. This literature has mainly focused on the initiation or onset of militarized interstate disputes as the dependent variable and has rarely operationalized nationalism as the independent variable.[8] However, the theoretical and empirical focus of the thesis on nationalism and revisionist behavior indicates that this literature will be enriched if it takes these two factors more seriously in empirics. Specific examples include the novel finding of the thesis that the pacifying effects of nuclear deterrence and liberal peace to reduce revisionist behavior are thwarted by nationalistic rivalry, suggesting that neither nuclear deterrence nor liberal peace can sufficiently tackle instability in the interstate system.

Third, the theory of nationalistic rivalry brings new insight to the literature on

[8] Exceptional quantitative studies on nationalism and interstate conflict include Cederman, Warren, and Sornette (2011), Mansfield and Snyder (2005), Schrock-Jacobson (2012), Wimmer and Min (2006), and Woodwell (2007).

interstate rivalry. As shown already, nationalistic rivalry as a distinctive subset of interstate rivalry has substantial explanatory power which other rivalries do not. Hence, the rivalry literature might find that its current status will be advanced by the theory of nationalistic rivalry.

Finally, the concept of nationalism suggests a way to overcome an ostensible gap between rational choice modelers and constructivists in the literature on international relations as well as conflict,[9] since nationalism can be understood as the source of payoffs in rational choice terms and of identity in constructivist terms. In terms of rational choice theory, nationalism is the source of actors' given preferences because it "has its own rules, rhythms and memories, which shape the interests of its bearers even more than they shape its contours, endowing them with a recognizably 'nationalist' political shape and directing them to familiar national goals" (Smith 2001, 3). In terms of constructivist theory, nationalism is the source of identity as it demarcates "self" and "other" along the lines of national identity. As the theory of nationalistic rivalry will imply, ideational factors such as nationalism influence how actors interpret material factors such as nuclear weapons or economic relations.

The thesis also has significant policy implications. If nationalism can be either a positive force of national integrity and self-defense or a negative force of revisionist foreign policy, it is essential to understand when the latter appears and how to prevent it. If nationalism is here to stay, will the catastrophe of the World Wars remain possible in the future, as "hyper-nationalism helped cause the two world wars" (Mearsheimer 1990, 7)? This is a plausible concern, particularly given the analogy of the global financial crisis since late 2000s with the Great Depression in early 1930s. By the theory and

[9] For an exception, see Fearon and Wendt (2002).

empirical models of nationalistic rivalry, the thesis aims to develop an understanding of the causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior. It hopes that a better understanding of this causality will help to bring better insight into how to manage contemporary world politics.

Structure of the Thesis

The structure of the thesis reflects a standard social-scientific research design: deductively develop a theory (including the clarification of key concepts), draw empirically testable hypotheses from this theory, test these hypotheses in light of empirical evidence by rigorous research methods, and discuss the implications of the results. The basic framework of the datasets to be analyzed in this thesis is created by EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000a), and the datasets unavailable in EUGene are merged by Stata (version 10.1). All replication datasets and codes are available on request. Most of the statistical analysis is conducted through Stata version 10.1 but the estimation of marginal effects is done on Stata version 13. The details of research designs for testing specific hypotheses are explained in the corresponding chapters.

The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 aims to set theoretical underpinnings for the argument of this thesis. To this end, it discusses a set of literature which is relevant to this thesis: revisionist states, interstate rivalry, nationalism, and social identity theory. The most important points of the chapter are summarized as follows. First, revisionist states are the fundamental source of instability in the interstate system, and should be measured by their behavior rather than by identity. Second, the chapter reviews the literature on interstate rivalry, and points out that the literature has failed to fully theorize the relationship between nationalism and interstate rivalry. Then, it defines

nationalism as the political ideology which advocates the norm that a community which is distinctive due to its territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both, should govern its own affairs; and argues that the nation is a community defined by this norm. These definitions of nationalism and the nation in turn suggest methodological points. The unit of analysis in this thesis is the state or a pair of states (dyads), and to overcome the ambiguity surrounding the concept of the nation, the state, and ethnic groups, their relations with one another are clarified. The chapter also points out that the thesis focuses on the post-WWII period, as in this period nationalism has gained a distinctive status in the interstate system. The section on nationalism ends with a detailed rationale for the dichotomy of state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism. Finally, the chapter focuses on social identity theory, which suggests that nationalism causes conflict only if nations see others as a threat to nationhood.

Drawing on Chapter 1, Chapter 2 develops the theory of nationalistic rivalry. It firstly conceptualizes and operationalizes nationalistic rivalry, and describes the data of nationalistic-rivalry dyads for the period of 1946-2001. Then, the chapter theorizes what conditions cause nationalistic rivalry, how nationalistic rivalry leads society specifically to revisionist state behavior, and what implications the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms have for the causality between nationalistic rivalry and revisionist behavior.

The theoretical discussions in Chapter 2 generate the following nine hypotheses, which are empirically examined by statistical analysis in Chapter 3.

H1. The higher the absolute level of ethnic heterogeneity in a less ethnically heterogeneous state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry.

H2. The higher the absolute level of political instability in a more politically stable state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry.

H3. If the power holder ethnic group of the state has transborder ethnic kin in another state, the dyad is more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry.

H4. If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry.

H5. If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to nationalist mobilization than those without such rivalry.

H6. If states have a higher level of nationalist mobilization within nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior.

H7. In nationalistic-rivalry dyads, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism.

H8. Mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry make a similar propensity for revisionist behavior.

H9. In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism.

In Chapter 3, the details of statistical modeling for each hypothesis test are explicated, and the results of analysis are discussed in depth. It is found that empirical analysis accepts all hypotheses, although Hypothesis 7 is only weakly supported.

Chapters 4 and 5 consider what implications existing conflict-mitigating factors have for the effect of nationalistic rivalry on revisionist behavior. Chapter 4 investigates whether nuclear deterrence reduces revisionist war behavior in nationalistic rivalry, and Chapter 5 examines whether jointly democratic dyads, economic interdependence, and

intergovernmental organizations – the liberal peace elements – reduce revisionist behavior in nationalistic rivalry. In both chapters, large-N statistical analysis presents results unsupportive for nuclear deterrence and liberal peace theories, and small-N case studies of India-Pakistan, Greece-Turkey, and China-Japan illuminate causal mechanisms whereby nationalistic rivalry compromises the theoretically expected pacifying effects of nuclear deterrence and liberal peace. Since the null findings in statistical models do not automatically guarantee that there is no effect, case studies help to complement empirical analysis.

Finally, the concluding chapter sums up the arguments, notes the limitation of this thesis, discusses implications for the literature and further research, and presents policy implications for better international peace and security. Admitting that the focus of the thesis is limited, I argue that it still develops our understanding of the causality between nationalism and revisionist state behavior.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Underpinnings

This chapter presents the theoretical underpinnings for this thesis. The first section explains how revisionist states destabilize the interstate system. The second reviews the literature on interstate rivalry. The third defines nationalism and the nation, and discusses their relations with states, ethnic groups, and the interstate system. Finally, the chapter focuses on social identity theory to explain how difference in social identity results in hostility and conflict between groups.

Significance of Revisionist States in Interstate Politics

As briefly mentioned in the introduction chapter, revisionist states increase instability in the interstate system. This section explains in greater detail how they do so, to make it clear why revisionist states are problematic for international peace and security.

While quantitative research on interstate conflict usually focuses on the initiation or onset of interstate conflict, International Relations (IR) theories sometimes use the dichotomy of revisionist and status-quo states (e.g., Davidson 2006; Johnston 2003; Morgenthau 2006; Schweller 1994).[1] Revisionist states are referred to as those that are dissatisfied with the status quo in interstate politics and intend to revise it by military means. Status-quo states are defined as those which are satisfied with the status quo and are motivated to preserve it.[2] Given the above definition of revisionist states, if states

[1] Morgenthau uses "imperialist" rather than "revisionist" to describe the states which challenge the status quo of distribution of power in the interstate system.

[2] This definition parallels the one by Davidson (2006, 12-14).

seek to change the status quo only by peaceful means (such as negotiation and diplomacy), they should also be categorized as status-quo states. To avoid terminological confusion, the thesis uses “non-revisionists” as the antonym for revisionists.

It might be debatable which point of time should be regarded as the status quo to define a state as a revisionist or not. For example, if a territory used to belong to one state (e.g., a decade ago) but was annexed by another state, and if the former claimed on the territorial rights over it, it would be a revisionist in terms of the past decade but could be interpreted as a non-revisionist in reference to the time further back. The thesis assumes that the reference point of time is the situation immediately before a militarized dispute occurs. This assumption cannot avoid the problem entirely at the operational level, as the very reference point, i.e., when a militarized dispute starts and ends, might also be contested (which would raise a challenge not only to this thesis but also to the entire conflict literature). Admitting this ambiguity, the thesis relies on the existing data (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) to operationalize revisionist states in the next chapter.

Revisionist states are a source of fear for security-seeking states in interstate anarchy. Structural defensive realists argue that the security dilemma derived from the structural self-help imperative of interstate anarchy causes interstate conflict, due to fear of aggression by other states as well as uncertainty of the intentions of these states. For example, Waltz (1979, 63-64) argues that reductionist theories (i.e., those which attribute a systemic propensity for war and peace to characteristics of, and interactions between, units) would predict that, if there were more warlike states, the system would be more war-prone, and if there were more stable states, the system would be more

stable. Against this view, Waltz contends that even if all states were stable, they "would nevertheless remain insecure; for the means of security for one state are, in their very existence, the means by which other states are threatened" (64).

Waltz is correct in that he emphasizes that reductionist theories lack the viewpoint of systemic causal effects on units. However, the security dilemma cannot occur unless states know from history that some state has a revisionist aim and resorts to aggression. This is because, as Schweller (1996, 119) argues, "the concept of the security dilemma…rests on the assumption that some states are misperceived to be either currently harboring aggressive designs, or that they may become aggressive in the future." Schweller asks "why, in the absence of any history of aggressors, states would arm for security" (118). If there had never been a revisionist threatening the status quo of others in world history, there should be no idea of aggressors and, therefore, no rationale that states must be worried about aggressors. Therefore, if all states were non-revisionists, there should be no interstate conflict. History tells us that some states are non-revisionists and some are revisionists.

According to Davidson (2006, 10), the Wars of the French Revolution and of Napoleon, the Second World War, the Korean War, and the Gulf War were all "driven by revisionists." However, being revisionists does not necessarily mean being aggressors, namely initiators of conflict (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, 138-139). A non-revisionist might be an initiator of conflict with a revisionist, if the latter incited the former to take a militarized action. The fear of revisionist aggression leads the non-revisionist to resort to conflict. In short, the potential/actual presence of revisionists increases conflict among states in the interstate system, and if interstate conflict is to be mitigated, it is essential to understand the causes of revisionism.

The question is how states (and outside observers in general) perceive others as revisionists or non-revisionists. Whereas we can never be sure of what others think, behavior (namely, what they say and what they do) informs states of others' intention. Surely revisionists are not only the matter of their behavior but also that of their nature/identity. However, as Davidson (2006, 14) points out, "revisionists and status-quo seekers [non-revisionists] do not *by definition* pursue revisionist and status-quo [non-revisionist] policies" (emphasis original). Behavior is much more influential on the decision making of other states than identity, because states can perceive the presence of revisionist states and fear aggression only through seeing what others do. As long as states with revisionist *identity* do not engage in revisionist *behavior* (which can range from a verbal threat to full-scale war), they are equal to non-revisionists for other states. On the other hand, even states with the identity of non-revisionists might be perceived as revisionists by others, based on what they do (e.g., preventive war for a self-defense purpose). Therefore, the thesis distinguishes revisionist states from non-revisionist ones by their behavior.

Interstate Rivalry

Scholars on rivalry used to focus on "enduring rivalries," dyads which pass a certain threshold of temporal density of militarized interstate disputes.[3] However, recently the focus has shifted to rivalry *per se*, such as issues in dispute or states' perception, rather than a specific temporal dispute-density (e.g., Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007; Dreyer 2010, 2012; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006; Mitchell and Thies 2011; Thompson and Dreyer 2012). Issues at dispute are a necessary but insufficient condition for rivalry.

[3] For a brief summary, see Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 36-55).

Dreyer (2012, 472) states, “Rivalries are rooted in contending issue claims.” Yet, although many dyads have issues at dispute, only few of them are rivals in a conventional, military way. For example, while Japan and the United States experienced trade/currency disputes in the late 20th century, the two were not rivals in a conventional, military way. Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 25) provides a more rigorous definition of rivalry: a situation where states “regard each other as (a) competitors, (b) the source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized, and (c) as enemies.”

In this definition of rivalry, a competitor status is more complicated than it looks. Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 31-32) explain that if dyads had power asymmetry (such as Denmark-USSR in the Cold War), the weaker state would see a threat from the stronger state as being too difficult to address by itself, and the stronger would regard a threat from the weaker as being too insignificant to deal with seriously. However, Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2007, 32) also note that there are some exceptions in which rivalry emerged even in power asymmetry, and that “[u]ltimately, it depends on the decision-makers and their perceptions of sources of threat and who their enemies are.”

What these two apparently inconsistent points suggest is that a competitor status does not mean power symmetry. Power symmetry (i.e., relative power) is one factor which causes threat perception; however, so are geography and the capability of power projection (i.e., absolute power). For instance, if two states in power asymmetry were proximate to each other, that power asymmetry could be reduced by the state-sponsored insurgency of the weaker state. Although India has been more powerful than Pakistan in terms of conventional military forces, India has still felt a threat due to Pakistan’s

state-sponsored insurgency in Kashmir. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) even show that the majority of rivalries are power-asymmetrical. Thus, power symmetry is not a necessary condition for a competitor status.

In the rivalry literature, scholars have paid attention to largely two points (which are also related to each other). One is the effect of rivalry on interstate/domestic politics (e.g., Colaresi 2004; Colaresi and Thompson 2002; Mitchell and Prins 2004; Rasler and Thompson 2000; Vasquez 1996). The other is the process and dynamics of rivalry *per se* (e.g., Bennett 1996; Colaresi 2005; Cornwell and Colaresi 2002; Dreyer 2012; Goertz and Diehl 1995; Hensel 1999; Morey 2011; Rudkevich, Travlos, and Diehl 2013).[4] As will be shown in Chapter 2, this thesis firstly illustrates the causes of nationalistic rivalry and then its effects on state behavior.

It is important to emphasize that interstate rivalry and interstate conflict are different concepts. Interstate conflict is defined as an *event* in which a state resorts to a specific militarized action against another state. This definition draws on the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996; Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004), which is a widely used dataset of interstate conflict. Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996) define MIDs as "united historical cases in which the threat, display of use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state" (168) and – citing Small and Singer (1982) – war as "[w]hen militarized interstate disputes evolve, or escalate, to the point where military combat is sufficiently sustained that it will result in a minimum of 1,000 total battle deaths" (171).

[4] A recent interesting application of rivalry is the one to transnational terrorism between international rivals by Findley, Piazza, and Young (2012).

Interstate rivalry is a *situation* where states perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 25). An interstate conflict can occur outside interstate rivalry. For example, the United States and Afghanistan were too asymmetric to be rivals, but the former initiated war against the latter in 2001 after the 9.11 terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, interstate rivals may not always engage in interstate conflict. For example, India and Pakistan have been rivals since their independence from British India, but according to the MID dataset, have not engaged in armed conflict every year. Nonetheless, scholars of interstate rivalry, despite their different coding schemes, agree that a small number of rivals account for a large number of interstate conflicts (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 3; Maoz and Mor 2002, 3-4).[5] In short, rivals are a significant subset of dyads for the study of interstate conflict, especially given that, according to Wendt (1999, 314), the interstate system itself shifted from a war-dominant Hobbesian system to a limitedly conflictual Lockean system in the 17th century, initially in Europe, and now is shifting to a peaceful Kantian system. In other words, interstate rivals are the residuals, or anomalies, left behind in the shift to more peaceful systems.[6]

The concept of rivalry is significant in understanding the relationship between nationalism and interstate relations. A nationalist discourse often refers to a threatening "other" to mobilize society (Kaufman 2001; Snyder 2000). Rivalry could serve as a reference point for the governing nation of one state to interpret the intention and behavior of the counterpart of another state, not only when these states are engaged in

[5] According to the coding scheme of rivalry by Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 21), "rivals…have opposed each other in 58 (77.3 percent) of 75 wars since 1816," "41 (87.2 percent) of 47 wars" in the 20th century, and "21 (91.3 percent) of 23 wars" since 1945.

[6] See also Rousseau (2006, 232).

conflict but also when they are not fighting but still hostile to each other. In other words, rivalry captures a specific type of situation (rather than event like conflict) which could influences national decision-making in a particular way.

The literature on interstate rivalry has failed to fully theorize the relationship between nationalism and interstate rivalry. The thesis intends to theorize this relationship in the next chapter. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to understand what nationalism is, and how it causes conflict. The rest of this chapter addresses these questions.

Nationalism and the Nation

Definition

Any study on nationalism must define what it exactly means by saying "nationalism" and "nation," as "perhaps the central difficulty in the study of nations and nationalism has been the problem of finding adequate and agreed definitions of the key concepts, nation and nationalism" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994, 3-4). In addition, as Motyl (1992, 308) properly points out, "[t]he task before scholars is not to impose a uniform meaning [of nationalism] on their colleagues, which would be impossible both practically or epistemologically, but to ensure that the way *nationalism* is used in their own tests is uniform" and "[i]nternal consistency is the goal" (emphasis original). Therefore, it is imperative to define what nationalism and the nations mean in this thesis *for its own purpose*, although the meanings should not deviate too far from the ordinary ones if the thesis is to be communicative and realistic.

While nationalism is an oft-used term in discourse regarding political, social, or cultural phenomena, it is actually a daunting task to define it in a clear and consistent manner. This is because, as Motyl (1992, 307) states, nationalism is "a word that

resonates with a number of different meanings." In the Oxford Dictionaries (2014b), nationalism is defined in three ways: (1) "Patriotic feeling, principles, or efforts"; (2) "An extreme form of patriotism marked by a feeling of superiority over other countries"; (3) "Advocacy of political independence for a particular country." If we assume that the Oxford dictionaries reflect well what the term means in common usage, the problem of thinking about nationalism lies in its diverse meaning. On the one hand, the first two definitions assume that nationalism is equated with patriotism, or the feeling of loyalty and love for one's own country, with or without a feeling of superiority. This means that these definitions assume that people who hold nationalism have their own state. On the other hand, the third definition says that nationalism seeks political independence as a state. It is sure that nationalism is relevant to both existing states, such as China, Japan, Russia, or Ukraine, and stateless groups, such as Kurds, Palestinians, Kashmiris, or Scots. Hence, we need a definition of nationalism overarching these ordinary meanings in a consistent way.

To this end, the thesis builds its own definition of nationalism based on the modernist and ethno-symbolist theories of nationalism.[7] Both modernism and ethno-symbolism

[7] The thesis does not consider primordialism, which argues that nations have existed since primordial times and they are a natural form of human collectivity. Primordialism assumes that nations are out there waiting to be awakened. This assumption is problematic, because it implicitly supports the determinist view that conflict between nations is impossible to resolve due to "ancient hatred," which is widely rejected in conflict studies these days (see Cederman 2002, 414). According to Ozkirimli's (2010, 67-69) survey of the recent primordialist literature, primordialism has some merit in that it sheds different light on the interpretation of the nation and nationalism by looking at pre-modern "nations" or "nationalism." Even this new primordialist literature is not free from criticisms, however. First, its "understanding of national identities and cultures is static, at times essentialist, their account of nation formation reductionist and teleological," and it commits "the tendency to project modern concepts and

argue that nationalism seeks the self-governance of a nation. For example, modernist Gellner (2006, 1) defines nationalism as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent," and ethno-symbolist Smith (2001, 9) defines it as "[a]n ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'."[8]

Modernism and ethno-symbolism disagree on the way nations have emerged. On the one hand, modernism argues that modernization processes brought about nationalism, and nations were the product of nationalism (Gellner 2006). Gellner (2006, esp. ch.4) attributes the emergence of nationalism mainly to industrialization, Anderson (2006, esp. ch.3) to "print-capitalism," Breuilly (1993, esp. 20-21) to "modern state centralization," and Hechter (2000, esp. 24-29, 35-37, ch.4) to the "direct rule" of people and territory by the central government.[9]

On the other hand, ethno-symbolism points out that ethnicity, which had existed before nations emerged, plays an important role as a baseline in forming a nation (Smith 1991; Ozkirimli 2010, ch.5). Smith (1986, 22-30) defines ethnicity as the collective

categories onto earlier social formations" (Ozkirimli 2010, 69). Second, it remains moot whether pre-modern nations and nationalism should be treated in the same way as modern nations and nationalism (Ozkirimli 2010, 70).

[8] Derivatives of the terms nationalism and nations are used in the following senses: "national" = "relating to or characteristic of a nation; common to a whole nation" (Oxford Dictionaries 2014a); "nationalist" = a person who holds or promotes nationalism; "nationalistic" = carrying a nationalist sentiment.

[9] Quantitative empirical evidence for these modernist theories is mixed. Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) argue that their macro-historical empirical models do not support modernist theories. Meanwhile, Robinson (2014) finds from her micro-foundational empirical models that, among African states, modernization has contributed to the rise of state-based national identity.

identity of ethnic communities which are based on "a collective name," "a common myth of descent," "a shared history," "a distinctive shared culture," "an association with a specific territory," and "a sense of solidarity." Nieguth (1999, 160-161) suggests that ethnic groups may emphasize one of these criteria over the others as the basis of their ethnicity, and in terms of some remaining criteria, the members of these groups may be heterogeneous. The difference between ethnic groups and nations is that the former are cultural and social while the latter are political as well (Smith 1991, 99). As Connor (1994a, 45) argues, "a nation is a self-aware ethnic group" while ethnic groups that are not aware of their uniqueness are not nations.[10] For ethno-symbolism, nationalism transforms ethnic groups to nations rather than creating nations out of nothing.

It would be a tough task to decide whether modernism or ethno-symbolism is more valid on the origin of nations. Fortunately, this debate is not relevant to this thesis, as it focuses on the time period when nationalism has already prevailed (more details later). The important point is that, in terms of either modernism or ethno-symbolism, nationalism forms nations.

The nation is well-conceptualized by Anderson (2006, 6): as an "imagined political community." Because nationalism advocates the political norm of self-governance, a community engendered by it is also political. The nation is "imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 2006, 6). To add to Anderson's argument, the nation is *voluntarily* imagined. This is because "the nation is a self-defined rather than an

[10] The difference between Smith and Connor is that the former recognizes territorial statehood as the other basis of nations while the latter confines nations to ethnic nations. See Smith (1991) and Connor (2004).

other-defined grouping" and what the group members believe regarding the nation (e.g., the origin, nature, or destiny) do not have to be true (Connor 1994a, 37).

Because Anderson's definition of the nation is so general, there is also a danger that the concept of the nation becomes a catchall and too ambiguous to be analytically useful. For example, the European Union or the United Nations can be thought as a type of an imagined political community, but it is unusual to regard them as "nations." Other scholars suggest that either statehood or ethnicity can be the basis of nations. On the one hand, Breuilly (1993, 2) argues that nationalism is "political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments." This argument suggests that statehood shapes a national contour, given that nationalism defines nations. On the other hand, Connor (1994b, 2004) confines nations to ethnic nations; hence, he writes: "Is there a Basque, Polish, or Welsh nation? Yes. Is there an American, British, or Indian nation? No" (2004, 37). Smith (1991) provides a middle-grounded view; the basis of nations is either territorial statehood or ethnicity (82-83), or a mix of them (13).[11] The thesis relies on this middle-grounded view to define nationalism and the nation.

While the aforementioned definition of ethnicity by Smith (1986, 22-30) is more objectivist and seems to conflict with the modernist ontology, ethnicity can also be understood as a social construction like the modernist understanding of the nation. Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009, 325) defines ethnicity as "a *subjectively experienced sense* of commonality based on *a belief in* common ancestry and shared culture" (emphasis added). This constructivist definition of ethnicity indicates that the

[11] See also Brubaker (1999) and Nieguth (1999). Further discussion follows later in terms of the civic-ethnic dichotomy of nationalism.

concept of ethnicity can be harmonious with the modernist ontology of the nation as a social construction.

Drawing on the discussions so far, the thesis now defines nationalism as *the political ideology which advocates the norm that a community which is distinctive due to its territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both, should govern its own affairs* and the nation as *a community defined by this norm*. The use of both territorial statehood and ethnicity as a criterion for nationhood allows both state-owning groups and stateless groups to be considered as the advocates of nationalism and, therefore, as nations.

Six implications of nationalism in terms of this thesis need to be mentioned. First, if nationalism advocates the political norm of self-governance, it guides a political movement, as Smith's aforementioned definition of nationalism indicates. Nationalism leads to a political movement to achieve and maintain the self-governance of a socially constructed imagined political community, the nation, and national members are required to serve this nationalist objective. It is important to note that nationalism does not necessarily represent all members, as Smith's aforementioned definition of nationalism also implies.[12] In general, only parts of populations, particularly those who have power, can actually mobilize nationalism. For example, the nationalism of a dictatorial government may be mobilized only by a handful of elites in the government, and the voice of the masses may be suppressed.

Second, nation-states are a specific product of nationalism, i.e., the complete congruence of the nation and the state. Therefore, nation-states exist if and only if nationalism successfully creates them. The lack of a nation-state does not evidence the

[12] "An ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which *some* of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'" (Smith 2001, 9, emphasis added).

absence of nationalism; it may be in the process of nation-state formation. In the process of nation-state formation, nations might be seeking statehood, or might already have their own states yet be attempting to assimilate non-members and/or to incorporate members outside the state boundaries to the nation-state framework. The completion of nation-state formation does not mean the end of nationalism either. As Billig (1995) argues, nations are reproduced to maintain established nation-states in their everyday life by "banal nationalism." To further this point, banal nationalism can be observed even if the nation and the state are not completely congruent. Nationalism may cease to be active in seeking a higher degree of congruence due to some political, social, or economic constraints. In this case, banal nationalism will maintain the status quo of incomplete nation-state congruence.

Third, nationalism in itself is not a driver of conflict. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, one's pursuit of nationalism does not have to, and often does not, conflict with another's. Hence, the common belief that nationalism is dangerous is actually a biased conceptualization of nationalism. This bias may be due to people's tendency to see their own nationalism as benign patriotism and others' nationalism as malign xenophobia (Billig 1995, ch.3).

Fourth, as Billig (1995) suggests, nationalism may be inactive or forgotten once nations are satisfied with a degree of congruence between the nation and the governing unit, but once a threat to nationhood emerges, it will be awakened as a powerful political force to counteract the threat. Thus, the saliency of nationalism and national identity is, at least partly, determined in reference to a specific "other."

Fifth, the counter-principle of nationalism is internationalism: nations should not govern their own affairs but other political units which transcend national boundaries

should do. Internationalism is more likely to outweigh nationalism if individuals expect that their interest is maximized by international activities. The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 2001) is a typical example of internationalism, as it insists that the international community should intervene in states where human rights violations are going on. The interest of the advocates is to enable the international community to prevent human rights violations within states, and it requires them to overcome the non-intervention principle of sovereignty; therefore, they pursue internationalism rather than nationalism. Neither nationalism nor internationalism is a binary phenomenon; both can exist to some degree, but the degree of one's presence depends on that of the other's. In other words, when nationalism waxes, internationalism wanes; and vice versa.

Sixth, the ontological implication of nationalism is that both nations and states are not fixed but fluid entities. Nationalism defines, namely socially constructs, a nation and aims to achieve and maintain its self-governance. However, the congruence of the nation and the governing unit waxes and wanes. If the nation and the governing unit are matched, nationalism attempts to preserve it. This congruence, however, can be broken, either if some internal group constructs its own nation and seeks political autonomy, or if a state tries to annex part of another state's territory where its ethnic kin live (i.e., irredentism). This understanding of the nation and the state parallels the ontology of what Cederman (2002, 419) calls "systemic nation-constructivism," i.e., a "doubly constructivist perspective, endogenizing not only nations but also states." Both nations and states construct one another, and their boundaries are changeable. This ontological implication suggests that the concept of nationalism has significant methodological aspects, which are discussed in greater detail below.

Methodological Aspects of Nationalism and the Nation

There are two methodological points which need to be explained. First, this thesis aims to examine the causality between nationalism and revisionist state behavior and, therefore, states (and a pair of states, i.e., dyads) are the unit of analysis. States and nations (and relevantly "interstate" and "international") are often interchangeably used in IR literature but are not the same concepts. Likewise, nations are often equated with ethnic groups, although ethnic groups and states are not interchangeably used. Connor (1994b, 89) lamented this kind of a "terminological chaos" surrounding the study of nationalism. To clarify what the thesis means, I describe the definitions of ethnic groups, the state, and the nation as follows:[13]

- Ethnic group: groups who have "a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture" (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, 325)
- State: the political unit having sovereignty in the interstate system[14]
- Nation: the political community of people which believe its affairs should be governed by themselves and not by other peoples, and which are distinguishable by territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both

[13] I refer to these definitions here, because how to relate nations, ethnic groups, and states to one another is a methodological (or ontological and epistemological) choice. For example, if one took "methodological nationalism," an approach which assumes that nation-states are a natural unit of analysis, he/she would assume that a nation is equal to a state. Meanwhile, as already discussed, the thesis relies on Cederman's (2003) "doubly constructivist perspective."

[14] By sovereignty, I denote that "states [have] a right to govern themselves however they chose, free from outside interference or intervention" (Glanville 2013, 1). According to Glanville, this meaning has actually prevailed since 1945 with the establishment of the United Nations (2, 7-9). As discussed later, the temporal scope of the thesis is also the post-WWII period.

As in the case of defining nationalism and the nation, these definitions are set only for the analytical purpose of the thesis. The aim of the thesis is to study the causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior, and I do not intend to argue that the above definitions are superior to others in the literature.

Nations may or may not have their own state (*state-owning nations* and *stateless nations*). Stateless nations (such as Kurds) usually define their nationhood by ethnicity, because they do not have their own territorial statehood, but it is also possible that multiple ethnic groups seek common statehood under which all of them will compose the territorial-state nation. Because the unit of analysis in this thesis is states or dyads, stateless nations do not constitute observations in the dataset – though they could be used as a factor in explaining interstate relations (e.g., see Woodwell 2007). Hereafter, if the thesis simply refers to nations, it means state-owning nations.

State-owning nations usually use both territorial statehood and ethnicity as their national identifier in the arena of interstate politics. If there is only one ethnic group in a state, all of the nation, the ethnic group, and the state share the same boundary. This is the case where the terminological chaos "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group" (Connor 1994a) is most likely to happen.

If there is more than one ethnic group in a state, each ethnic group can become a nation in terms of ethnicity but may not necessarily match the state boundary. If only one ethnic group aligns with the state government, it is the only state-owning nation (e.g., the Han Chinese in the People's Republic of China) but its boundary still does not perfectly match the boundary of the state, because other ethnic groups occupy some space as stateless nations in the state (e.g., Tibetans and Uighurs in the case of the PRC). In this case, ethnicity (the Han Chinese) more than territorial statehood (the state of the

PRC) shapes the state-owning nation. If more than one ethnic group aligns with the state government, they compose one state-owning nation (e.g., British consisting of four ethnic groups: the English, the Scottish, the Welsh, and the Northern Irish – albeit not all people of each group, such as Scottish or Irish "nationalists," would identify themselves with the British nation). In this case, territorial statehood (Britain) more than the ethnicity of each ethnic group forms the state-owning nation, although the British territorial-state nationhood might also be able to create the British "ethnicity." Thus, it is difficult to clearly delineate purely ethnic or territorial-state nations (Brubaker 1999; Nieguth 1999), and this is why I define nations in terms of territorial statehood, ethnicity, *or both*.

Figure 1-1: Types of relations between nations and states



The squares: states
The ovals/circles and their size: nations and the level of their political power
The rounded rectangular shape: an internationalist norm

The types of relations between nations and states in the interstate system are summarized in Figure 1-1. They are ideal types, and the examples mentioned below may not necessarily match them exactly. Each of the six squares represents a state and

composes the interstate system. Each oval/circle signifies a nation, and its size represents the level of political power and not the size of the group population. The white area within states can be considered as the ethnic groups which are not mobilized to be nations, or as remote areas where no one lives. Finally, for reference purposes, the rounded rectangular shape denotes an internationalist norm, such as communism, which covers more than one nation. I explain each of the three cases from left to right.

In Case 1, the national boundaries do not go beyond the state boundaries. In the above case, a state has only one nation and, therefore, an ideal type of nation-state, such as South Korea. Multiethnic states are also considered in this category if territorial statehood forms the nation, such as the United States. In the below case, a state has two nations but the number of nations may be three, four, or more. The point is that there are multiple nations within states, but one dominates the state apparatus (i.e., the sole state-owning nation) while the other(s) is/are marginalized (i.e., stateless nations). China is close to this type.

In Case 2, the above nation is the state-owning nation in the upper state but not in the lower state. This is a typical case of irredentism. India-Pakistan is an example, as Pakistan has an irredentist cause over Kashmir, wherein Pakistani transborder ethnic kin live but are marginalized in the whole Indian state. Although the figure does not indicate the presence of marginalized nations within either of the states, it is possible.

In Case 3, one nation covers two states. This is a typical case of a national unification movement. As in Case 2, while not indicated, it is possible that these states also include minority groups, but the transstate nation dominates the government in both states. China-Taiwan is an example, as both governments claimed that one was the representative government of the whole Chinese nation.

If the state-owning nation includes more than one ethnic group, only the ethnic group which has the highest power is likely to be able to pursue irredentism and a national unification movement as the state-owning nation. If ethnic groups which are not powerful within a state attempted to pursue these foreign policies, other ethnic groups would be able to oppose and hinder such foreign policies that their success would change the balance of power among ethnic groups within the state.

The nation-state-ethnic boundaries are not static but dynamic, even though they do not change so often. For example, if an ethnic group had been part of the state-owning nation defined by the territorial statehood of multiethnic society but began to oppose the central government, it would become a stateless nation defined by ethnicity. Likewise, if an ethnic group had been part of the state-owning nation defined by the territorial statehood of multiethnic society but took over the whole government, the state-owning nation would be reframed as the nation defined by both territorial statehood and the ethnic group's ethnicity whereas the remaining ethnic groups which had also constituted the state-owning nation could become stateless nations defined by ethnicity. The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia well-describes a dynamic process of nation-state-ethnic boundary making. The Yugoslav state-owning nation was defined by the territorial statehood of Yugoslavia while including several ethnic groups, such as Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, as coalition partners. However, after President Tito died and as the Cold War was ending, the Yugoslav territorial-state nationhood began to dissolve, as many of the ethnic groups began to define their nationhood by their own ethnicity rather than the territorial statehood of Yugoslavia. Croats, Bosniaks, Slovenes, and Macedonians chose to become independent from the state of Yugoslavia whereas Serbs became the dominant nation there.

The second methodological aspect of nationalism and the nation is that the thesis focuses on the post-WWII period, because it is the distinctive time in which nationalism has been the most influential (Connor 1994b, 37-38, 173). This focus is critical to develop an understanding of the causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior for policy making nowadays. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 101) quote Anthony O'Hear (1989, 43), who writes that, although "there may be no true universal theories, owing to conditions differing markedly through time and space," "science could still fulfil [sic] many of its aims in giving us knowledge and true predictions about conditions in and around our spatio-temporal niche." King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) argue that this point "applies even more strongly to the social sciences" (101) and that "[m]ost useful social science theories are valid under particular conditions…or in particular settings" (103). A (social) scientific theory needs not be idiosyncratic to each case and can be generalized, but to the extent that the preconditions for the theory to demonstrate its conditions exist in a specific spatial-temporal domain. Therefore, if the thesis aims to develop an understanding of the causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior for policy making nowadays, it needs to draw inference from empirical observations which share a similar context of world politics to the contemporary one. In other words, it is necessary to assure the "unit homogeneity" of nationalism.

Admittedly, nationalism began to spread in the world long before the Second World War (Smith 1991, 59). In particular, since the French Revolution, states have emulated and socialized nationalism as a powerful force of war (Kadercan 2012, 404-405; Posen 1993).[15] Wimmer's (2013, 4) argument on the spread of nationalism and nation-states is

[15] Waltz (1979, 128) argues that "states will display characteristics common to competitors:

worth a lengthy quote:[16]

> Nationalism as a new principle of legitimacy emerged from Tilly's war-making Western states. Increasing state centralization and military mobilization led to a new contract between rulers and ruled: the exchange of political participation and public goods against taxation and the military support by the population at large. The idea of the nation as an extended family of political loyalty and shared identity provided the ideological framework that reflected and justified this new compact. It meant that elites and masses should identify with each other and that rulers and ruled should hail from the same people. This new compact made the first nation-states of Great Britain, the United States, and France militarily and politically more powerful than dynastic kingdoms or land-based empires because they offered the population a more favorable exchange relationship with their rulers and were thus considered more legitimate. Ambitious political leaders around the world adopted this new model of statehood, hoping that they too would one day preside over similarly powerful states. These nationalists subsequently were able to establish new nation-states wherever the power configuration favored their ascent and allowed them to overthrow or gradually transform the old regime, leading to cascades of nation-state creations that altered the political face of the world over the past 200 years.

In short, nationalism has influenced the shaping of world politics for more than two centuries.

Empirical evidence, however, also indicates the distinctive feature and significance of

namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialized to their system."

[16] "Tilly" in the quote refers to Charles Tilly.

nationalism in the post-WWII period in comparison to the previous periods. Quantitatively, first, there has been a dramatic increase in the rate of colonial dependencies becoming independent states (Strang 1990, 849-850); in other words, as Anderson (2006, 113) says, "the nation-state tide reached full flood." Second, a number of factors in explaining decolonization have different effects in the post-WWII period compared with the pre-WWII period, and a couple of such factors (the naval power of metropolitan states and self-governing institutions in the colonies) are statistically significant only in the post-WWII period (Strang 1990, 855-856).

Qualitatively, two significant (and mutually relevant) nationalist norms have been institutionalized in the interstate system. The United Nations (n.d.) has endorsed "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" (Article 1). The meaning of sovereignty that "states [have] a right to govern themselves however they chose, free from outside interference or intervention" (Glanville 2013, 1) has prevailed since 1945 with the establishment of the United Nations (2, 7-9). Furthermore, nationalism became influential even in absolute monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia (Determann 2014, esp. 104; Nehme 1994). The absolute monarchy is a "least-likely" case for nationalism to function,[17] because "Kingship organizes everything around a high centre" and "[i]ts legitimacy derives from divinity, not from populations, who, after all, are subjects, not citizens" (Anderson 2006, 19).

To recapitulate the two methodological points relevant to nationalism, the unit of analysis in this thesis is states or dyads. Nations, states, and ethnic groups are all somewhat related to one another, but are not the same things. The post-WWII period is distinctive from previous eras. The thesis focuses on it to assure the unit homogeneity of

[17] For generalization based on least-likely cases, see Levy (2008, 12).

nationalism.

Civic-Ethnic Dichotomy Reconsidered

Finally, this section discusses the oft-used civic-ethnic dichotomy of nationalism. As pointed out in the introduction chapter, nationalism can be characterized in contradictory ways to explain state behavior: a negative force of revisionist foreign policy on the one hand, and a positive force of self-defense and self-determination on the other hand. The dichotomy of "civic nationalism" and "ethnic nationalism" is the most well-known categorization to distinguish positive nationalism and negative nationalism (Brubaker 1999, 54).

Figure 1-2: Relationship of the civic-ethnic dichotomy to the thesis's definition of nationalism



The left pole: the ideal type of territorial-statehood-based nationalism
The right pole: the ideal type of ethnicity-based nationalism
The dashed line: the point nationalism is based on territorial statehood and on ethnicity equally

According to Muller (2008, 20), civic nationalism is the idea that "all people who live within a country's borders are part of the nation, regardless of their ethnic, racial, or

religious origins," and ethnic nationalism is the idea that "nations are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic ancestry." In other words, in terms of this thesis's definition of nationalism, civic nationalism is the ideal type of territorial-statehood-based nationalism (but implies the nationalism only found in democratic regimes, as pointed out later), and ethnic nationalism is the ideal type of ethnicity-based nationalism (see Figure 1-2).

It is widely accepted that civic nationalism is inclusive, liberal, democratic, and peaceful whereas ethnic nationalism is exclusive, illiberal, chauvinistic, and dangerous (e.g., Ignatieff 1993, 5-9; Muller 2008; Snyder 2000, 74, 80-82). The implication of the dichotomy for state behavior is that civic nationalism pursues a prudent, non-revisionist foreign policy while ethnic nationalism provokes a reckless, revisionist one.[18] Brubaker (1999, 57) even points out that the use of the dichotomy "is often done in an ideological mode, to distinguish one's own good, legitimate civic nationalism from the illegitimate ethnic nationalism of one's neighbors or of other polities or movements, specified or implied" (see also Billig 1995, ch.3). Thus, the civic-ethnic dichotomy is both analytically and politically utilized and has a significant influence on the understanding of nationalism.

Despite its popularity, Brubaker (1999) and Nieguth (1999, 157-164) argue that the civic-ethnic dichotomy suffers from the conceptual ambiguity and ambivalence of definitional criteria. First, as Smith (1991, 13) points out, "every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms." On the one hand, Nieguth (1999, 161-162) contends that "even if the nation is not formally defined in

[18] For example, see Snyder (2000, 82). Snyder (2000) actually argues that "revolutionary" and "counterrevolutionary" nationalisms are the most conflict-prone. I do not consider them here, since they are specific categories for Snyder's work.

terms of ethnicity, the culture of the dominant ethnic group will none the less be instituted as the norm." The United States is such an example: it "allow[s] and require[s] immigrants to assimilate into the dominant mainstream culture" (Neiguth 1999, 162). Thus, although "most often cited as paradigmatic of civic nationalism," US nationalism also "involve[s] a crucial cultural component" (Brubaker 1999, 61). On the other hand, while it is often assumed that African states lack state-territorial nationhood due to the saliency of diverse ethnic identities and interethnic competition, cross-country empirical evidence actually suggests that modernization makes state-based national identity more salient than ethnic identity (Robinson 2014). Hence, it is difficult to draw a clear line between ethnic nationalism/nation and civic nationalism/nation in empirical cases.[19]

Second, as Brubaker (1999, 64) points out, "all understandings of nationhood and all forms of nationalism are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive" and "[w]hat varies is not the fact or even the degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, but the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion." Thus, citizenship, the heart of civic nationalism, is also a form of exclusion for those who cannot obtain it (64-65). Therefore, it is implausible to attribute state behavior merely to the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of nationalism.

Third, the common usage of the concept of civic nationalism assumes democratic norms in its definition. Thus, civic nationalism "might be a proxy for democracy" (Schrock-Jacobson 2012, 838). Yet a non-democratic state can also be the framework of a nation (Brubaker 1999, 67), such as Tito's Yugoslavia (see Smith 1986, 149-150). Hostile nationalism does not have to be based only on ethnicity either. A nation can be

[19] Other cases showing the duality of civic and ethnic components of nationalism are described in Smith (1991, 102-106).

multi-ethnic but agitated to hostile nationalism against others. Likewise, ethnic nationalism does not have to be violent. A nation can be ethnically homogenous but democratic and generally peaceful. Nationalism can be hostile, whether the nation is based on territorial statehood or ethnicity.

Brubaker (1999, 62) summarizes the difficulty of classifying nationalism based on the civic-ethnic dichotomy. If only either of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism were strictly defined, few cases would fit in the stricter category and the remaining would be too heterogeneous for the other one to be analytically useful. In terms of Figure 1-2, one category would cover all range except for the pole of the other category. Meanwhile, if both civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism were strictly defined, there would be "few instances of either one and a large middle ground that counts as neither," and it would be no longer possible to "think of the civic-ethnic distinction as an *exhaustive* way of classifying types of manifestations of nationalism" (emphasis original). According to Figure 1-2, the dichotomy would not be able to cover the range apart from the two poles. Finally, if both of them were broadly defined, there would be "a large middle ground that could be classified either way, and one can no longer [think] of the civic-ethnic distinction as *mutually exclusive*" (emphasis original). In terms of Figure 1-2, the dichotomy would at best be unable to classify the middle point into either civic or ethnic nationalism and would at worst fail to differentiate a range around the middle point. For these reasons, the thesis's definition of nationalism specifies a community which is distinctive due to its territorial statehood, ethnicity, *or both*. In other words, territorial statehood and ethnicity are not a dichotomy but continuum, unlike the civic-ethnic dichotomy.

To criticize the civic-ethnic dichotomy, Shulman (2002) proposes three categories of

nationalism (ethnic, civic, and *cultural*). In his definition, cultural components of nationalism, such as religion, language, and traditions, are removed from civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism is defined only in terms of territory, citizenship, will and consent, political ideology, and political institutions and rights, while ethnic nationalism in terms of ancestry and race (559). However, this categorization also falls into the pitfall of ambiguity and ambivalence. It is doubtful that there are nations that do not promote cultural components of nationalism *at all*. Even Shulman himself argues that "an ethnic conception of the nation…logically leads to the promotion of the dominant ethnic group's culture, because…a group's common ethnic identity is expressed *through its culture*" (emphasis added). Shulman's empirical analysis also shows that both civic and cultural components of national identity are, if not to the same degrees, observed within the same states in Western and Eastern/Central European regions (562-579). Thus, ethnic, civic, and cultural categories are not mutually exclusive either, and cannot be a plausible alternative to the civic-ethnic dichotomy.

Thus far, the civic-ethnic dichotomy has been rejected as a plausible analytical tool to distinguish different implications of nationalism. Then, the question is whether it is implausible to use a dichotomy to differentiate nationalism by any means. The answer is no; it is possible to differentiate nationalism by modifying the civic-ethnic dichotomy. For example, Brubaker (1999, 67-69) proposes as a "modest alternative" to the civic-ethnic dichotomy: "state-framed" nationalism and "counter-state" nationalism. Brubaker argues that "the notion of state-framed nationhood or nationalism enables us to talk about the way in which linguistic, cultural and even (narrowly) ethnic aspects of nationhood and nationalism may be framed, mediated, and shaped by the state" (68). In

counter-state nationalism, nationhood is “conceived as distinct from or in opposition to an existing state,” and “[needs] not be conceived in ethnic terms, or even, more loosely, in ethnocultural terms” (68).

Brubaker’s typology hints at how to differentiate state-based nationalism and ethnicity-based nationalism in a coherent way. Because the democratic aspect of civic nationalism makes the concept too narrow to cover state-based nations, it is plausible to replace it with territorial statehood, whether democracies or non-democracies. Although Brubaker himself argues that counter-state nationalism needs not be conceived in ethnic terms, ethnicity is still worth focusing on in the analysis of state behavior. This is because ethnicity has been one of the major identities that conflict studies have examined in recent decades (e.g., Carment and James 1995; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Wimmer 2013; Woodwell 2007). The focus on ethnicity, however, is not a rejection of Brubaker’s proposition but a fine-tuning in terms of conflict studies.

Smith’s (1991) dichotomy of territorial/civic nationalism and ethnic/genealogical nationalism in independent states resembles Brubaker’s idea. Territorial nationalism seeks the establishment of a state where a group of people whose ethnicity is often diverse perceives themselves as a nation identified by the territorial state (Smith 1991, 82). Thus, the basis of a nation in territorial nationalism is the territorial framework of a state and, therefore, it is state-framed nationalism. Ethnic nationalism pursues the creation of an ethnonational state, where an ethnic group is congruent as a nation by including the foreign territory wherein its ethnic kin reside (Smith 1991, 83). Thus, the basis of a nation in ethnic nationalism is transstate ethnicity and, therefore, it is counter-state nationalism.

Focusing on transstate ethnic groups has merit in differentiating the effect of nationalism on state behavior for two reasons. First, previous studies have found that ethnonation-state incongruence causes interstate conflict (Carment and James 1995; Miller 2007; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Woodwell 2007).[20] In other words, the presence of transstate ethnic groups undermines the state-territorial demarcation of nationhood. Second, and more importantly, the presence and absence of transstate ethnic groups rely on a (relatively) objective criterion, i.e., states. In the case of the civic-ethnic dichotomy, the demarcating criterion is whether nations are state-based or ethnicity-based, but this causes the ambiguity because a nation *within states* can include the elements of both civic and ethnic nationhood. However, in terms of transstate ethnic groups, the demarcating criterion is whether states have an ethnic group existing beyond territorial statehood, which is much clearer to distinguish. For these reasons, the thesis contrasts territorial statehood (which may include ethnic elements domestically) with transstate ethnicity (which could cause a motivation to expand territorial statehood to cover transstate ethnic groups beyond the current state borders).

Smith's territorial-ethnic dichotomy, however, has three points to be discussed further. First, the term "territorial nationalism" might sound confusing as if it involved a territorial claim on an area outside the state framework based on transstate ethnicity, though this is actually the aim of ethnic nationalism. In Smith's definition of territorial nationalism, not ethnicity but territorial statehood is the boundary shaping national identity. This thesis slightly modifies the term to *state-territorial nationalism* for the sake of clarification.

[20] Relevantly, it has been found that ethnicity-related territorial disputes are more prone to conflict and war than other types of territorial disputes and non-territorial ones. See Vasquez (2009, 373).

Second, the term "ethnic nationalism" might also be ambiguous. According to the definition of state-territorial nationalism, the nationalism of ethnically homogenous states to seek status-quo statehood is state-territorial nationalism and not ethnic nationalism, even though the nation consists of the ethnic group. Miller (2007, 89) points out that both ethnically homogenous states and multi-ethnic states can be "[c]ongruent nation-states…in which there is a good match between the political boundaries of the state and the national loyalty of its population." Ethnic nationalism, by Smith's definition, must be targeted at ethnic kin outside the state territory. As the contrasting concept to state-territorial nationalism, the thesis uses the term "*transstate-ethnic nationalism*" rather than just "ethnic nationalism" to denote nationalism covering ethnic kin beyond state borders.

Finally, and most importantly, Smith's definition of territorial nationalism and ethnic nationalism suggests that they pursue the physical integration of a nation. On the one hand, such a pursuit is always the case in state-territorial nationalism as its basis is the territory of a state; on the other hand, it may not necessarily be true of transstate-ethnic nationalism. For example, an ethnic homeland state might not necessarily aim to annex an ethnic enclave in another state into its own territory but might only provide indirect support for its ethnic kin (e.g., Turkey's support of the partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish areas, i.e., *taksim*). Indirect support, however, also suggests the intention of the ethnic homeland state to exercise a political influence on its ethnic kin beyond state borders and, therefore, can be understood as the exercise of transstate-ethnic nationalism.

To summarize the definition of the two types of nationalism, state-territorial nationalism defines nationhood in terms of territorial statehood, and transstate-ethnic

nationalism defines nationhood in terms of transstate ethnicity. This does not mean that states concerned with transstate ethnicity do not care about their current territorial statehood. Depending on the situation, they would prioritize either transborder ethnic kin or the state for the nationalist objective of achieving and maintaining national autonomy, unity, and identity. The point is that if states have a transstate ethnic group, they are different from those that do not have such a group. Transstate-ethnic nationalism is more unique than state-territorial nationalism in the interstate system. Territorial statehood is the basis for survival of nations in interstate anarchy, while transstate ethnicity is observable only if states have transborder ethnic kin.

The definition of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms suggests that the type of nationalism of one state varies depending on its relation with another state. Saideman and Ayres (2008, 12) argue that "[n]ationalisms define who is 'us' and who is 'them.'" Nationalism does not stand alone but needs a target, since without the "other" there is no distinction between "self" and "other."

I describe a few examples to illustrate this point more clearly. First, if states do not engage in conflict, this means that they mobilize *neither* state-territorial nationalism *nor* transstate-ethnic nationalism against each other, because their nationhood is already secured in relation with the other side.[21] Second, if states are engaged in conflict, the type of nationalism they pursue differs depending on the nature of a nationalist issue at dispute. If both states have nationalist issues which do not involve transstate ethnic

[21] Of course these states may still have "banal nationalism," or reproduce their nationhood throughout everyday unnoticed national symbols, such as a national flag (Billig 1995). Banal nationalism is irrelevant here, however, since it is about an internal practice for maintaining the nation while the nationalism that this paragraph focuses on is about an external relation with other states.

groups, both pursue state-territorial nationalism against each other; if both of them have nationalist issues which involve transstate ethnic groups, both promote transstate-ethnic nationalism; and if only one side has a transstate ethnic issue and the other does not, the former pursues transstate-ethnic nationalism while the latter seeks state-territorial nationalism. Thus, the presence of a nationalist issue is a necessary condition for the pursuit of nationalism in dyadic relations, and the nature of the issue determines the type of nationalism *dyad by dyad*.

As noted before, differentiating nationalism by state territory and transstate ethnicity avoids the problems that plague the civic-ethnic dichotomy, because what distinguishes state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism is not homogenously civic or ethnic nationhood in the domestic realm like the civic-ethnic dichotomy but *state* territory and *transstate* ethnicity in the interstate realm. This point suggests that whilst nationalism frames "self" and "other," who is "other" differs depending on whether the level of analysis is interstate or intrastate politics. The distinction in the level of analysis is important to avoid confusion about the implication of nationalism at different levels of analysis. On the one hand, both state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism developed here deal with a relation between states. On the other hand, if a theory of nationalism focused on a relation between domestic actors within the same state (such as a relation between the government and a rebel group), its level of analysis would be intrastate and, therefore, a relation between a "self" and an "other" would be concluded *within the state* (e.g., the Turkish state government vs. the Kurdish separatists).

Because state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms are defined at the level of interstate relations, they do not determine by themselves how a government treats

different ethnic groups from a dominant one *within the state*. It depends on its regime type rather than the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms. For example, on the one hand, if state-territorial nationalism were combined with a democratic regime, it would be so-called civic nationalism, inclusive to various ethnic groups within a state. On the other hand, if state-territorial nationalism were utilized in a military authoritarian regime, it could result in autocratic militarism, oppressive to ethnic minorities. Furthermore, it is possible for transstate-ethnic nationalism to be observed in democratic states. In such a case, the government could be tolerant to different ethnic groups within the state, even if one of these ethnic groups were the kin of a dominant ethnic group in the target state of one's transstate-ethnic nationalism. This would be particularly likely if that ethnic group were not mobilized to oppose the transstate-ethnic nationalist foreign policy of the government. In short, the treatment of different ethnic groups at the intrastate level is a function of the regime type and domestic politics, rather than of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms. State-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms are theorized as factors determining a relation between states, not between actors within a state. The thesis supposes neither that state-territorial nationalism respects and protects the rights of all peoples inside a state, nor that transstate-ethnic nationalism necessarily creates a situation where the rights of different ethnic groups from a dominant one within a state are suppressed.

Nationalism and Social Identity Theory

As argued previously, nationalism defines a nation as a community which is distinctive due to its territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both. Hence, it delineates a group boundary between one's own nation and the remaining others. This means that relations between

nations are a specific type of intergroup relation. Therefore, social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), which explains the dynamics of intergroup relations and conflict along the line of group/social identity, has many significant implications for studying the causality between nationalism and conflict.

According to Brewer (2001, 19-20), people have a cognitive process to categorize things. Cats and dogs are categorized to animals while apples and oranges to fruits. Likewise, people categorize others to different categories, such as family, local community, ethnicity, race, and nation, thereby creating social identity. Social identity helps to establish a "secure sense of self" (Seul 1999, 556), for example, to fulfill their needs for positive self-evaluations such as the sense of belonging, self-esteem, and self-actualization (Seul 1999, 554-556), and to overcome fear of mortality by the broader spatial and longer temporal realm of a group than that of individuals (Castano et al. 2002). To enable a secure sense of self through social identity, people seek group positivity (Seul 1999, 556; Tajfel and Turner 1986, 16). To this end, they differentiate their own group (in-group) from others (out-groups), and aim to feel superiority to out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 17).

Group identity makes its members have "a collective motivation to serve the purposes and goals on which the members' individual identities, and the survival of the group, depend" (Seul 1999, 556). Group identity is not the mere sum of individual identity of the members nor is the individual identity of members the product of group identity (e.g., Hogg 1993); rather, both types of identity influence each other. This dynamic and endogenous relationship between group identity and individual identity parallels the structure-agency relationship (Giddens 1984; Archer 1995; King 2010).

National identity is a powerful social identity and persists in the long run because

nationhood has a much wider spatial and longer temporal realm than individuals (see Smith 1995, 160). Nationalism is a process whereby individuals seek their identity in and as a nation. In other words, national identity is both the cause and effect of individual identities. This endogenous relationship enables Cederman's (2002, 419) aforementioned "systemic nation-constructivism," i.e., a "doubly constructivist perspective, endogenizing not only nations but also states." On the one hand, if agents (either individuals or subnational groups) find their current national identity illegitimate and have enough power to overcome the social structure of current national identity, they will reconstruct national identity in their own way. On the other hand, if agents are satisfied with their current national identity or do not have enough power to reconstruct it, the status-quo structure of national identity will last.

Tajfel and Turner (1986, 14) argue that people disproportionately favor in-group members against out-group members, even if disfavoring out-group members does not increase the benefits of the in-group.[22] This in-group favoritism suggests that a simple cost-benefit calculation does not apply to intergroup relations, and that people see benefits in terms of "relative gains" rather than "absolute gains" when intergroup relations are present in their cognitive process.[23] In other words, groups assess what in-group members gain relative to out-group members (or what the former lose relative to the latter) not in terms of an objective, purely mathematical way, but from the viewpoint of a subjective, biased way in favor of the in-group. This process does not mean that actors are irrational and emotion-laden; they are "rational" in their own way.

[22] In-group favoritism has received empirical support from psychological experiments (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 13-14).

[23] For the relative-gain problem in International Relations, see Grieco (1990), Powell (1991), Snidal (1991), and Grieco, Powell, and Snidal (1993).

However, the pursuit of group positivity and superiority and in-group favoritism do not need to end up with *hostility* towards out-groups. If group identity and intergroup relations are perceived as stable and legitimate among all groups, no group will need to challenge the status quo (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 22) and, therefore, there will be no conflict among groups. Brewer (2001, 27) and Tajfel and Turner (1986, 23) indicate that when people perceive out-group members as a threat to their own group, they feel hostility against the out-group. The objects to which people feel a threat may be material, such as economic resources, or may be non-material, such as power, status, or cultural homogeneity (Schneider 2008; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, 318; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009, 354; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 428), as long as these objects are necessary for the good condition of one's own group.

These insights from social identity theory illustrate the causality between nationalism and hostility. Nationalism by definition categorizes "self" and "other" through national identities. Nationalism is not a sufficient condition for hostility, but it causes hostility and conflict between nations when they perceive others as a threat to their own nationhood. For example, Smith (1991, 78) argues that "[t]he virtues [nationalism] celebrates are exclusively and solely those of the 'national self', and the crimes it condemns are those that threaten to disrupt that self." Similarly, Gellner (2006, 1) writes that when the principle of nationalism (i.e., the congruence of the national and political units) is violated, it causes a nationalist sentiment of anger.

Hostility to out-groups is shaped in terms of intergroup relations, or social identities, rather than relations among individuals, or individual identities. Brewer (1991, 478) argues, "Evidence for the relative potency of group identity over personal identity is available from a number of research arenas." For example, Cikara et al. (2014)

empirically show by a neuroscientific approach that people are less likely to be morally constrained to harm others when competing as a group than when competing as an individual. In other words, hostility is more likely to escalate in an intergroup context than an inter-individual one. Meanwhile, Tajfel and Turner (1986, 8) argue that "the more intense is an intergroup conflict, the more likely it is that the individuals will behave toward each other as a function of their respective group memberships, rather than in terms of their individual characteristics or individual relationships." In short, the intensity of intergroup hostility and the saliency of group identity over individual identity constitute an endogenous relationship.

Tajfel and Turner (1986, 9) also note an important theoretical distinction between "social mobility" and "social change" to explain the relationship between individuals and groups. Both are "individuals' belief systems about the nature and the structure of the relations between social groups in their society" (9). "Social mobility" here means that individuals can move from one group to another if they are dissatisfied with the group to which they belong. "Social change" denotes the opposite: it is impossible or difficult for individuals to move from one group to another even if they are dissatisfied. If group members have more of a "social change" than "social mobility" belief system, they are more likely to present uniform behavior toward out-groups and more likely to assess members of out-groups in terms of group characteristics rather than individual ones (10-11). In other words, in the "social change" belief system, group identity rather than individual identity shapes human behavior, and individuals who do not behave according to group identity will be accused of treason (9-10). Thus, the social structure of group identity increases a tendency for group members to show solidarity with or without personal acceptance of the group's policy (McCauley 1989) and with or without

friendly relationships within the group (Hogg 1993). In short, if it is difficult for individuals to move from one group to another, intergroup competition in general and intergroup conflict in particular will create the social structure of group identity which constrains individual identity, and such a structure will overwhelm the agency of individual identity to shape intergroup relations.

Membership with the nation reflects the social change belief system rather than the social mobility one, as there are so many criteria for an individual to be qualified as a member of the nation, including both cultural and administrative aspects (e.g., language, culture, tradition, life-style, or citizenship). National members will risk being marginalized (or being killed in an extreme case) by fellow members if they act in opposition to their own nation, and because it is difficult to change their national affiliation, nationhood becomes a significantly powerful pivot of collective behavior in intergroup relations. Nationalism even enables the altruist self-sacrifice of individuals for the nation (Stern 1995).

To recapitulate, social identity theory has many implications for thinking about the causality between nationalism and conflict. The most important ones are, firstly, that nationalism causes hostility and conflict between nations if and only if they see others as a threat to their own nationhood; secondly, that national identity tends to be far more powerful than individual identity in shaping individual behavior and, therefore, if nationalism is mobilized, it results in a high possibility of collective behavior among the individual members of the nation.

One caveat is that the literature on social identity and intergroup conflict often assumes that relations are between a dominant group and a subordinate one (Tajfel and Turner 1986), such as natives vs. immigrants (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky

2006; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Schneider 2008). Meanwhile, rivals are competitors by definition, which suggests a smaller status gap. Actually, social identity theory predicts that the wider the status gap between groups, the more likely they are to accept the status quo (Brewer 2001, 25). Hence, intergroup conflict is likely to be intense in interstate rivalry. In the next chapter, the theory of nationalistic rivalry explains how intergroup relations and conflict between nations can be conceptualized as a type of interstate rivalry.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed revisionist states, interstate rivalry, nationalism, and social identity theory. The most important points of these discussions are summarized in Table 1-1. Drawing on the theoretical underpinnings discussed in this chapter, the next chapter develops the theory of nationalistic rivalry.

Table 1-1: Summary of each section of Chapter 1

section	summary
revisionist states	Revisionist states are the fundamental source of instability in the interstate system. Revisionist states are measured by their behavior.
interstate rivalry	Rivalry is the situation where states see each other as threatening and competing enemies, based on which the governing nation of one state could interpret the intention and behavior of the counterpart of the rivaling state.
nationalism and the nation	Nationalism is the political ideology which advocates the norm that a community which is distinctive due to its territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both, should govern its own affairs. The nation is a community defined by nationalism. The unit of analysis is the state or a pair of states (dyads). The nation, the state, and ethnic groups are somehow overlapped but not necessarily the same. The post-WWII period assures the unit homogeneity of nationalism in the interstate system. Nationalism is categorized to state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism.
social identity theory	Nationalism causes conflict only if nations see others as a threat to their own nationhood. National identity tends to be far more powerful than individual identity in shaping individual behavior and, therefore, if nationalism is mobilized, it results in a high possibility of collective behavior among the individual members of the nation.

Chapter 2

Theory of Nationalistic Rivalry

The last chapter has discussed the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis. The thesis now develops the theory of nationalistic rivalry. The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first and second sections respectively conceptualize and operationalize nationalistic rivalry. The third section theorizes the causes of nationalistic rivalry. The fourth section explains the causal mechanisms between nationalistic rivalry and revisionist behavior. The fifth section discusses the implications of the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms for nationalistic rivalry. The concluding section describes the summary of the arguments and hypotheses derived from the theory of nationalistic rivalry, which will be tested empirically in the next chapter.

Conceptualizing Nationalistic Rivalry

To recapitulate the definition of nationalism and the nation in this thesis, nationalism is the political ideology which advocates the norm that a community which is distinctive due to its territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both, should govern its own affairs, and the nation is a community defined by nationalism. The demarcation of a national political boundary by nationalism in turn distinguishes the national "self" from all other nations, in terms of territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both.

The norm of national self-governance indicates that nationalism as a movement aims at "attaining and maintaining the *autonomy*, *unity* and *identity* of a nation" (Smith 1991,

74, emphasis original). The absence of national autonomy means the denial of self-governance, which contradicts nationalism; the absence of national unity and identity endangers the idea (and ideal) of the distinctive community and, therefore, the foundation of the nationalism. If any of these legitimacies of nationalism is challenged, the existence of the nation (or nationhood) is threatened, because nationalism does define the nation. Therefore, national autonomy, unity, and identity (whose boundary is drawn along the line of territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both) make up the core of nationhood.

As noted in the last chapter, people differentiate an in-group from out-groups, and aim to feel superiority to out-groups. Yet, even if they feel inferior to out-groups, intergroup competition is not a necessary consequence of pursuit for group positivity (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 19-20). They might move to a superior group or find a new dimension over which they can feel superiority (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 19-20).

In the case of relations between nations, the first option is infeasible. At the individual level, national boundaries are difficult for individuals to overcome, as national belonging is deeply rooted in history, culture, and citizenship. At the group level, assimilation is an unacceptable option, because if a nation assimilates to another nation, the former loses national autonomy, unity, and identity, meaning that assimilation contradicts the very idea of nationalism. The second option is possible, as long as nations can find dimensions that do not challenge each other's senses of national superiority. For example, Japan's feeling of national superiority in baseball and New Zealand's feeling of national superiority in rugby are compatible, as baseball and rugby are different dimensions.

Groups engage in competition for superiority, if (and only if) group positivity can be

achieved only at the expense of the other (Brewer 2001, 24-26). In terms of relations between nations, competition occurs if they face an issue which makes one's desire to achieve and maintain national autonomy, unity, and identity incompatible with the same desire of the other. This is because national autonomy, unity, and identity as the core of nationhood are essential for the feeling of national superiority. If one side fails to fulfill any one of them due to the incompatibility, it means that one nation is "incomplete" relative to the other "complete" nation. Thus, it is imperative that one feels national inferiority relative to the other.

For example, in the case of contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is an issue in which Japan's nationalist aim to maintain its own national territorial integrity is incompatible with China's one to achieve its own national territorial integrity. The territorial rights of the disputed islands endow one of the two states, and only one of the two states, with its national superiority relative to the other as the legitimate governor of the islands.

In the case of Turkey-Syria, their respective national identities are related to the history of the Ottoman Empire but in a conflicting way. On the one hand, Turkey "considered itself as *the main successor state [of the Ottoman Empire]* with negative memories of Arabs" (Aras and Köni 2002, 50, emphasis added), and thought that "Arab nationalists in Damascus had once been disloyal subjects who took advantage of World War I to break free from Turkish rule" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 180). On the other hand, for Syria, "Turkey was *the residual of the former Ottoman Empire* against which Arab nationalism was first oriented" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 181, emphasis added). Thus, if the discourse of one's national identity is supported, that of the other's national identity is necessarily questioned.

In a competition over national superiority, both sides believe that one is righteous and the other is illegitimately challenging it, due to in-group favoritism. Thus, they perceive each other as a threat to their own nationhood. It was argued in the last chapter that competing groups become hostile to each other if they see each other as a threat to their own group in terms of material aspects and/or non-material ones, and this logic applies to nations as well. Therefore, in the situation of a mutual threat perception, competing nations project nationalistic hostility towards each other.

The reciprocal projection of nationalistic hostility in turn makes the matter of competition not only the feeling of national superiority but also the assurance of national security[1] from the threatening "other." Once the competition involves a security aspect, the sense of endangered national security promotes one's effort to increase the sense of national identity for in-group solidarity; this increased sense of national identity then hardens the perception of dangerous "other" for national security further, and so on and so forth. In short, the sense of endangered national security and the hardening of national identity constitute an endogenous relationship to sustain a mutual threat perception and, therefore, the reciprocal projection of nationalistic hostility.

The last chapter noted that the situation of interstate hostility can be defined as interstate rivalry – the situation where states perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 25). Given the theoretical

[1] "Security" here denotes physical security. Although the meaning of security is sometimes broadened to denote psychological stability, I stick with the narrower meaning. This is because in IR, national security is usually assumed to be physical security from military threats and, therefore, using the term to denote both physical and psychological security could cause confusion.

mechanisms between group identity and hostility illustrated by social identity theory in the last chapter, this threat-competitor perception is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for identifying reciprocal nationalistic hostility and conceptualizing nationalistic rivalry.[2]

Yet, it is also the case that even among the rivalry dyads identified by Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007), some experience more militarized disputes than others. The presence of "dispute-proneness" is theoretically distinctive from its absence in terms of social identity in general and national identity in particular. It indicates that identification between "self" and "other" is so salient that conflict rather than cooperation becomes routine. As I briefly noted in the introduction chapter, what constitutes "dispute-proneness" may not be so clear-cut. Instead of newly conceptualizing dispute-proneness, I refer to Klein, Goertz, and Diehl's (2006) rivalry data in order to operationalize nationalistic rivalry later. It is sure that among rivalry dyads specified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), some period of dispute-prone relationships might be not due to national identity but because of different social identities. Rather, the period of dispute-proneness specified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) suggests hardened identification between states along the line of some social identity during this time period, and this characteristic should also apply to national identification where nationalism becomes relevant in rivalry. In short, in terms of nationalism, both threat-competitor perception and dispute-proneness are necessary to capture nationalistic rivalry in a consistent manner.

Finally, not all interstate rivalries develop *nationalistic* hostility. Rivalry holds

[2] The perception of threat and competitor is sufficient to suggest enemy perception (i.e., threatening opponents in competition are enemies) and, therefore, I shorten it to "threat-competitor" perception for the sake of brevity.

nationalistic hostility if and only if states are competing over a *nationalist issue*, i.e., an issue which makes it possible for only one of the rivals to complete the nationalist project of achieving national autonomy, unity, and identity. If states are competing over the sphere of influence beyond national borders, it reflects internationalism, and the sense of superiority is established based on an internationalist identity (e.g., the leader of communism, a region, or the world). In such a case, rivalry is due to an *internationalist issue*, i.e., an issue which makes it possible for only one of the rivals to complete an internationalist objective (e.g., capitalism vs. communism in the Cold War, or competition for regional/global hegemony).[3] Meanwhile, nationalism seeks to achieve and maintain the governance of *one's own national affairs* based on territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both, and consequently generates national identity along the lines of a national political boundary. Hence, the sense of superiority is based on national identification vis-à-vis other nations.

It might be argued that even apparently internationalist issues are actually the result of nationalism, because such issues could also threaten national security whereas a successful internationalist movement could contribute to the improvement of national security and the feeling of national superiority. Three counter-arguments to this criticism are possible.

First, such a catch-all argument makes the concept of nationalism unhelpful for analysis. If a concept means anything depending on interpretation, any hypothesis derived from it will be unfalsifiable. For a concept to be useful for analysis, it must clearly demarcate what it captures and what it does not. Hence, if nationalism is to be a

[3] To avoid confusion, "international" in this thesis denotes "between/among nations" and not "between/among states."

useful concept to study state behavior, its scope must first of all be clearly defined. Only by doing so can we assess the utility of a concept by empirical analysis. To demarcate the conceptual boundary of nationalism, it is helpful to contrast nationalist issues with internationalist issues.

Second, the criticism confuses the cause and the effect. Internationalist issues could *lead to* the sense of threat to national security and/or successful internationalist movements could *result in* the improvement of national security and the feeling of national superiority. However, these points do not automatically mean that these internationalist issues and movements are *caused by* the states' pursuit of national autonomy, unity, or identity.

Third, to establish that nationalism is the main driver of rivalry, there must be some explicit evidence of a nationalist issue in the rivalry, because nationalism enables people to feel national identity and act collectively as the nation. Put differently, even if one could argue that an internationalist issue was actually caused by nationalism in a catchall way (which is problematic in itself as pointed out above), but if the society perceived the issue as an internationalist one anyway, not nationalism but internationalism would be the factor which leads people to behave collectively as the state (and not as the nation). As will be explained later, the causal mechanism between nationalism and revisionist behavior is based on the *nationalist* logic of mobilizing a society towards a specific collective action as the nation through the medium of the state. Hence, rivalry must be explicitly over nationalist issues to be nationalistically charged rivalry.

In short, nationalistic rivalry is defined as the situation where dispute-prone states perceive each other as a threatening and competing enemy due to a nationalist issue. It

is a specific subset of interstate rivalry. Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson's (2007) definition of rivalry (threat-competitor perception) provides a necessary condition for identifying interstate hostility; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl's (2006) definition of rivalry (dispute-proneness) indicates a distinctive level of identification between "self" and "other"; and the dichotomy of nationalism and internationalism differentiates nationalistic rivalry from non-nationalistic rivalry. The criterion of dispute-proneness might not be seen as a necessary condition for nationalistic rivalry. Rivalry could be due to a nationalist issue without dispute-proneness. However, the theory of nationalistic rivalry focuses on dispute-prone dyads, because separating dispute-prone rivalry dyads from those which are not makes sure to capture a distinctive level of national identification between "self" and "other." National identification in the rivalry dyads which are dispute-prone and face a nationalist issue is expected to be more salient than in those which are not dispute-prone and experience a nationalist issue. The latter type of rivalry might be conceptualized as proto- or semi-nationalistic rivalry. I leave this task for future research.

The conceptual elements of nationalistic rivalry are graphically illustrated in Figure 2-1. The horizontal solid lines denote a time span and the vertical dashed lines denote the period of nationalistic rivalry. In Case 1, threat-competitor perception and the presence of a nationalist issue match each other while dispute-proneness has a shorter span. In Case 2, dispute-proneness has a longer span than threat-competitor perception and the presence of a nationalist issue. In Case 3, all elements have different lengths of time whereas in Case 4 all have the same one. In every case, nationalistic rivalry is considered as present if and only if all three factors are observed during the same time period.

Figure 2-1: Variation in identifying nationalistic rivalry



Horizontal solid lines: time span
Vertical dashed lines: period of nationalistic rivalry

Nationalistic rivalry is a contextual factor to capture the causal effect of nationalism. Since nationalism is a belief, it is inherently impossible to observe directly and can be only inferred from some proxies. Nationalistic discourse, nationalistic behavior, and nationalist profiles often serve as such proxies but have limitations. First, the absence of these proxies does not guarantee the absence of nationalism. If someone said or did something nationalistic one day and did not another day, would this mean that he/she held nationalism the previous day but not the other day? If someone declared that he/she is no longer a nationalist, would it be plausible to believe? Second, these proxies are

conditioned by a context. Waltz (1979, 61) argues that "[f]rom attributes one cannot predict outcomes if outcomes depend on the situations of the actors as well as on their attributes." Depending on the situation, "as peacemakers may fail to make peace, so troublemakers may fail to make trouble" (Waltz 1979, 61), and so "nationalists" may fail to make nationalistic discourse or behavior, or even to be nationalists. Thus, rather than behavior, discourse, or profiles, this thesis primarily measures nationalism and nationalistic hostility by a contextual factor of nationalistic rivalry.[4]

It might be questioned whether merging rivalry and nationalism into one single concept, i.e., nationalistic rivalry, makes it impossible to distinguish the effect of nationalism from that of rivalry on the probability of revisionist behavior. This concern, however, arises out of the misunderstanding of the theory of nationalistic rivalry. The concept of nationalistic rivalry does not measure the effect of rivalry on the probability of revisionist behavior in general. Rather, it is a specific type of interstate rivalry, capturing the situation where (state-owning) nations are engaged in competition *over a nationalist issue* and, therefore, see each other as threatening and competing enemies *along the line of national identities*. Hence, it is incorrect to argue that nationalistic rivalry cannot distinguish the effect of nationalism from that of rivalry on the probability of revisionist behavior, because it does not aim to do so.

Operationalizing Nationalistic Rivalry

The last section has conceptualized nationalistic rivalry by specifying the following three elements between states: threat-competitor perception, dispute-proneness, and

[4] Other examples of capturing nationalism by contexts are incomplete democratization by Mansfield and Snyder (2005) and ethnonation-state incongruence by Woodwell (2007).

nationalist issues. Although it is possible to create data of nationalistic rivalry out of scratch, at least threat-competitor perception and dispute-proneness can be measured by existing datasets (whereas the identification of nationalist issues needs new coding and its detail is explained later).

First, the article has argued that Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007) define rivalry as the situation where states perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies. They also created a dataset of rivalry through the identification of this threat-competitor perception at the government level, in reference to comprehensive historical literature on foreign policy (28-36).[5] They admit that their data are subject to contestation but also contend that so are other conflict data (29-30). They expect that "[t]he most likely source of error lies in omissions of rivalries about which we know very little in the corners of the globe that are not well covered by historians or journalists" (36), which may be the case in conflict data in general. At least the number of citations of their project suggests a good level of intersubjective agreement among scholars.[6] Thompson and Dreyer (2012) – an up-to-date version of Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007) – also provide rivalry narratives for those rivalry cases, thereby allowing third-parties to check the robustness of the data. I also read these narratives in the process of identifying nationalist issues as explained later, and made a few modifications when I had good justification in terms of the theory of nationalistic rivalry.[7] In short, I primarily relied on Thompson and Dreyer (2012) to measure the element of threat-competitor perception

[5] Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 35) say that "[t]he list of references exceeds some fifty pages."

[6] According to Google Scholar as of April 26, 2015, a project article, Thompson (2001), is cited 269 times and Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007) 119 times.

[7] Those modifications are described in the rivalry narratives in Appendix B.

but also scrutinized their validity.[8]

Second, as for dispute-proneness, as mentioned before briefly, the article relies on Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006, updated to ver. 5.20), which operationalize rivalry by the presence of more than one militarized dispute per dyad with issue linkage. Their dataset is more objective than Thompson and Dreyer (2012) in that it relies on the arguably most widely used dataset of interstate conflict, the MID dataset. While there are other rivalry datasets using dispute-proneness as a definitional criterion (see a review by Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 36-71), Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) are the most up-to-date. The popularity of their project is also apparent from the number of citations.[9]

If Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) capture threat-competitor perception and dispute-proneness respectively, the intersection of these two rivalry datasets can be used to identify both threat-competitor perception and dispute-proneness in the same dyads. While Thompson and Dreyer (2012) cover the period of 1494-2010 and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) that of 1816-2001, only the post-WWII period (1946-2001) is considered for the reason discussed in Chapter 1 (i.e., for the unit homogeneity of nationalism in the interstate system). The list of all rivalries during this period in these datasets is available in Appendix A.

[8] A potential alternative approach might be the measurement of foreign policy similarity between states, based on alliance portfolios, UN voting, or trade (e.g., Signorino and Ritter 1999). However, foreign policy similarity is insufficient to capture threat-competitor perception. Even if states do not share similar foreign policy, it does not automatically mean that they perceive each other as threatening *and* competing enemies. They might see each other as threats but not as competitors or vice versa.

[9] According to Google Scholar as of April 26, 2015, an older version of their project, Diehl and Goertz (2000), is cited 464 times and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) 179 times.

If the end year of a rivalry in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) is sometime between 1987 and 2001, and if the end year of the counterpart in Thompson and Dreyer (2012) is after 2001, I checked whether there occurred some other incident after 2001 which could be qualified as one of the militarized actions according to the codebook of the MID dataset (Ghosn and Palmer 2003).[10] In Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), rivalries are identified based on the series of MIDs with an issue linkage, and the timing of rivalry termination is at the year when the last MID ends. However, this criterion may be problematic if a rivalry is ongoing after 1986. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl's (2006) data are based on the MID data ver. 3.10, whose temporal scope is up to 2001; yet another militarized dispute may have occurred after 2001, or the last MID in a rivalry may have been ongoing after 2001.

It is debatable to determine how long a period should be to confirm that a rivalry has terminated before another militarized dispute would have occurred. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) themselves are ambiguous about this point.[11] To determine whether a militarized dispute after 2001 extends the period of rivalry, I adopted the threshold of 15 years – the maximum number of years to qualify the rivalry as terminated in Klein,

[10] As of May 22, 2013.

[11] There are at least three conflicting claims on rivalry termination in their data. First, an issue linkage rather than a temporal proximity is a primary matter to decide rivalry continuation. Therefore, if two disputes are within 10-15 years (a criterion of rivalry in Diehl and Goertz's [2000] data) but their issues are not related, they may not be considered as rivalry (338). Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) also state that the 10-15 year rule to decide a rivalry end year "is at odds with our new coding rules…, in which some rivalries continued even though they experienced periods of 15+ years without a dispute" (338-339). Second, Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) state that "the end of the last MID is the last 'behavioral manifestation' of rivalry," and "consider[s] the rivalry to have ended in the 10-15 years after this time" (339). Finally, their actual data coding indicates that rivalry terminates at the end of the last MID, rather than sometime in the 10-15 years after it.

Goertz, and Diehl (2006, 339) – and the presence of an issue linkage. In short, if a rivalry is ongoing beyond 1986 in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) as well as after 2001 in Thompson and Dreyer (2012), and if it is found that a militarized dispute related to issues in the rivalry occurs after 2001 within 15 years since the end year specified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), its rivalry year is considered ongoing beyond 2001.[12] For example, the end year of the China-Japan rivalry is set as 1999 in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), which is the end year of the last MID in the dyad (MID #4180). However, in Thompson and Dreyer (2012) it is coded "ongoing" after 2001, and expert/news sources also report that disputes on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have occurred within 15 years since 2001 (for examples, see the case study of China-Japan in Chapter 5). These events are considered as the evidence of rivalry continuation after 1999, making the Sino-Japanese nationalistic rivalry coded as ongoing after 2001.

Once the intersection of Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) identified the dyads with threat-competitor perception and dispute-proneness, I referred to Thompson and Dreyer's (2012) rivalry narratives to examine whether rivalry includes specifically a nationalist issue, i.e., an issue which makes one's desire to achieve and maintain national autonomy, unity, and identity incompatible with the other's. Among all rivalry issues in the intersection of the two rivalry datasets, nationalist issues were non-ethnic territorial disputes (e.g., China vs. Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands), transstate ethnic issues including irredentism, national unification, and transstate ethnic leadership (e.g., Greece vs. Turkey over Cyprus, China vs. Taiwan for national unification, and Iraq vs. Egypt for Arab leadership), conflicting

[12] This method "upgrades" Ethiopia-Eritrea in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) from an isolated conflict to a rivalry.

national identities (e.g., Turkey vs. Syria over the history of the Ottoman empire), and sub-conventional insurgency warfare (e.g., Uganda vs. Kenya over mutual rebel supports). This list of nationalist issues is not a theoretical guide for coding; it is a finding from coding.

Non-ethnic territorial disputes question the national superiority of the legitimate governor of a territory. A challenger sees a target territory illegitimately owned by the rival, and demands that territory should be "returned" to its original national owner. Meanwhile, a target state perceives the challenger making an illegitimate claim on its own national territory. Thus, these states experience rivalry over contending nationalisms framed by territorial statehood. An example is the aforementioned China-Japan rivalry over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Not all territorial disputes are a nationalist issue. Competition between great powers over colonial territory was motivated by internationalist imperialism rather than by the nationalist principle of territorial integrity. Such territorial disputes were not observed in the data, however, and all disputed territories were proximate to the rivaling states' own territory,[13] which suggests that the disputes were over national territorial integrity.

Transstate ethnic issues create incompatibility over the nationalist norm between states in three respects. First, if only one side has a transstate ethnic claim against the rival, the former's nationalism is based on transstate ethnicity whereas the latter's is based on territorial statehood. The ethnic homeland state supports transborder ethnic kin to advance its nationalist norm that the ethnically defined nation should govern its own affairs and should not be governed by another government. As in the case of territorial

[13] Proximity was checked by Google Maps (accessed October 13, 2014, https://www.google.ie/maps/).

disputes, the target state perceives this transborder ethnic support as a threat to its national unity. For example, Pakistan has provided assistance to Kashmiri militants for a long time as it believes that India's part of Kashmir should belong to Pakistan, whereas India has seen it as a threat to its national unity defined by territorial statehood. Second, if both sides have transborder ethnic kin in some other state, they mutually seek an irredentist policy in the third state and engage in an ethnic proxy conflict. For example, Greece and Turkey have supported their respective ethnic compatriots in Cyprus, where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots engaged in violent ethnic conflict. Third, if both sides have a transstate ethnic claim based on the same ethnic group, they compete over which is the "real" nation who should govern all ethnic members. China and Taiwan used to mutually claim that one is the real Chinese nation and the other should be unified. Iraq and Egypt would compete for Arab leadership in the Middle East as contending Pan-Arab nationalists. The presence of transborder ethnic kin is not a sufficient condition for the identification of nationalist issues. It must be framed as a topic of rivalry at the government level.

Conflicting national identities usually derive from history which is relevant to, but has different implications for, rival nations. The aforementioned Turkey-Syria rivalry is such an example. Finally, sub-conventional warfare through mutual rebel support, such as the case of the Uganda-Kenya rivalry, threatens each other's national autonomy in governing one's own affairs.

The above types of issue are not mutually exclusive but rather are often related to each other. For example, the extreme forms of irredentism and national unification movement require the annexation of outside territory, thereby making territorial disputes between rivals as well. Sub-conventional warfare often develops along the lines of

transstate ethnicity. Conflicting national identities are occasionally caused by incompatible territorial claims.

Even if specified by the intersection of Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), rivalry is not coded as nationalistic rivalry in the following cases. First, if only one side supported rebels against the rival (e.g., Democratic Republic of the Congo [Zaire] vs. Angola), it was not coded as nationalistic rivalry unless some other nationalist issue exists. This is because in such a case, it cannot be said that states are rivals due to incompatible desires for achieving national autonomy, as only the target state faces the problem of national self-governance while the rebel-supporting state does not.

Second, if rivalry issues were internationalist ones, it was not coded as nationalistic rivalry, as internationalism is the opposite of nationalism. Among all rivalry issues in the intersection of the two rivalry datasets, internationalist issues were contending internationalist ideologies (e.g., the US-Soviet rivalry over liberal capitalism vs. communism) and competition for regional/global influence (e.g., the Soviet-China rivalry over Asian regional leadership[14]) which did not have any transstate ethnic aspect (i.e., China-Taiwan rivalry for national unification or Egypt-Iraq rivalry for Arab leadership are coded as nationalistic rivalry due to their transstate ethnic aspect). In those cases, rivalry developed over competing ideologies beyond national borders.[15]

If rivalries had more than one issue, they were coded as nationalistic rivalry when

[14] The Soviet-China rivalry is coded as nationalistic rivalry after territorial disputes began in 1963. See its narrative in Appendix B.

[15] Appendix B lists and describes the rivalries that are identified by the intersection of Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) but not coded as nationalistic rivalry, and explains why.

they had at least one nationalist issue, as nationalism is a more powerful political ideology than internationalism.[16] As Breuilly (1993, 68) points out, "the self-reference quality of nationalist propaganda and the theme of the restoration of a glorious past in a transformed future has a special power which it is difficult for other ideological movements to match."

In short, the data of nationalistic rivalry are to some extent overlapped with, but not the same as, existing categories of rivalry, such as territorial (Vasquez 2009; Thompson and Dreyer 2012), dispute-prone (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006), threat-competitor (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007; Thompson and Dreyer 2012), and positional, ideological, or interventionary (Thompson and Dreyer 2012). Nationalistic rivalry is often territorial rivalry but also includes non-territorial rivalry based on other types of nationalist issue. Nationalistic rivalry is dispute-prone and involves threat-competitor perception, but not all dispute-prone rivalries or threat-competitor rivalries are nationalistic rivalry. Positional, ideological, and interventionary rivalry is nationalistic rivalry only if its rivalry issue is a nationalist one.

The data of nationalistic rivalry specifically record the presence of transstate ethnic issues, as the presence of transborder ethnic kin is known as a distinctive factor in explaining the effect of nationalism on interstate conflict (Miller 2007; Woodwell 2007; Carment and James 1995; Gokcek 2011; Huibregtse 2010; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Van Evera 1994, 12, 14-15, 17-18, 22; Wimmer and Min 2006, 874-875, 891). As transstate ethnic issues are the nationalist issue that involves one's ethnic kin outside its state territory, it is assumed that the area which the government of a state controls with

[16] Those having both a nationalist issue and an internationalist one are Russia (Soviet Union)-China from 1963, China-India, Libya-Sudan, Yemen People's Republic-Oman, Morocco-Algeria, and Uganda-Tanzania.

or without interstate recognition is inside the state framework.[17] How to identify ethnic groups in general (Weidmann, Rød, and Cederman 2010) and transstate ethnic ties in particular (Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009, 421-422, 433) are certainly topics of a controversy. Here, transstate ethnic issues are identified if states resort to a transstate cultural, religious, or racial tie (all of which can constitute ethnicity) as a *political* boundary. The rationale is that states are unlikely to politicize such a tie, particularly in the form of interstate conflict, unless it matters for the ethnic aspect of their own nationhood.

Because the unit of analysis in the dataset is a dyad-year, if a transstate ethnic issue lasts less than six months within a year, it is ignored. This may miss some nuance; however, this kind of problem is not specific to this dataset but any dyad-year datasets (e.g., in the annual data of regime type, if a state were a democracy only for five months within a year, should it be coded as a democracy?). The exception for this rule is the change of territorial configurations during armed conflict. In these cases, territorial configurations are often temporary and unstable because of the repeated attempts of occupation and retrieval between conflicting states, thereby making it more difficult to decide in which side of territory an ethnic group exists. Therefore, the change of territorial configurations is ignored during armed conflict, and the original territorial configuration is used for identifying the side having a transstate ethnic issue. Only after the end of armed conflict, is it assumed that the control of the area is established and the new territorial configuration is used for coding. Finally, if a transstate ethnic issue disappears at a dyad-year during the ongoing years of nationalistic rivalry, it is coded as

[17] It must be noted that the thesis has no intention to make a political claim for specific states that a disputed territory should belong to one's sovereignty.

present at that year and as absent from the following years.

There are a few ambiguous cases to code the presence and absence of transstate ethnic issues, mainly because of the lack of sufficient information. In these cases, a possible alternative way of coding is also recorded for robustness checks.

Table 2-1 is the list of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. Dyad IDs in the first column consist of the smaller one and the larger one of the Correlates of War (COW) state code of two states. The second column is the name of the nationalistic rivalry. The third column specifies the rivalry periods, and “ongoing” means whether a nationalistic rivalry is ongoing after 2001. Nationalistic rivalry specifically focuses on the post-WWII period and, therefore, the earliest year for observing nationalistic rivalry is 1946. In the fourth column, the presence of transstate ethnic issues is recorded for each state in the dyads. The description and coding decision of all nationalistic-rivalry dyads are available in Appendix B.

Table 2-1: List of nationalistic-rivalry dyads

Dyad ID	Nationalistic rivalry	Period	Transstate ethnic issues
91092	Honduras-El Salvador	1969-1992	El Salvador
91093	Honduras-Nicaragua	1957-1961	neither
100101	Colombia-Venezuela	1982-2001[ongoing]	neither
101110	Venezuela-Guyana	1966-1999	neither
130135	Ecuador-Peru	1946-1955	neither
		1977-1998	neither
155160	Chile-Argentina	1952-1984	neither
160200	Argentina-United Kingdom	1976-1983	neither
210850	Netherlands-Indonesia	1951-1962	neither
230600	Spain-Morocco	1957-1975	Morocco
260265	German Federal Republic-German Democratic Republic	1961-1971	German Federal Republic
325345	Italy-Yugoslavia	1946-1947	both
		1948-1954	Italy
339350	Albania-Greece	1946-1949	Greece
		1994-1996	Greece
344345	Croatia-Yugoslavia	1991	Yugoslavia
		1992-1995	both
		1996-2000	Yugoslavia
344346	Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992-1996	Croatia
345346	Yugoslavia-Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992-1994	Yugoslavia
345355	Yugoslavia-Bulgaria	1946-1947	Yugoslavia
350355	Greece-Bulgaria	1946-1947	Bulgaria
350640	Greece-Turkey	1958-2001[ongoing]	both
355640	Bulgaria-Turkey	1946-1950	Turkey
365710	Russia-China	1963-1989	neither
371373	Armenia-Azerbaijan	1992-1994	Armenia
		1994-2001[ongoing]	Azerbaijan
432439	Mali-Burkina Faso	1974-1986	neither
452461	Ghana-Togo	1961-1963	both
		1964-1966	Ghana
		1966-1994	neither

Dyad ID	Nationalistic rivalry	Period	Transstate ethnic issues
471475	Cameroon-Nigeria	1981-2001[ongoing]	neither
483620	Chad-Libya	1976-1979	Libya
		1983-1987	Libya
		1988-1994	neither
490500	Democratic Republic of the Congo-Uganda	1996-2001[ongoing]	neither
490517	Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda	1996-2001[ongoing]	Rwanda
500501	Uganda-Kenya	1987-1995	neither
500510	Uganda-Tanzania	1971-1979	neither
500625	Uganda-Sudan	1968-1972	neither
		1994-1999	Uganda
		2000-2001[ongoing]	neither
501520	Kenya-Somalia	1963-1981	Somalia
516517	Burundi-Rwanda	1964-1966	Burundi
520530	Somalia-Ethiopia	1960-1985	Somalia
522531	Djibouti-Eritrea	1996-2001[ongoing]	neither
530531	Ethiopia-Eritrea	1998-2001[ongoing]	neither
530625	Ethiopia-Sudan	1967-1982	Sudan
		1983-1997	both
531625	Eritrea-Sudan	1994-1999	both
541560	Mozambique-South Africa	1983-1984	both
		1985-1987	South Africa
551552	Zambia-Zimbabwe	1965-1979	Zambia
551560	Zambia-South Africa	1968-1987	Zambia
600615	Morocco-Algeria	1962-1984	Morocco
620625	Libya-Sudan	1973-1984	Libya
620651	Libya-Egypt	1975-1985	both
625651	Sudan-Egypt	1991-1996	Sudan
630645	Iran-Iraq	1958-2001[ongoing]	both
630670	Iran-Saudi Arabia	1984-1988	both
630700	Iran-Afghanistan	1996-1999	Iran
640652	Turkey-Syria	1955-2001[ongoing]	neither

Dyad ID	Nationalistic rivalry	Period	Transstate ethnic issues
645651	Iraq-Egypt	1959-1962	both
		1990-1999	both
645652	Iraq-Syria	1976-1991	both
645666	Iraq-Israel	1948-1998	Iraq
645670	Iraq-Saudi Arabia	1968-2001	both
645690	Iraq-Kuwait	1961-2001	neither
651663	Egypt-Jordan	1948-1962	both
651666	Egypt-Israel	1948-1989	Egypt
651670	Egypt-Saudi Arabia	1962-1967	both
652663	Syria-Jordan	1949-1951	Jordan
		1952-1957	neither
		1958-1982	Syria
652666	Syria-Israel	1948-2001[ongoing]	Syria
663666	Jordan-Israel	1948-1949	Jordan
		1950-1966	neither
		1967-1973	Jordan
670679	Saudi Arabia-Yemen	1994-1998	neither
680698	Yemen People's Republic-Oman	1972-1982	neither
700770	Afghanistan-Pakistan	1949-1974	Afghanistan
		1975-1996	both
710713	China-Taiwan	1949-1991	both
		1992-2001[ongoing]	China
710740	China-Japan	1996-2001[ongoing]	neither
710750	China-India	1950-1987	neither
710816	China-Vietnam	1975-1977	neither
		1978-1986	China
		1987-1991	neither
731732	North Korea-South Korea	1949-1960	both
		1961-2001[ongoing]	North Korea
750770	India-Pakistan	1947-2001[ongoing]	Pakistan
811816	Cambodia-Vietnam	1976-1979	both
811817	Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam	1956-1967	Cambodia
816817	Vietnam-Republic of Vietnam	1960-1975	both

Despite the use of Klein, Goertz, and Diehl's (2006) rivalry data, it is possible that the whole period of nationalistic rivalry does not observe any dispute. It might sound contradictory with the theory of nationalistic rivalry (which requires dispute-proneness as a conceptual element), and I explain why it is actually consistent with the theory in detail here.

Figure 2-2: Nationalistic rivalry without any dispute



Horizontal solid lines: time span
Vertical dashed lines: period of nationalistic rivalry
White circles: onset of militarized disputes

The whole period of nationalistic rivalry without any dispute could be observed, if the period of rivalry specified by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and that of nationalist issues are much shorter than that of Klein, Goertz, and Diehl's (2006) rivalry; or if rivalry identification in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) is mostly based on disputes before 1946. Figure 2-2 illustrates an example. While the dyad is considered as dispute-prone, nationalistic rivalry is observed without any dispute due to the short

period of the nationalist issue. According to the last section, the whole period of dispute-proneness (*P* in Figure 2-2) indicates hardened identification between "self" and "other" along the line of some social identity during this time period. The last section has also noted that the indication of salient identification by dispute-proneness should also apply to national identification when nationalism becomes relevant in rivalry (*p*, which is a subset of *P*, in Figure 2-2). Hence, if dyads are dispute-prone for period *P* *and* if they face a nationalist issue for period *p*, hardened identification between "self" and "other" becomes the matter of national identities during *p*. In other words, dispute-proneness does not have to be established only within the period of nationalistic rivalry in order to capture a distinctive level of national identification between "self" and "other."

The limitation of the coding scheme of nationalistic-rivalry dyads is that one of its coding criteria, dispute-proneness, makes coding retrospective. This limitation results in potential case exclusion. In other words, the current coding scheme cannot include the dyads which have engaged only in one dispute, but which will have experienced another dispute within fifteen years following the year of the first dispute in the future.[18] Only if we could know what will happen in the future, would it be possible to code all nationalistic-rivalry dyads. This limitation, however, should have a minimum effect on the current dataset, because its temporal scope is up to 2001. As explained before, as of May 22, 2013, I checked whether there occurred a militarized dispute after 2001 in the dyads which are coded as rivalry by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) but not by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) due to their reliance on the MID dataset ver. 3.10. In other

[18] This problem is not only of nationalistic rivalry but also of dispute-density rivalry approaches in general.

words, eleven and a half out of fifteen years after 2001 were taken into consideration to remedy the retrospective nature of the data.

Causes of Nationalistic Rivalry

The conceptual definition of nationalistic rivalry in the first section of this chapter points out that nations experience reciprocal hostility when they engage in competition for national superiority to others. Such a situation occurs when nations have a nationalist issue which makes one's desire to achieve and maintain national autonomy, unity, and identity incompatible with that of another. What conditions cause such incompatibility and, therefore, nationalistic rivalry? This section theorizes this point, which is the first phase of the thesis's causal mechanism between nationalism and revisionist behavior (see Figure 2-3).

Figure 2-3: First phase of the thesis's causal mechanism between nationalism and revisionist behavior



The black objects denote the focus of this section

First, if states in a dyad are ethnically heterogeneous, the dyad is more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry. If society is mobilized along the line of diverse ethnic groups, the central government is unable to achieve state-based nation-building and, therefore, to establish the competitive military for survival in interstate politics (Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012; Posen 1993). The sense of national superiority in the interstate system "can unify a country's population and loss of [such] status can have the opposite effect" (Sambanis and Shayo 2013, 310). Hence, in a highly ethnically heterogeneous society, the government uses nationalism for national unity. This action increases national identification vis-à-vis others and strengthens the sense of the difference between "self" and "other" in the interstate system.

The intensification of national identification in the interstate system in turn hardens in-group favoritism. In such a situation, a minor disagreement or dispute is more likely to escalate to a significant nationalist issue. Thus, an ethnically heterogeneous society creates an environment where nationalistic rivalry is more probable to emerge (Sambanis and Shayo 2013, 320).

At the dyadic level, only if both states in a dyad are ethnically heterogeneous are they likely to experience nationalistic rivalry. If only one state in a dyad is ethnically heterogeneous, the other state does not have to promote nationalism as much as the ethnically heterogeneous counterpart and, therefore, is able to be more flexible in dealing with a dispute than simply reciprocating hostility. If both states must be ethnically heterogeneous to develop nationalistic rivalry, it is necessary to look at the absolute level of ethnic heterogeneity in a less ethnically heterogeneous state in the dyad.

Hypothesis 1: The higher the absolute level of ethnic heterogeneity in a less ethnically heterogeneous state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry.

In terms of intrastate conflict, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009, 317) argue, "Rather than high degrees of diversity, it is ethnic exclusion from state power and competition over the spoils of government that breed ethnic conflict." Yet, in terms of interstate conflict, the ethnic heterogeneity of society itself increases the necessity of the government to promote nationalism for state-based nation-building, whether multiple ethnic groups are included in or excluded from state power, because either way the government is under pressure to keep national unity. In the case of multiethnic powersharing,[19] the senior partner ethnic group gives political rights to the junior partner counterparts ("carrot") whereas in the case of multiethnic authoritarian systems, the dominant ethnic group oppresses the other groups ("stick"). If the government fails to keep national unity in terms of territorial statehood, both cases can cause a secessionist movement, as have been seen in the powersharing regime of the United Kingdom or Spain or in the authoritarian regimes of China or Russia. Divided society in turn makes the central government ineffective to mobilize the military power for survival in the interstate system. In short, whether multiple ethnic groups are included in or excluded from state power, a highly ethnically heterogeneous society motivates the government to promote nationalism for national unity.

In addition to ethnically heterogeneous society, the aforementioned existing theories

[19] I rely on Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009, online appendix) regarding the definition of powersharing: "any arrangement that divides executive power among leaders who claim to represent particular ethnic groups. Such an arrangement can be either formal, as in Lebanon, or informal, as in Switzerland."

on nationalist conflict, i.e., nationalist political competition and ethnonation-state incongruence, provide two potential causes of nationalistic rivalry. The nationalist political competition explanation expects that domestic political instability causes nationalist mobilization provoking conflict with other states (Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000; Gagnon 1994/95). When domestic politics is unstable, elites resort to nationalist discourse as a strategy to attract popular support. For that purpose, they describe some other state as a threat to nationhood. For example, they might claim that some other state is lusting for part of its own territory and, therefore, is a threat to national unity and autonomy. Such a nationalist rhetoric creates a nationalist issue in the interstate arena. At the dyadic level, for the same reason as in the case of ethnically heterogeneous society, only if both states in a dyad use this kind of nationalist discourse are they likely to develop nationalistic rivalry. Thus, it is necessary to measure the absolute level of political instability in a more politically stable state in a dyad.

Hypothesis 2: The higher the absolute level of political instability in a more politically stable state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry.

It is argued that ethnonation-state incongruence increases the probability of irredentism and national unification movements, thereby causing interstate conflict (Miller 2007; Woodwell 2007; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Van Evera 1994, 12, 14-15, 17-18, 22; Wimmer and Min 2006, 874-875, 891). On the one hand, if states in a dyad have transborder ethnic kin in the other side, they are more likely to pursue transstate-ethnic nationalism in order to complete the goal of national self-governance. On the other hand, being the target of transstate-ethnic nationalism also poses a threat to

national autonomy, unity, and identity. If part of one's national territory were governed by the government of another nation, neither national autonomy nor unity would be fulfilled, which could in turn endanger the sense of national identity. Hence, ethnonation-state incongruence creates a nationalist issue between states.

As states are not ethnic groups, it is necessary to consider exactly what condition is necessary for an ethnic group to pursue transstate-ethnic nationalism through the state apparatus. I focus on power holder ethnic groups, i.e., the ethnic groups who monopolize or dominate national politics, or those who are senior partners in a powersharing regime.

Hypothesis 3: If the power holder ethnic group of the state has transborder ethnic kin in another state, the dyad is more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry.

The ethnic groups who are junior partners in a powersharing regime are not taken into consideration. It is reasonable to expect that junior partners have less power to pursue their irredentist/national unification foreign policy than senior counterparts in a powersharing regime. Senior partners are likely to oppose such a policy, because if the annexation of irredenta or national unification were successful, it would change the ethnic power balance in the regime in favor of the junior partners. Meanwhile, even if the junior partners oppose the senior partner's transstate-ethnic nationalist policy, the senior partner is still able to pursue it due to its relative advantage in the powersharing regime, thus either ignoring or suppressing the opposing junior partners.

If there is more than one senior partner, ethnonation-state incongruence is likely to matter only when these senior partners share the same transborder ethnic kin. If senior

partners in a powersharing regime do not share the same transborder ethnic kin, the pursuit of an irredentist/national unification foreign policy by one senior partner is likely to be opposed by other senior partners. The latter senior partners have no moral motivation for such a policy due to the lack of an ethnic tie, whereas they would fear that the success of such a policy would change the ethnic power balance in the powersharing regime in favor of the former senior partner. Faced with opposition from other senior partners, the senior partner seeking an irredentist/national unification foreign policy might either give up such a policy, or hijack domestic politics to end the powersharing regime and to pursue its transstate ethnic policy, in which case that group is no longer regarded as a senior partner but as a dominant ethnic group.

Nationalistic Rivalry and Mobilization towards Revisionist Behavior

Nationalistic rivalry captures the interstate context where states project nationalistic hostility towards each other. However, hostility itself does not automatically result in revisionist behavior. Hence, some mechanism is necessary to connect nationalistic hostility to revisionist behavior. This section explains how nationalistic rivalry leads society specifically to revisionist behavior, which is the second phase of the thesis's causal mechanism between nationalism and revisionist behavior (see Figure 2-4).

Figure 2-4: Second phase of the thesis's causal mechanism between nationalism and revisionist behavior



The black objects denote the focus of this section

In domestic politics, both elites and masses are able to mobilize society by nationalism (Kaufman 2001, 27-38). First, as for elite-led nationalist mobilization, as the nationalist political competition explanation indicates, elites seek a nationalist mobilization for their political survival (Gagnon 1994/95; Kadercan 2012; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000).[20] Political survival can be in terms of either domestic politics or interstate politics (or both).

In terms of domestic politics, elites attempt to divert the attentions of constituencies from domestic issues to foreign issues, such as an external threat to nationhood from the rival, in order to gain and maintain popular support (Mitchell and Prins 2004). These elites use, or purposively create, nationalistic hostility among the masses against the rival, to depict themselves as those who can protect their own nation and, therefore,

[20] By "elites," I mean not only leaders but also other high-ranking political/military figures.

should remain in office. It might look counterproductive at first glance that elites seek to remove a threat from the rival, because this threat is the source of their popular support. However, after making the rival a central political issue in society, elites must in turn resolve this issue to enable a political achievement. Because diversionary use of nationalism increases nationalistic hostility against the rival, if elites could not address a threat from the rival, it would be seen as a diplomatic failure and would be counterproductive for political survival. Hence, elites would have to seek to remove a threat from the rival. For example, if elites persuaded the masses to believe that the rival's control of the ethnic enclave is illegitimate, then they would have to address this issue by annexing that enclave.

In terms of interstate politics, if elites believed that the rival is a threat to their nationhood, they would provoke nationalistic hostility among the masses to mobilize them for a revisionist attempt to remove the threat.[21] A threat to nationhood could also be a threat to the political survival of elites, because these elites might lose power if the rival interfered with national self-governance.

In short, for domestic or interstate political survival, nationalism is a powerful tool for elites to use in mobilizing the masses, whether those elites are true believers in nationalism or not (see also Connor 1994b, 76). An example of elite-led mobilization for domestic political survival is Serbia's use of nationalistic hostility against Croatia and Bosnia in the Yugoslav war in the early 1990s. Serbian elites manipulated domestic politics to win political competition by emphasizing a threat to the Serbian nation from these neighboring states (Gagnon 1994/95). An example of elite-led mobilization for

[21] Protecting the nation does not mean protecting all people. Under the name of protecting the whole nation, some minorities might be sacrificed.

interstate political survival is Pakistan against India. Fearing that "India is waiting to undo partition by taking over Pakistan at some later stage" (Pande 2011, 19), Pakistani elites have appealed to Islam-based nationalism to mobilize the masses for conflict with India (Pande 2011, 21-22; Paul 2006, 614).[22]

The masses can also mobilize nationalism.[23] If they spontaneously felt a threat to their nationhood from the rival, they would pressure their government to remove the threat for peaceful everyday life. To gain and maintain popular support, even dovish elites would follow this mass-led mobilization to show their determination and capability of protecting the nation. Otherwise, they would risk being overthrown by those masses or other hardline political competitors who would mobilize the public instead (Colaresi 2004). In mass-led mobilization, if the elites demonstrated weak attitudes and could not deal with the nationalistic hostility of the masses to the external threat, they would risk being treated as a "traitor" to the nation – which was unthinkable in the age of dynasty (Anderson 2006, 85) and characteristic in the age of nationalism. Faced with mass-led mobilization, elites in the age of nationalism would be either compelled to act as hardliners or be taken over by other hardliners. In other words, mass-led mobilization is the other side of the same coin as elites' political survival in terms of domestic politics. In short, forcing moderate elites to be hawkish or allowing hardline nationalists to hijack politics, the masses would lead the government to adopt revisionist policy in order to address a threat from the rival.

[22] Paradoxically, "most Indian leaders have accepted partition and the existence of Pakistan" (Pande 2011, 30), although minority Hindu right-wing nationalists in India have made claims concerning the undoing of the partition (56). Thus, Pakistan's subjective suspicion plays a powerful role to shape its fear of being absorbed by India.

[23] By "masses," I mean those who are not elites.

An example of mass-led mobilization is China's anti-Japan nationalism among the masses, typically over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese government has needed to take a hardline policy in face of disputes with Japan, in order to prevent the masses who hold hostile anti-Japan nationalism from criticizing the regime and doubting its legitimacy (He 2007, 6-11, 14).[24] The Chinese government "fears the force of public opinion being used by anti-authority elites to defy its rule, and chooses to co-opt rather than suppress the popular sentiment" (He 2007, 19).

To recapitulate, either the elites or the masses can initiate nationalist mobilization. Once initiated, however, both types of mobilizations can go hand in hand to reinforce one another. If elites initiate nationalist mobilization, it creates the threat perception of the rival among the masses, which in turn leads to mass-led mobilization constraining the policy choice of elites since the masses will punish dovish attitudes and favor a hardline policy. If the masses kick off nationalist mobilization, it gives elites an opportunity (if hawks) or an imperative (if doves) for elite-led mobilization. An important implication is that both elites and masses can use, and be influenced by, nationalism, unlike the common assumption that elites take advantage of nationalism while the masses are manipulated by such elites (see also Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012, esp. 193). As discussed in Chapter 1, nationalism is a social structure which constrains individual behavior, whether these individuals are the elites or the masses. More specifically, nationalistic rivalry institutionalizes nationalist mobilization towards revisionist behavior in domestic politics.[25]

[24] Ironically, the overt expression of Chinese anti-Japan feeling was originally accelerated by the Chinese government's nationalist policy to increase regime legitimacy since the early 1980s (He 2009). For more detail on this, see the case study of China-Japan in Chapter 5.

[25] Blumer's (1958) group position theory posits a similar line of argument: "even though given

The structural effect of nationalism for a specific collective action (here, revisionist state behavior) is particularly powerful in the case of nationalistic rivalry, because a threat perception increases national identification in society along the line of the righteous "self" vis-à-vis the threatening "other." To quote Tajfel and Turner (1986, 8) again, "the more intense is an intergroup conflict, the more likely it is that the individuals will behave toward each other as a function of their respective group memberships, rather than in terms of their individual characteristics or individual relationships." Thus, under the condition of nationalistic rivalry, nationalist mobilization is more likely to be successful in shaping national collective behavior and leading the state to a revisionist attempt against the rival. In short, as Brewer (1991, 479) argues, "the collective self dominates the individuated self."

It might be questioned why states seek to change the status quo by a military means rather than through a peaceful method. I argue that the Prisoners' Dilemma is working in the case of nationalistic rivalry. States engaged in nationalistic rivalry are reluctant to cease threatening each other and reach a rapprochement by peaceful means for following reasons. If a state proposed negotiation, it would signal to the rival that it does not intend to behave aggressively. However, the state must also consider that if the rival were a real aggressor, it would take advantage of its conciliatory attitude and become even more threatening (Prins and Daxecker 2008, 24). This concern causes negotiation to be seen as implausible, even if both sides know that cooperation is better than conflict (Kelman and Fisher 2003, 316).

individual members may have personal views and feelings different from the sense of group position, they will have to conjure with the sense of group position held by their racial group" (5). If "racial group" is replaced with "national group," the argument clearly resembles what the thesis posits here.

The mistrust of the rival and the optimism of military success are derived from the combination of in-group favoritism and nationalist mobilization. Group members (here national members) significantly underestimate “the threat posed by their own group toward the other” (Brewer 2003, 113). An implication is that they believe their own position vis-à-vis the rival is righteous and justifiable. In addition, nationalist mobilization creates the image that the rival is “more threatening than it really is yet more easily defeated by united opposition than the true probabilities may warrant” (Snyder 2000, 50). In short, both sides in nationalistic-rivalry dyads hold a biased, chauvinist thought that their own nation is righteous and stronger while the rival nation is threatening but weaker. Locked in this chauvinist thought, society believes that it is more plausible to change the status quo by a military means than by a peaceful means.

In short, it can be expected that states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry.

Hypothesis 4: If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry.

The above hypothesis is a structuralist approach to comparing nationalistic-rivalry dyads with other dyads regarding a revisionist propensity. Meanwhile, it has been theorized that the social structure of nationalistic rivalry allows for elite-led and mass-led nationalist mobilization in society, thereby leading the state to revisionist ambition. Thus, it is also possible to formulate the following causal-mechanistic hypotheses.

Hypothesis 5: If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to nationalist mobilization than those without such rivalry.

Hypothesis 6: If states have a higher level of nationalist mobilization within nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior.

State-Territorial and Transstate-Ethnic Nationalisms in Nationalistic Rivalry

The last chapter established the dichotomy of state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism as an alternative to the civic-ethnic dichotomy. To recapitulate the reason for categorizing nationalism, it is for distinguishing the positive and negative aspects of nationalism. In other words, the dichotomy of state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism must differentiate a propensity for revisionist behavior if it is to be a useful analytical concept for this thesis.

At first glance, it might seem obvious that transstate-ethnic nationalism is more prone to revisionist behavior than state-territorial nationalism, given the previous finding that ethnonation-state incongruence increases the likelihood of revisionist conflict (Miller 2007; Woodwell 2007). Since ethnonation-state incongruence is a necessary condition for transstate-ethnic nationalism, it seems that transstate-ethnic nationalism is more revisionist-prone, whereas state-territorial nationalism favors the status-quo as its national boundary is already defined by the existent state framework.

However, it is also possible to reason that this initial thought may not always be the case. If a state pursuing state-territorial nationalism concluded that the only way to resolve the nationalist issue is to conquer the threatening rival, it would take a revisionist policy of invading it. If a state pursuing transstate-ethnic nationalism just

supported the status quo of ethnic kin in another state by political/economic assistance rather than annexing them by force, it would be status-quo seeking rather than revisionist-oriented. Thus, the issue of whether transstate-ethnic nationalism is really more revisionist-prone than state-territorial nationalism requires more consideration.

As explained in the last chapter, it is a necessary condition for one's mobilization of nationalism vis-à-vis another in dyadic relations that states experience incompatible desires to achieve and maintain national autonomy, unity, and identity; and the nature of a nationalist issue at dispute determines the type of nationalism dyad by dyad. Nationalistic rivalry captures such a condition.[26] For example, if a state aims to annex an ethnic enclave in another state but the latter shows no compromise on territorial integrity, the former state's transstate-ethnic nationalism conflicts with the latter state's state-territorial nationalism.

The two types of nationalism generate three types of nationalistic rivalry: *mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry*, *mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry*, and *state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry*. In mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry, both states in a dyad seek state-territorial nationalism. For example, nationalistic rivalry between two states claiming territorial rights without any transstate ethnic aspect, such as China-Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, is mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry.

In mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, both states in a dyad pursue transstate-ethnic nationalism due to a transstate ethnic issue. The nature of transstate ethnic issues can vary depending on contexts. Ethnic kin might reside in each other's

[26] Nationalistic rivalry may not be the sole condition for identifying the presence of a nationalist issue at dispute in dyadic relations. However, it is a condition where such an issue is most likely to result in revisionist behavior.

areas, or in an outside area such as a third-party state's territory or an unsettled/disputed area. The power holder ethnic group of the states either can be different (e.g., Iran-Iraq) or the same one which competes for ethnonational leadership (e.g. North Korea-South Korea).[27]

In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, one state in a dyad seeks state-territorial nationalism and the other pursues transstate-ethnic nationalism. The state-territorial nationalism side perceives the transstate-ethnic nationalism side as a threat to nationhood in terms of the existing state framework while the latter regards the former as a threat to nationhood in terms of transstate ethnicity. As in mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, the ethnic kin of the transstate-ethnic nationalism side would reside in the rival's area, or in an outside area such as the third-party state's territory or an unsettled/disputed area. India-Pakistan over Kashmir is a typical example of the former case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. The latter case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry may need an additional explanation. In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, the state-territorial nationalism side might be worried about the transstate-ethnic nationalism rival's support of ethnic kin, even if they do not reside in its own area. This is because the state-territorial nationalism side might fear that its nationhood would be even more threatened, if the transstate-ethnic nationalism rival were able to create a

[27] For a similar line of argument, see Woodwell (2007). Woodwell theorizes that, in transborder nationalism, "irredentist-type dyads contain a unilaterally revisionist (homeland state) and, by a unilaterally defensively oriented (kin state), while the states within contending government dyads are better characterized as both bilaterally revisionist and defensively oriented" (34-35). The weakness of this categorization is that it misses dyads containing mutually revisionist-irredentists. For example, the Greece-Turkey nationalistic rivalry is largely over their respective ethnic kin in Cyprus.

stronger national tie with transborder ethnic kin and became more powerful.

Does the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms matter in differentiating a propensity for revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry? This question can be answered at both monadic and dyadic levels of analysis. In terms of the monadic level of analysis, state-territorial nationalism should be less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism. Transstate-ethnic nationalism actors feel more fear than state-territorial nationalism actors over their nationhood. This is because ethnic kin outside the state territory are more vulnerable to aggression from a rival than the population within the state territory. The rival could harass, discriminate, or even ethnic-cleanse the ethnic kin. State-territorial nationalism actors are more secure than transstate-ethnic nationalism actors, because their people live within the state territory and, therefore, can be defended more easily. For instance, if state-territorial nationalism actors feel a threat from a rival, they can enhance security by fortifying the borders, which would be impossible in the case of ethnic kin outside state territory. Hence, within nationalistic rivalry, state-territorial nationalism actors should be less inclined to resort to revisionist behavior.

Hypothesis 7: In nationalistic-rivalry dyads, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism.

In terms of the dyadic level of analysis, however, the implications of the dichotomy are more complex. The nature of dyadic interaction suggests different dynamics between the symmetrical dyads of mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry and the asymmetrical dyad of

state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry.

In the symmetrical cases, because both sides share the same type of nationalism, they can anticipate what the other side thinks and feels, and have some degree of certainty about the other's intention. In the case of mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry, both sides know the other does not feel as much threat as transstate-ethnic nationalism actors. As a result, they tend to take advantage of the other's overconfidence in defending the nation. Meanwhile, in the case of mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, both sides know that the other feels grave concerns about its ethnic kin and, therefore, can expect that conflict will easily escalate to war. Consequently, they are likely to engage in revisionist behavior only at a strategically appropriate moment and avoid reckless adventures. In other words, the dyadic strategic interaction of state-territorial nationalism (which is expected to be less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism at the monadic level) makes dyads as likely to resort to revisionist behavior as that of transstate-ethnic nationalism (which is expected to be more prone to revisionist behavior than state-territorial nationalism at the monadic level).

Hypothesis 8: Mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry make a similar propensity for revisionist behavior.[28]

[28] I phrase the hypothesis in this way rather than as the null hypothesis, because the difference between two continuous sizes of effect (here, an effect to change the probability of revisionist behavior) can be very close to, but cannot be, zero and therefore the null hypothesis (i.e., the difference of effect sizes = zero) can never be true (Frick 1995, 133). However, given the prior common belief that ethnic nationalism is dangerous while civic nationalism is peaceful, a *similar* propensity for revisionist behavior between state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism would be by itself a novel and counter-intuitive finding.

If this hypothesis is the case, what is deduced from the monadic argument is that a differentiated propensity for revisionist behavior should be observed only in state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. Here, the dyadic interaction is asymmetrical. The state-territorial nationalism side seeks to resolve a nationalist issue in terms of the existing state framework, whereas the transstate-ethnic nationalism side aims to do so in terms of transstate ethnicity.

The transstate-ethnic nationalism side is expected to be more prone to revisionist behavior than the state-territorial nationalism side, because the former feels more fear than the latter. As already noted, ethnic kin outside state territory are more vulnerable to aggression from a rival than a people within state territory. Although this point is the case in transstate-ethnic nationalism states for both mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry and state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, the symmetrical and asymmetrical nature of dyadic interactions differentiates its consequence.

In the case of mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, both states know that the other side has fear over its ethnic kin and conflict could easily escalate. Hence, they would be more careful to handle transstate-ethnic nationalist claims than transstate-ethnic nationalism states in state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. In the case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, the transstate-ethnic nationalism side would fear aggression on their ethnic kin by the state-territorial nationalism rival, which is less vulnerable to aggression than the transstate-ethnic nationalism side. In turn, because the transstate-ethnic nationalism side is more likely to resort to revisionist behavior, the state-territorial nationalism counterpart has fewer opportunities to pursue its revisionist aim to resolve the

nationalist issue. More resources are spent on defense than on offense, because it is a primary imperative to have enough defensive capabilities and protect the state and counteract the transstate-ethnic nationalism rival's revisionist aggression. Therefore, the state-territorial nationalism actor in state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry is less likely to engage in revisionist behavior than the transstate-ethnic nationalism counterpart. In short, because of its asymmetrical nature, state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry dyads demonstrate the asymmetric tendency of revisionist behavior.

Hypothesis 9: In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism.

Conclusion

This chapter has first of all theorized and operationalized nationalistic rivalry. Nationalistic rivalry captures the situation where dispute-prone states perceive each other as a threatening and competing enemy due to a nationalist issue. Then, the chapter has discussed the causes and effects of nationalistic rivalry, which are summarized as nine hypotheses in Table 2-2. Those hypotheses are tested empirically in the next chapter.

Table 2-2: List of hypotheses

Hypothesis 1	The higher the absolute level of ethnic heterogeneity in a less ethnically heterogeneous state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry.
Hypothesis 2	The higher the absolute level of political instability in a more politically stable state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry.
Hypothesis 3	If the power holder ethnic group of the state has transborder ethnic kin in another state, the dyad is more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry.
Hypothesis 4	If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry.
Hypothesis 5	If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to nationalist mobilization than those without such rivalry.
Hypothesis 6	If states have a higher level of nationalist mobilization within nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior.
Hypothesis 7	In nationalistic-rivalry dyads, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism.
Hypothesis 8	Mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry make a similar propensity for revisionist behavior.
Hypothesis 9	In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism.

Chapter 3

Empirics of Nationalistic Rivalry

The previous chapter has formulated nine hypotheses from the theory of nationalistic rivalry. This chapter empirically examines these hypotheses in order. For the list of all hypotheses, see Table 2-1 in the concluding section of the last chapter.

Empirical Analysis of the Causes of Nationalistic Rivalry

This section conducts the empirical analysis of Hypotheses 1-3, i.e., the causes of nationalistic rivalry. The first part explains a research design. The second displays and discusses the results of the analysis.

Research Design

The dependent variable is nationalistic rivalry, coded 1 if a dyad is engaged in nationalistic rivalry in a year; 0 otherwise. The data of nationalistic-rivalry dyads cover the period of 1946-2001, and to control for the endogeneity of simultaneity bias, the observations one year ahead (t+1) are used. The unit of analysis is non-directed dyad-years, as nationalistic rivalry is a non-directed dyadic phenomenon.

The explanatory variables of interest are as follows. As discussed in the previous chapter, according to the definition of nationalistic rivalry, states must mutually project hostility towards each other and, therefore, the source of nationalistic hostility must be observed in both states. Hence, societal causes are measured by the observation of a theoretically less nationalistic side in dyads in the unit of analysis of non-directed

dyad-years.

Ethnically heterogeneous society is measured by the number of politically relevant ethnic groups (PREGs) within states, according to the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). As Hypothesis 1 indicates, a smaller number of PREGs in dyads is used to identify a less ethnically heterogeneous side. Ethnic groups are politically relevant where "at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena, or…members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics" (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, 325). Thus, it can capture the ethnic division of domestic politics which causes the government to promote nationalism for national unity, unlike a mere ethnic demography which might just reflect cultural plurality and not a political division. The EPR data suppose that there is no PREG in the "countries or specific periods in which political objectives, alliances, or disputes were never framed in ethnic terms, thus avoiding using an ethnic lens for countries not characterized by ethnic politics, such as Tanzania and Korea" (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, online appendix). In such cases, the number of PREGs is coded zero, where there is no ethnic heterogeneity which causes the government to promote nationalism. This situation is different from the one where there is only one PREG but politics is still characterized by the ethnicity of the PREG.

Political instability is measured by the Polity 2 score (complete autocracy = -10, complete democracy = 10) and its squared term (Marshall 2013). Following Hypothesis 2, a larger score in dyads is used to capture the level of political instability in a more politically stable side. A more autocratic than democratic society has higher political instability, because competition for political survival tends to be more serious in that

losers could be expelled from a country or be killed. However, this effect of regime type is supposed to diminish as it approaches complete autocracy, where leaders have enough power to maintain their regime (Gates et al. 2006). Thus, the larger Polity 2 score measures the linear effect of regime type (autocracy vs. democracy) and its squared term captures the concave effect of regime type (complete autocracy, inconsistent regime, complete democracy). The expectations are, firstly, that if the larger Polity 2 score has the same absolute number, dyads whose larger Polity 2 score is a negative number are more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry than those whose larger Polity 2 score is a positive number; and, secondly, that if the squared term of the larger Polity 2 score is bigger, dyads are less likely to experience nationalistic rivalry.

Ethnonation-state incongruence is coded 0 if there is no ethnonation-state incongruence in a dyad; 1 if the ethnic group who is the power holder of one state in a dyad has ethnic kin in the other state; 2 if the power holder ethnic group in both states has its transborder ethnic kin in the other side.[1] The data of ethnonation-state incongruence are created based on the specification of transborder ethnic kin in Cederman et al. (2013) utilizing the EPR dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). The EPR dataset identifies not only ethnic demography but also power relations among ethnic groups in domestic politics. Therefore, it can measure the effect of

[1] The last chapter has defined power holder ethnic groups as those who monopolize or dominate the government or who are senior partners in a powersharing regime. Even if the EPR dataset regards an ethnic group as politically irrelevant due to the lack of ethnic politics in the domestic arena but if that group is the only ethnic group within the state (e.g., Koreans in South/North Koreas or Germans in Germany), I code it as the power holder ethnic group. The target transborder ethnic kin are identified, whether politically relevant or irrelevant in the domestic politics of the target state. This is because the political irrelevance *within the target state* does not mean that *the homeland state* has no political interest in the kin; the homeland state might have a motivation to politicize its kin by an irredentist foreign policy.

ethnonation-state incongruence on interstate relations better than a mere ethno-demographic variable, because while the ethnic majority is often the power holder of states, there are also some cases where an ethnic minority holds the executive office (e.g., Saddam Hussein's Iraq as the regime of minority Sunni). If there is more than one senior partner, ethnonation-state incongruence is coded 1 only when these senior partners share the same transborder ethnic kin, as discussed in the last chapter. According to Cederman et al.'s (2013) data, only Pakistan and Israel are such cases during the period of 1946-2001.

The control variables are as follows. The literature on diversionary use of force has examined whether an economic downturn increases the probability of leaders' use of conflict for a rally-round-flag effect (e.g., Oneal and Tir 2006). This point is empirically tested by the average of the growth rate of GDP per capita in the previous two years (Oneal and Tir 2006, 763). To correctly compare GDP per capita over time, the real price by 2000 US dollars is used. Data are from GDP and population data 5.0 beta (Gleditsch 2002). If a state in the dyad has experienced economic decline, it might be more likely to promote nationalism for a diversionary purpose. Since the unit of analysis is non-directed dyad-years whereas economic growth is a societal factor, a larger economic growth rate in a dyad is used to measure a theoretically less nationalistic side. I expect, however, that an economic decline is not a significant cause of nationalist foreign policy, and political instability is a more fundamental cause. Consolidated democracy can discourage the government from resorting to reckless diversionary nationalist foreign policy, because a diverse public opinion is adequately reflected. For example, Japan had a general election in December 2014, after economic policy called Abenomics failed to benefit the majority of the population. Despite a

technical recession in the last quarter of the year, the Party for Future Generations, the far-right nationalist party, lost 18 seats out of the 20 that it had before the election, whereas more left-leaning parties, such as the Democratic Party of Japan and the Japan Communist Party, increased the number of seats. Fully democratic society of Japan did not allow far-right nationalists to hold a greater sway on national politics even under the condition of economic difficulty. Actually, the literature on diversionary use of force admits that the theory "has not received consistent empirical support" (Sobek 2007, 29).

Standard realist conflict factors are also controlled for. The distance between states is measured by miles between the capitals, or another important city, of two states in a dyad. It is calculated by EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000a) utilizing the COW Direct Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al. 2002) and then transformed to the natural logarithm to increase the normality of the distribution.[2] The absolute power of a weaker side in a

[2] The binary measure of contiguity is also often used as a geographic predictor of conflict and rivalry in the literature. I do not include it here for two reasons. First, contiguity and distance are, by definition, conceptually overlapped things (and do not constitute causality) and, therefore, should not be included together (Ray 2003, 15-19). Second, distance is a more nuanced measure of geographic effect on interstate interaction, as it is a continuous measure. If contiguity is used instead of distance, the results do not change, except that the smaller number of PREGs in dyads becomes statistically insignificant in predicting nationalistic rivalry. It is unlikely, however, that contiguity is a confounder of an ethnically heterogeneous society, as it is difficult to imagine how the contiguity between two states changes the number of PREGs in these states. Rather, it is more likely that an ethnically heterogeneous society increases contiguous states. An ethnically heterogeneous society is more likely to be partitioned along ethnonational lines, but partition usually does not achieve ethnically homogeneous states but creates new ethnically heterogeneous states by leaving a fraction of various ethnic groups in the partitioned states (e.g., India and Pakistan after the partition of British India, or Balkan countries after the partition of the Ottoman Empire). Then, contiguity increases the chance of ethnic territorial disputes, thereby resulting in nationalistic rivalry. Thus, contiguity is an intervening variable between ethnically heterogeneous society and nationalistic rivalry and, therefore, should not be

dyad is measured by a smaller Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987) in a dyad (hereafter, "the smaller capability"),[3] which is transformed to the natural logarithm to increase the normality of the distribution.[4] These two variables measure the possibility of interaction between states. Rivalry should emerge only if states can interact with each other.

Finally, the effect of dyadic power relationships is measured by the capability ratio, or the ratio of the weaker state's CINC to the stronger state's CINC, which is transformed to the natural logarithm to increase the normality of the distribution. Power transition theory (Organski and Kugler 1980; Levy 1998, 148) suggests that a closer power gap between states should provoke hostility between states and cause interstate rivalry.

In order to control for the temporal dependence of binary dependent variables in the time-series cross-sectional data, the cubic polynomials of year counters are also included as time controls (Carter and Signorino 2010). This counter sets as zero the first year of dyad-year observations and the first year after the last event of interest, and calculates the number of years until another event is observed. The cubic polynomials of both non-nationalistic-rivalry-year counters and nationalistic-rivalry-year counters are implemented (see Morey 2011, 270).

To highlight the distinctive nature of nationalistic rivalry, the chapter also examines whether statistical models produce similar or different results to explain other rivalries.

controlled for to estimate the *total* effect of ethnically heterogeneous society on the probability of nationalistic rivalry (Ray 2003, 4-6).

[3] The COW National Material Capabilities dataset version 4.0 is used.

[4] If the smaller CINC is 0, the missing value is assigned, as the logarithm of 0 is not mathematically defined.

The first measure of other rivalries is coded 1 if interstate rivalries appearing in Thompson and Dreyer (2012) are not nationalistic rivalry. The second measure is coded 1 if interstate rivalries appearing in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) are not nationalistic rivalry. The time controls are implemented in the same way as nationalistic rivalry. The two rivalry datasets are not combined together, because there is no theoretical ground for that. They measure interstate rivalry in quite a different way, and simply combining them is atheoretical. The data of nationalistic rivalry utilize the intersection of these two rivalry datasets because the theory of nationalistic rivalry provides a theoretical ground for this practice. The number of the observations where rivalry exists in the non-directed dyad-year data during the period of 1946-2001 is 1,387 for nationalistic rivalry, 1,356 for other rivalries identified by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), and 2,570 for other rivalries specified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006).

Probit regression is used as the dependent variables are binary. Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are implemented to control for within-group correlations.

Results

The results of probit regressions are displayed in Table 3-1 and those of predicted probability estimations are presented in Figure 3-1 for the smaller number of PREGs, in Figure 3-2 for the larger Polity 2 score, and in Table 3-2 for ethnonation-state incongruence.[5] In Table 3-1, the dependent variables are nationalistic rivalry in Models 3-1 and 3-2, other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) in Models 3-3 and 3-4, and

[5] Those predicted probabilities are estimated while holding the remaining variables at the mean or mode, except that the time controls are set at the mean of nationalistic-rivalry years estimated within the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads (and, therefore, the counter of non-nationalistic-rivalry years is set as zero).

other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) in Models 3-5 and 3-6. One model for each dependent variable has only the main explanatory variables, and the other includes the control variables, to check whether the inclusion of control variables causes misleading results (Achen 2005).

Table 3-1: Probit regression of nationalistic rivalry and other rivalries in the post-WWII period

	Model 3-1	Model 3-2	Model 3-3	Model 3-4	Model 3-5	Model 3-6
	nationalistic rivalry		other rivalries (TD)		other rivalries (KGD)	
Smaller # of	0.0355***	0.0183**	0.0301***	0.0105	0.0406***	0.00833
PREGs	(0.0106)	(0.00896)	(0.0106)	(0.00839)	(0.0124)	(0.00707)
Larger Polity2	-0.00468	-0.00866	-0.00772	-0.0111	0.00765	-0.000116
Score	(0.00716)	(0.00773)	(0.00663)	(0.00748)	(0.00522)	(0.00595)
Larger Polity2	-0.00327***	-0.00520***	-0.000898	-0.00213	0.00181*	-0.000122
Score^2	(0.00125)	(0.00155)	(0.00130)	(0.00159)	(0.000998)	(0.00118)
Ethnonation-State	0.606***	0.243***	0.558***	0.227***	0.531***	0.121**
Incongruence	(0.0523)	(0.0686)	(0.0460)	(0.0625)	(0.0374)	(0.0524)
Larger Economic		-0.401		-0.783		-0.405
Growth		(0.573)		(0.751)		(0.519)
Distance		-0.372***		-0.353***		-0.381***
		(0.0384)		(0.0418)		(0.0256)
Smaller		0.207***		0.224***		0.237***
Capability		(0.0330)		(0.0348)		(0.0205)
Capability Ratio		0.0314		-0.0249		-0.160***
		(0.0373)		(0.0487)		(0.0206)
Constant	-2.270***	3.132***	-2.390***	2.694***	-2.274***	3.101***
	(0.0924)	(0.396)	(0.0914)	(0.413)	(0.0737)	(0.268)
Observations	370,844	337,786	370,844	337,786	370,844	337,786

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Time controls suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Figure 3-1: Predicted probabilities of nationalistic rivalry, given the smaller number of PREGs in the dyad



The solid lines are the mean; the dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals

Figure 3-2: Predicted probabilities of nationalistic rivalry, given the larger Polity 2 score in the dyad



The solid lines are the mean; the dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals

Table 3-2: Predicted probabilities of nationalistic rivalry, given ethnonation-state incongruence

ethnonation-state incongruence	mean	95% CI	
both sides	.96	.91	.99
only one side	.94	.88	.97
neither	.90	.83	.95

First of all, I focus on the results of nationalistic rivalry. All the smaller number of PREGs, the squared term of the larger Polity 2 score, and ethnonation-state incongruence are statistically and substantively significant in predicting nationalistic rivalry. A dyad is more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry, if the number of PREGs in a less ethnically heterogeneous state in the dyad is larger, if the same absolute value of the larger Polity 2 is observed in the autocracy side (the negative Polity 2 score) rather than the democracy side (the positive Polity 2 score) and regime type is closer to imperfect democracy or autocracy, or if at least one state has transborder ethnic kin in the other state. Substantively speaking, ethnic heterogeneity, political instability, and ethnonation-state incongruence are all associated with a higher probability of nationalistic rivalry. Thus, all Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 3 are supported.

In terms of other rivalries, the smaller number of PREGs is statistically significant only in the models without the control variables. Once probit regressions control for the distance and the smaller capability to measure the possibility of interstate interaction (a necessary condition for states to experience rivalry), the smaller number of PREGs is no longer a robust predictor for other rivalries. The squared term of the larger Polity 2 score does not demonstrate its theoretically expected effect either. It is statistically

insignificant in explaining other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012). It is statistically significant in predicting other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), only in the model without the control variables, and its effect is the opposite of the theoretical expectation; inconsistent regime decreases the probability of rivalry. In short, other rivalries are not caused by the nationalist effects of ethnic heterogeneity and political instability.

Meanwhile, ethnonation-state incongruence is statistically significant and raises the likelihood of other rivalries, though its effect is lower than in the case of nationalistic rivalry. A possible explanation for other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) is that ethnonation-state incongruence has provoked interstate hostility which involves transstate ethnonationalist aspects but has not caused enough militarized interstate disputes that Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) would have identified as rivalry (e.g., only one dispute or no issue linkage across disputes). The theory and data of nationalistic rivalry focus specifically on the rivalries which have shown the highest level of national identification (i.e., the dispute-prone relationship). Yet, it is also possible that the dyads in Thompson and Dreyer (2012) have been caused by ethnonation-state incongruence but have not been dispute-prone (or have ceased to be so), thus having not been qualified as nationalistic rivalry. Unsurprisingly, many of such cases in the data are the dyads which used to engage in nationalistic rivalry but ceased to be dispute-prone, or those which are coded as nationalistic rivalry once they meet the criterion of dispute-proneness according to Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006).

A possible explanation for other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) is that ethnonation-state incongruence works as a proxy for another factor. The correlation between ethnonation-state incongruence and other rivalries needs careful consideration

before reaching the conclusion that ethnonation-state incongruence *causes* those rivalries (i.e., it must predict rivalries whose issue is over transstate ethnic groups). A closer investigation of Klein, Goertz, and Diehl's (2006) other rivalries reveals that ethnonation-state incongruence incorrectly "predicts" cases where ethnonation-state incongruence is irrelevant (e.g., the US-Canada rivalry over fishery rights; see Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative). Meanwhile, additional tests confirm that ethnonation-state incongruence increases the likelihood of nationalistic rivalry, even if the data of nationalistic-rivalry dyads are limited only to those with transstate ethnic issues.

As for the control variables, conforming to previous research, economic growth does not have a significant effect on any of rivalries, although its coefficient is negative. The distance between states and the smaller capability have a theoretically expected effect; the closer states and the larger the absolute power of a weaker state in a dyad, the dyad is more likely to experience all kinds of rivalries. Finally, the capability ratio demonstrates no theoretical expectation of power transition theory, suggesting that as discussed in Chapter 1, rivalries are not necessarily power-symmetrical.

Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Nationalistic Rivalry

This section empirically tests Hypotheses 4-6, namely the effects of nationalistic rivalry on the probability of revisionist behavior. The structuralist Hypothesis 4 is firstly examined. Then, the section investigates Hypotheses 5 and 6, the hypothesized causal mechanism between nationalistic rivalry and revisionist behavior. In each case, a research design is explicated and then the results of analysis are discussed.

Research Design for Testing Hypothesis 4

To measure revisionist behavior as the dependent variable, I rely on the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996), which identifies revisionist states in each militarized dispute.[6] The dataset bases its "indicator of what constitutes a revisionist state on the prevailing status quo of the issues in dispute prior to the onset of any militarized action and record[s] as revisionist the state or states that sought to overturn the status quo ante" (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 178). In each MID, one, both, or neither side in dyads can be a revisionist (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, 138-139).

Revisionist behavior is coded 1 if a state is a revisionist and resorts to a militarized action against another state in disputes; 0 otherwise.[7] In the MID data, not all recorded revisionists resort to militarized actions. Because the thesis as well as the literature in general deals with revisionism at the militarized rather than non-militarized levels, revisionist behavior is coded 0 if the MID data's recorded revisionist states conduct no militarized actions.

The MID data include militarized disputes initiated not only by the intention of the government executive but also by other kind of actors, such as soldiers in deployment or even civilian activists. While this wide scope of militarized disputes has posed a challenge to theories relying solely on the decision-makings of the executives (Downes and Sechser 2012), the theory of nationalistic rivalry does not limit its theoretical scope to the executives. The structural effect of nationalistic rivalry institutionalizes mobilization towards revisionist behavior against the rival in the society, as suggested

[6] Version 3.10 is used.

[7] Militarized actions include the threat to use force, the display of force, the use of force, and war (i.e., the MID whose total casualties exceed 1,000).

by the arguments on elite-led/mass-led mobilizations in the last chapter. Thus, the theory covers those cases where not the government executive but other agents behaved in a revisionist manner against the rival. For example, in the Kargil War, the operation was mainly planned by a number of generals in the Pakistani military, and it remains unclear whether Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif played a decision-making role in advance (Joeck 2009, 140n10). The Pakistani military sector saw as unacceptable the success of India's counter-insurgency operation in Kashmir (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 151-153), as the source of its legitimacy is Islamic nationalism (Nasr 2005, 191).[8] In the case of the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis between China and Japan, Chinese fisherpersons entered an area around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It provoked a political reaction from the Japanese government and then forced the Chinese government to take a firm stance against Japan, thereby constituting a militarized dispute between Japan and China.[9] Although it is often difficult to make sure whether non-executive actors behave in a revisionist manner against the rival state independently from the government executives, the point is that either the government executives or other actors can engage in a revisionist attempt due to the structural effect of nationalistic rivalry and, therefore, the scope of the MID dataset is adequate.

Whereas nationalistic-rivalry dyads are motivated by some specific nationalist issue(s), those issues do not have to correspond to contested issues in each case of revisionist behavior. Vasquez (2009, 80) argues, "Leaders in a rivalry will adopt a negative affect calculus rather than a cost-benefit or interdependence calculus" and these leaders will "favor any position that will hurt their opponents and oppose any

[8] For a greater detail of the Kargil War, see Chapter 4.

[9] For a greater detail of the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis, see Chapter 5.

position that will help their opponents." In nationalistic rivalry, nationalistic hostility leads a society into such a negative affect calculus. Such a situation "will lead each actor to link more and more stakes into a single issue, since the issue is being defined simply as what hurts one's opponent" (Vasquez 2009, 80). For example, although Kashmir has been the core issue of the India-Pakistan nationalistic rivalry, even the 1971 war over the independence of Bangladesh was relevant to their nationalistic rivalry. Gokcek (2011, 292) points out that for India, "the potential gain was tremendous, as supporting the Bengali secessionist movement would weaken Pakistan by jeopardizing its territorial integrity." Thus, the 1971 India-Pakistan war, while its primary issue was the independence of Bangladesh, was actually fought in the wider context of the India-Pakistan nationalistic rivalry. Thus, nationalist issues in nationalistic rivalry are the basis of nationalistic hostility, yet dyads engaged in such rivalry can also experience armed conflict over another issue.

The unit of analysis is the directed-dyadic observations of militarized disputes, in the period of 1946-2001 due to the data availability of nationalistic rivalry. The directed-dyadic level is more adequate than the non-directed-dyadic or country level, as revisionist behavior is one state's action towards another state. For example, the first Indo-Pakistani war (1947-49) is recorded as two observations: one for India's action against Pakistan and the other for Pakistan's action against India. All actors in the dispute (i.e., initiators, targets, and joiners) are included to create directed dyads, because all of them can resort to revisionist behavior. For example, a target state might have been dissatisfied with the original territorial arrangement with an initiator state before the onset of conflict, and might use the conflict as an opportunity of annexing some territory of the initiator while pretending as if it were for a self-defense purpose.

Another state might also have been dissatisfied with the regime of the initiator state, and might join the conflict to overthrow the regime.

Directed-dyad disputes are more suitable than directed dyad-years as the unit of analysis. Directed dyad-years are time-series cross-sectional data and, therefore, include non-dispute observations (i.e., the dyad-years when there is no dispute). The inclusion of non-dispute observations could severely bias the estimation of the effect of nationalistic rivalry in favor of Hypothesis 4. It is plausible to suspect that nationalistic-rivalry dyads are more prone to militarized disputes than non-nationalistic-rivalry dyads, as nationalistic-rivalry dyads are conflict-prone by definition. Because militarized disputes include at least one revisionist almost always,[10] logically speaking the *absolute* number of revisionist attempts should be higher in nationalistic-rivalry dyads than in non-nationalistic-rivalry dyads. Hence, it is obvious that nationalistic rivalry will have a statistically significant effect to increase revisionist behavior given all directed dyad-years, but it is also almost tautological.[11] However, if the observations are limited to directed-dyad disputes, an empirical model compares the proportion of revisionist behavior to non-revisionist behavior *in militarized disputes* between states engaged in nationalistic rivalry and between those without such rivalry. For example, if nationalistic-rivalry dyad A has three militarized disputes and

[10] According to the non-directed dyad-year data of all dyads from 1946-2001 generated by EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000a), the number of the observations of militarized interstate disputes (including both originators and joiners and excluding ongoing years) is 3,606, and 2,937 observations out of them include at least one revisionist state.

[11] See Table C-1 in Appendix C for the results of directed dyad-year models including peace year time controls (Carter and Signorino 2010) and dropping the ongoing years of revisionist behavior (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 661) to control for temporal dependence. Unsurprisingly, nationalistic rivalry as well as other rivalries (which are also conflict-prone by definition) is statistically significant and associated with a higher probability of revisionist behavior.

non-nationalistic rivalry dyad B has only one militarize dispute, and if only one side has always behaved in a revisionist manner, the probability of revisionist behavior is equal in both cases (.5). In other words, if nationalistic rivalry is to have a statistically significant effect, the proportion of revisionist behavior to non-revisionist behavior in militarized disputes must be significantly higher than in the absence of nationalistic rivalry.

Even if some selection bias existed in the use of directed-dyad disputes as the unit of analysis, it would work *against* Hypothesis 4. I explain why it does so, along the line of Sartori (2003, 114). Nationalistic-rivalry dyads are by definition conflict-prone. Meanwhile, if non-rivalry dyads experience militarized disputes, it means that they have some characteristic other than rivalry to engage in those disputes. However, those non-rivalry dyads might not be representative of all non-rivalry dyads (if they were a representative sample, there would be no selection bias). They might be a subset unique to experience militarized disputes due to some characteristic which is not measured in a statistical model. Provided that this unmeasured characteristic also increases revisionist behavior, the inclusion of those non-rivalry dyads in the selected sample results in the underestimation of the effect of nationalistic rivalry on the probability of revisionist behavior, because those non-rivalry dyads have the zero value of the binary independent variable, i.e., nationalistic rivalry. Hence, assuming that this selection bias exists, if the results of ordinary probit regression which examines only dispute observations still support the hypothesis, it rather increases the confidence in the theory of nationalistic rivalry.[12]

[12] A selection model with directed dyad-year observations might be considered to correct this selection bias. I discuss this point later as a robustness check.

The explanatory variables of interest are as follow. To examine the effect of nationalistic rivalry on a revisionist propensity in militarized disputes, nationalistic rivalry is coded 1 if an actor state is engaged in nationalistic rivalry with a target state.

The control variables are as follows. Ethnonation-state incongruence is coded 1 if the ethnic group who is the power holder of an actor state has ethnic kin in the target state, according to the same data as in the last section. The dataset of nationalistic rivalry only includes the information that rivals have transstate ethnic issues at dispute and, therefore, cannot be used to examine the potential effect of ethnonation-state incongruence to become a disputed issue. Ethnonation-state incongruence is a necessary condition for transstate ethnicity to become a disputed issue and might be a confounder of nationalistic rivalry to explain revisionist behavior.

Although the theory of nationalistic rivalry *per se* does not argue that rivalries other than nationalistic rivalry have no effect on the probability of revisionist behavior, it is useful to examine whether nationalistic rivalry has a distinctive effect in comparison with other rivalries. Hence, the effect of other rivalries is estimated by the binary variables of the aforementioned measures: other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), and those by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006). The number of the observations where each rivalry exists in the directed-dyad dispute data is 1,100 for nationalistic rivalry, 392 for other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), and 1,576 for other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006). Thus, each rivalry measure has a sufficient number of observations over the total observations (4,344).

Contiguity is coded 1 if a dyad is contiguous through land or the water which is equal to or less than 150 miles; 0 otherwise, according to the Correlated of War (COW) Direct Contiguity dataset version 3.0 (Stinnett et al. 2002). Contiguous states may be more

likely to engage in territorial revisionism due to a shared border.[13]

To consider the effect of dyadic power relations on the probability of revisionist behavior, there are two contending propositions. On the one hand, to quote Thucydides (1997, 307) again, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Therefore, if the capability difference is wider, the stronger state may be more likely to pursue revisionist attempts against the weaker state. On the other hand, power transition theory (Organski and Kugler 1980; Levy 1998, 148) suggests that a closing power gap may cause both the weaker side and the stronger side to resort to revisionist behavior. The weaker side may desire to improve its position relative to the stronger side if the power gap is small enough for this purpose. Meanwhile, the stronger side may resort to preventive war (which is also revisionist behavior) to forestall this revisionist attempt by the weaker side.

To test these contending propositions on the dyadic power relationship, the capability difference between states, calculated by an actor state's CINC (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987) minus a target state's CINC, and its squared term are included. For example, if state A has a CINC score of 0.7 and state B has a CINC score of 0.3, the difference is 0.4 for state A and -0.4 for state B; its squared term is 0.16 for both. If state C has a CINC score of 0.5 and state D has a CINC score of 0.45, the difference is 0.05 for state C and -0.05 for state D; its squared term is 0.0025 for both. If the first proposition were true, state A (the capability difference = 0.4) would be more likely to engage in revisionist behavior than states B (-0.4), C (0.05), and D (-0.05). If

[13] Unlike explaining nationalistic rivalry, contiguity is more suitable than distance, because not the possibility of interaction but a shared border is the potential cause of revisionist behavior. Given the observations here are limited to the dyads which have engaged in militarized disputes, it is redundant to measure the possibility of interaction.

the second proposition were the case, states C and D (the capability difference squared = 0.0025) would be more likely to pursue revisionist foreign policy than states A and B (0.16).[14]

Finally, democratic peace theory argues that democratic dyads share the democratic norms of nonviolent conflict resolution (Maoz and Russett 1993, 625).[15] Therefore, it can be expected that they are unlikely to engage in revisionist behavior to resolve disputes. To measure this democratic peace effect, democratic actors are coded 1 if an actor state has a Polity 2 score equal to or more than six (Marshall 2013), and 0 otherwise; democratic targets are coded 1 if a target state has a Polity 2 score equal to or more than six, and 0 otherwise. The interaction term between these two variables, namely democratic dyads, captures the democratic peace effect. Although the literature often includes only democratic dyads as a covariate, the omission of the constitutive terms can mislead statistical analysis (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Democratic peace is the effect of jointly democratic dyads; in other words, the pacifying effect of an actor state's democracy is conditional on the regime type of a target state (Gartzke and Jo 2009, 219).

The estimator of choice is probit regression, since the dependent variable is binary. To control for the endogeneity of simultaneity bias between the explanatory variables and revisionist behavior, the observations of all explanatory variables are those one year

[14] The capability ratio, or the ratio of the weaker state's CINC to the stronger state's, is inadequate here, because it is the non-directed dyadic measure of power relations and cannot distinguish actor and target states in a dyad. Distinguishing actor and target states in a dyad is necessary here to test the argument that the wider the capability difference, the more likely the stronger state is to pursue revisionist attempts against the weaker state.

[15] The causality between democratic peace and interstate conflict, however, has been contested. For a summary, see Hayes (2011) and Ungerer (2012).

before militarized disputes start.

If a dyad experiences more than one militarized dispute per year, all disputes are recorded. While the inclusion of multiple disputes within one dyad in a year might cause autocorrelations among them and violate the assumption of the independence of observations, it can be controlled for by robust standard errors clustered on dyads.

Because the observations do not have any non-dispute observation, peace year time controls for the temporal dependence of non-dispute dyad-years (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010) are irrelevant (e.g., see Asal and Beardsley 2007; Schrock-Jacobson 2012).[16] Potential dependence of current revisionist behavior on past revisionist behavior can be addressed by robust standard errors clustered on dyads as well as the rivalry variables.

Results of Testing Hypothesis 4

The results of testing Hypothesis 4 are displayed in Table 3-3. Model 3-7 uses only nationalistic rivalry to check whether the inclusion of control variables causes misleading results (Achen 2005). Model 3-8 includes all control variables except for other rivalries; Models 3-9 and 3-10 add one measure of other rivalries. In all models, the presence of nationalistic rivalry has a statistically significant effect to increase the probability of an actor state resorting to revisionist behavior in militarized interstate

[16] The inclusion of a peace year counter from previous revisionist behavior to next one does not affect the results of nationalistic rivalry. One significant change is that the variable of other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) becomes statistically significant and increases revisionist behavior (see Table C-2 in Appendix C). However, its coefficient is smaller than that of nationalistic rivalry. Thus, this robustness check does not change the conclusion that nationalistic rivalry has more explanatory power than other rivalries in predicting revisionist behavior.

disputes. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is supported.

Table 3-3: Probit regression of revisionist behavior in directed-dyad disputes

	Model 3-7	Model 3-8	Model 3-9	Model 3-10
Nationalistic Rivalry	0.289***	0.225**	0.213**	0.249***
	(0.103)	(0.0947)	(0.0970)	(0.0950)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.197**	0.196**	0.197**
		(0.0897)	(0.0895)	(0.0896)
Other Rivalries			-0.0718	
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012)			(0.106)	
Other Rivalries				0.0401
(Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)				(0.0575)
Contiguity		0.0254	0.0352	0.0154
		(0.0713)	(0.0725)	(0.0720)
Capability Difference		0.800*	0.799*	0.800*
		(0.444)	(0.443)	(0.443)
Capability Difference^2		-0.436	-0.434	-0.574
		(2.668)	(2.664)	(2.646)
Democratic Actor		-0.385***	-0.382***	-0.393***
		(0.0932)	(0.0931)	(0.0944)
Democratic Target		0.259***	0.262***	0.251***
		(0.0731)	(0.0722)	(0.0735)
Democratic Dyad		0.153	0.142	0.167
		(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.133)
Constant	-0.223***	-0.233***	-0.230***	-0.243***
	(0.0338)	(0.0654)	(0.0656)	(0.0662)
Observations	4,344	4,136	4,136	4,136

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

As for the control variables, ethnonation-state incongruence is statistically significant and increases the likelihood of revisionist behavior, conforming to the existing literature. Yet, its coefficient is smaller than that of nationalistic rivalry, suggesting that

ethnonation-state incongruence has a smaller impact on the likelihood of revisionist behavior than nationalistic rivalry.[17]

In addition, the statistically significant result of ethnonation-state incongruence might not necessarily reflect the *substantive theory* of irredentism and national unification movement. The theory of ethnonation-state incongruence basically argues that ethnonation-state incongruence causes either irredentism or national unification movements. However, revisionist behavior here is measured by the MID dataset, which includes not only disputes involving irredentism or national unification movements but also any kind of militarized disputes. This measure is not problematic to the theory of nationalistic rivalry, because within nationalistic rivalry, states fight conflict not only over the exact nationalist issue at dispute but also on other issues which harm the rival due to the "negative affect calculus" (Vasquez 2009, 80). On the other hand, it is less plausible to expect that ethnonation-state incongruence results in such a calculus, because it measures the demographic and political configuration of ethnic groups across state borders as a necessary condition for irredentism or national unification movements and do not capture interstate nationalistic hostility itself. Thus, for example, while Canada is coded as having transborder ethnic kin in the United States, such coding incorrectly "predicts" revisionist behavior by the former against the latter over fishery rights (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative), which is a territorial dispute but neither irredentist or national unification conflict.

Other rivalries, whether identified by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) or by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), are statistically insignificant, indicating that nationalistic

[17] Because both variables are binary, it is possible to compare their relative effect by the coefficient in probit models.

rivalry has distinctive explanatory power to predict a revisionist propensity in comparison with other rivalries.[18] Contrary to the expectation, contiguity is statistically insignificant. This is possibly because nationalistic rivalry captures many of the dyads engaged in territorial conflict and, therefore, contiguity as a crude measure for territoriality loses its explanatory power. The capability difference is statistically significant and indicates that the stronger state in a dyad is more likely to behave in a revisionist manner. The squared term of the capability difference is statistically insignificant across all models. These findings suggest that the Thucydides proposition is more empirically valid than power transition theory in explaining the propensity of states for revisionist behavior in militarized disputes.

Somewhat surprisingly, democratic dyads, the robust predictor of dyadic peace, are statistically insignificant. As for democratic actors and targets (the constitutive terms of democratic dyads), if an actor state is a democracy, it is less likely to behave in a revisionist manner against autocratic targets, whereas democratic states are more likely to be a target of revisionist behavior by autocratic states. In short, democratic institutions or norms seem to constrain states from a revisionist attempt only against autocratic states and not against fellow democracies. Moreover, this constraint is exploited by the revisionist ambition of autocratic states.

Although these results seem to contradict democratic peace theory, it is necessary to

[18] It might be the case that the aforementioned selection bias dampens the effect of all rivalry variables, which might be why other rivalries are statistically insignificant. Yet, nationalistic rivalry still has a much larger coefficient than other rivalries in the models in Table 3-3, meaning that it is more influential. In addition, it is difficult to imagine why the selection bias has so much a larger dampening effect on other rivalries than on nationalistic rivalry that the order of the size of their coefficients will be turned around (0.213 vs. -0.0718 in Model 3-9 and 0.249 vs. 0.0401 in Model 3-10). This point is revisited later as part of robustness checks.

remember that observations are limited to directed-dyad disputes. In other words, these effects of democratic regime are observed only in the cases where democratic states are already engaged in militarized disputes. The results can be compatible with those of democratic peace empirics prevalent in the literature: democratic states are less likely to engage in militarized disputes but once they do so, a foreign policy calculus changes. I infer what such a change is, as follows. In democratic dyads, states mutually expect that the fellow democracy will not resort to revisionist attempts because of shared democratic norms of peaceful conflict resolution. However, once a militarized dispute occurs, these democracies may not believe so anymore, because they find themselves engaged in militarized disputes contrary to their expectation. As a result, they may not be constrained from resorting to revisionist behavior. On the other hand, in democracy-autocracy dyads, a democratic state believes that the autocratic target is more revisionistic and, therefore, more likely to respond by revisionist behavior possibly with the justification of self-defense. Hence, the democratic state may be more cautious to embark on a revisionist attempt, even if a militarized dispute sets on. However, this caution mitigates the autocratic counterpart's fear for counterattacks and causes lower deterrence credibility, thereby allowing the autocratic side to resort to revisionist behavior.

To understand the substantive effect of nationalistic rivalry, predicted probabilities are estimated, together with their 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 3-8, the estimation measures the effect of nationalistic rivalry and its absence on the probability of revisionist behavior in militarized disputes. All control variables are fixed at their mean (if continuous variables) or mode (if binary variables). The results are displayed in Table 3-4. If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they have a .51 probability of

resorting to revisionist behavior in militarized disputes, whereas if not, it is .42. Thus, nationalistic rivalry substantively increases revisionist behavior in militarized disputes.

Table 3-4: Predicted probabilities of revisionist behavior in militarized disputes

nationalistic rivalry	mean	95% CI	
present	.51	.43	.58
absent	.42	.37	.47

The above models attempted to control for the expected endogeneity of simultaneity bias between nationalistic rivalry and revisionist behavior by the use of lagged explanatory variables. However, it is also possible to use instrumental variables in order to address this potential endogeneity. For a robustness check, I run instrumental-variable models to check whether the results change in any significant way.

Chiburis, Das, and Lokshin (2011, 2) say that if both dependent variable and endogenous regressor are binary, common approaches are either linear instrumental-variable (LIV) and bivariate probit (biprobit) estimation. A LIV model is particularly useful in that it provides a number of statistics helpful for diagnosing the validity of instruments. In addition, it can be expected that linear probability models work well here. In probit/logit models, “the effects of the independent variables are nearly linear when probabilities of success are between 20% and 80%” (Achen 2002, 425). The positive outcome of nationalistic rivalry in the data used here amounts to 1,100 and that of revisionist behavior to 1,915 whereas the number of the total observations is 4,344, which means the probability of success is .25 for nationalistic rivalry and .44 for revisionist behavior. Therefore, the advantage of a LIV model should

be enjoyed without worrying about the side effect of linear probability models.[19]

However, Chiburis, Das, and Lokshin (2011, 3-4) also notes that if a model includes continuous control variables, the confidence intervals of LIV models tend to be "too large for any meaningful hypothesis testing," adding that in the case of excessive skewedness or kurtosis in the error terms, biprobit models "often lead to highly biased…estimates" and "overreject a true null hypothesis;" LIV models are "more robust in terms of size, but they are also less powerful." In short, both LIV and biprobit models have advantages and disadvantages. Hence, I use both estimations and compare results.

The instruments are the explanatory variables which are statistically significant in predicting nationalistic rivalry in Table 3-1: the smaller number of PREGs in dyads, ethnonation-state incongruence, the larger Polity 2 score in dyads and its squared term, distance, and the smaller capability in dyads.[20] All instruments are two-years lagged to control for the simultaneity bias between these instruments and nationalistic rivalry in the first equation, since nationalistic rivalry as an explanatory variable in the second equation is already one-year lagged. The control variables are the capability difference and its squared term. Contiguity is not used because contiguity and the distance by definition measures conceptually overlapped things and, therefore, should not be included together (Ray 2003, 15-19). For the same reason, an actor's democracy, a target's democracy, and democratic dyads are not included, as they are conceptually

[19] For LIV estimations, I use the ivreg2 command with the specification of the two-stage least square estimator (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007).

[20] While the constitutive term, the larger Polity 2 score in dyads, is statistically insignificant in Table 3-1, it must be included to estimate the effect of its squared term correctly (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006, 66-71).

overlapped with the larger Polity 2 score in dyads and its squared term. Finally, other rivalries is not controlled for, because they have been found to be irrelevant to two nationalist causes (ethnically heterogeneous society and political instability; see Table 3-1) and to have no significant effect on the probability of revisionist behavior.

The results are presented in Table 3-5. Both LIV and biprobit models show that nationalistic rivalry remains statistically significant and increases the probability of revisionist behavior. In the LIV model, the statistics for the diagnosis of instruments support the validity of the instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the equation is unidentified, meaning that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic indicates that the instruments are strong. Finally, the Hansen J statistic allows for the inference that the instruments are valid, or "uncorrelated with the error term, and that the…instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation" (ivreg2 help file). In a nutshell, nationalistic rivalry is robust even if endogeneity is rigorously controlled for.

Finally, I conduct another robustness check by a selection model with the observations of directed dyad-years, to examine whether, assuming that the aforementioned selection bias exists, a selection model changes the results significantly. The cubic polynomials of a peace year counter are included to control for the temporal dependence of the dyad-years of no revisionist behavior (Carter and Signorino 2010) and the ongoing years of revisionist behavior are dropped to address the temporal dependence of the dyad-years of revisionist behavior (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 661).

Table 3-5: LIV and biprobit regressions of revisionist behavior

	Model 3-11 (LIV)		Model 3-12 (biprobit)	
	1st eq. Nationalistic Rivalry	2nd eq. Revisionist Behavior	1st eq. Nationalistic Rivalry	2nd eq. Revisionist Behavior
Nationalistic Rivalry		0.163**		0.403**
		(0.0769)		(0.199)
Capability Difference	0	0.0328	0.110	0.0835
	(0.133)	(0.183)	(2.177)	(0.473)
Capability Difference^2	-3.279***	-0.00523	-77.75***	-0.100
	(0.862)	(1.126)	(20.84)	(2.985)
Smaller # of PREGs	0.0126***		0.0417**	
	(0.00347)		(0.0169)	
Ethnonation-State	0.147***		0.506***	
Incongruence	(0.0357)		(0.110)	
Larger Polity2 Score	-0.00722**		-0.0274***	
	(0.00307)		(0.0106)	
Larger Polity2 Score^2	0.00116*		0.00221	
	(0.000606)		(0.00228)	
Distance	-0.120***		-0.436***	
	(0.0255)		(0.102)	
Smaller Capability	0.0318***		0.208***	
	(0.0113)		(0.0539)	
Constant	1.144***	0.397***	-0.259***	3.214***
	(0.212)	(0.0227)	(0.0581)	(0.850)
R-squared	0.268	0.010	-	-
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic	-	53.150*** [a]	-	-
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	-	25.802[b]	-	-
Hansen J statistic	-	0.797[c]	-	-
Observations	3,900	3,900	3,900	3,900

[a] H_0 = the equation is underidentified

[b] Pass the 10% maximal IV size and the15% maximal IV size (Stock and Yogo 2002)

[c] H_0 = the instruments are valid

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

While a Heckman probit model is popular in the case of binary dependent variables to correct selection bias, it needs an explanatory variable which influences the selection (i.e., entering militarized disputes) but not the outcome (i.e., revisionist behavior). Unfortunately, it seems difficult to find such a variable, and the identification of the regressors in both selection and outcome equations causes poor performance (Sartori 2003, 122). Sartori's (2003) selection model overcomes this problem by assuming that the error terms in both equations are identical. This assumption is valid if "processes…involve similar decisions or goals," "selection and the outcome of interest have the same causes," and "the decision are close together in time and space" (117). Militarized disputes and revisionist behavior are likely to involve similar decisions (e.g., use of force), to have the same causes (e.g., rivalry), and to be decided within a close range of time and space. Thus, the above assumption seems plausible here.

The results of Sartori's models are displayed in Table 3-6.[21] A model including other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) fails to converge if the other covariates are specified; thus the model uses only nationalistic rivalry and these other rivalries as regressors as well as the cubic polynomials of a peace year counter. It should still illustrate whether nationalistic rivalry or other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) are more influential. All covariates (ethnonation-state incongruence, contiguity, the capability difference and its squared term, and democratic actors, targets, and dyads) can be expected to confound both nationalistic rivalry and the other rivalries in the same way. Therefore, the exclusion of them should not affect the estimation of the two rivalry variables in such a way that the results of only one of them would change drastically.

[21] Robust standard errors clustered on dyads cannot be implemented in Sartori's STATA program.

Table 3-6: Sartori's (2003) regression of revisionist behavior in directed dyad-years

	Model 3-13	Model 3-14	Model 3-15	Model 3-16
Nationalistic Rivalry	1.953***	1.001***	1.101***	2.197***
	(0.0325)	(0.0365)	(0.0371)	(0.0334)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.302***	0.275***	
		(0.0285)	(0.0283)	
Other Rivalries			0.659***	
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012)			(0.0456)	
Other Rivalries				1.994***
(Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)				(0.0268)
Contiguity		1.071***	0.984***	
		(0.0224)	(0.0230)	
Capability Difference		0.247*	0.214	
		(0.136)	(0.135)	
Capability Difference^2		12.50***	12.81***	
		(0.850)	(0.829)	
Democratic Actor		0.0561**	0.0542**	
		(0.0269)	(0.0270)	
Democratic Target		0.212***	0.210***	
		(0.0240)	(0.0238)	
Democratic Dyad		-0.577***	-0.544***	
		(0.0473)	(0.0472)	
Constant	-2.526***	-2.748***	-2.759***	-2.869***
	(0.0178)	(0.0269)	(0.0267)	(0.0225)
Observations	1,072,540	848,110	848,110	1,072,540

Standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Nationalistic rivalry remains statistically significant and increases the probability of revisionist behavior. Other rivalries either by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) or by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) are also statistically significant and associated with a higher likelihood of revisionist behavior. If the assumption were true that the selection bias

exists, those results of Sartori's models would be correct, indicating that the selection bias dampened the effect of these two types of other rivalries in the previous models to the extent that they became statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, if the assumption were wrong, Sartori's method would overestimate the effect of the rivalry variables (see Sartori 2003, 122, Table 1), which is another possibility about why other rivalries are statistically significant and associated with a higher probability of revisionist behavior. Even if it is assumed that Sartori's models are correct, however, the effect of other rivalries is still smaller than that of nationalistic rivalry. Thus, this robustness check does not affect the argument that nationalistic rivalry is more influential than other rivalries to cause revisionist behavior.

Research Design for Testing Hypothesis 5

This section has so far examined the structural causal relationship between nationalistic rivalry and revisionist behavior, but has assumed that the causal mechanism of nationalist mobilization works as theoretically expected. To examine this causal mechanism empirically, Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 are tested. I firstly test Hypothesis 5, which expects that the presence of nationalistic rivalry leads to nationalist mobilization in the society to be prepared for a revisionist attempt against the rival. This mobilization is measured by the ratio of military expenditure to GDP per capita (ME-to-GDPpc ratio). If nationalism mobilizes a society for a revisionist aim, the government should spend more national wealth on the military to increase the chance of a successful revisionist attempt. The observations one year ahead (t+1) are used to control for the endogeneity of simultaneity bias.

The ME-to-GDPpc ratio is a good measure of nationalist mobilization for three

reasons. First, the state capacity to mobilize people for a military purpose indicates the strength of integrity between elites and the masses, namely national solidarity (Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012). If the government is able to spend more national wealth on the military, it suggests that the whole society allows for it due to a higher level of national solidarity. As argued in the last chapter, external threats increase national identification and, therefore, national solidarity. Hence, it makes sense that nationalistic rivalry increases the ME-to-GDPpc ratio. If society has weaker national solidarity due to the lack of external threats, it means that people identify themselves less with the nation and, therefore, care less about their nation. In such a case, the majority of people, who may be elites or masses but do not work in the military,[22] see a high military budget as waste. Military spending could contribute to the whole economy through spillover effects on some other sectors (e.g., heavy industries). However, spending money on the military is not as good as spending the same amount of money directly on other sectors where the majority of people work (e.g., corporate tax reduction for business sectors or subsidies for agricultural sectors). Hence, if a society supports a higher ratio of military expenditure to GDP per capita, it is mainly not for economic reasons but because of national solidarity in face of external threats, whereby people perceive the strong military as good for their nation and for themselves.

Second, GDP per capita is more suitable than GDP. The former captures the average level of individual wealth whereas the latter reflects the aggregated level of national wealth. Because nationalism is a force amplifier of mass mobilizations for warfare (Posen 1993), it is important to see how much of individual wealth is spent on the

[22] 21% is the highest number of the ratio of military personnel to the total population in country-year data from 1946-2001, according to the COW National Material Capabilities dataset and the GDP and population data 5.0 beta (Gleditsch 2002).

military sector.

Third, the ratio of military personnel to the national population also reflects a *certain* aspect of nationalist mobilization, but is limited to human resources. In modern warfare, the mass army is only one aspect of nationalist mobilization, and the mobilization of citizens for the military sector in a direct or indirect way (e.g., hiring people for military factories or increasing a tax) also needs to be taken into consideration.

For these three reasons, the ME-to-GDPpc ratio is suitable to capture the nationalist mobilization of society. It might be argued that it is natural for nationalistic-rivalry dyads to have a higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio because conflict requires the military. However, if only the necessity of the military for conflict in general matters, not only nationalistic rivalry but also other rivalries should increase the ratio. Given this point, the validity of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio as a measure of nationalist mobilization can be checked in light of empirical models which compare the effect of nationalistic rivalry with that of other rivalries. If only nationalistic rivalry has a statistically significant effect to increase the ratio, it will indicate that the ME-to-GDPpc ratio is a measure of *nationalist* mobilization. The data of military expenditure comes from the COW National Material Capabilities dataset and GDP per capita from the GDP and population data 5.0 beta (Gleditsch 2002). Military expenditure is measured by current US thousands of dollars, and GDP per capita by current US dollars.

The independent variable is nationalistic rivalry, coded 1 if a state is engaged in nationalistic rivalry with some other state; 0 otherwise.[23] The control variables are as

[23] I do not consider the number of nationalistic rivalries in which a state is engaged, because the theory of nationalistic rivalry does not specify whether a higher number of nationalistic rivalries has a linear additive effect on the extent of nationalist mobilization. What the theory tells is that the presence and absence of nationalistic rivalry differentiates a propensity for nationalist

follows. Ethnonation-state incongruence is a binary variable, coded 1 if the power holder ethnic group has transborder ethnic kin in some other state, based on the same data as before. The presence of transborder ethnic kin is expected to motivate the homeland state to resort to nationalist mobilization for irredentist or national unification attempts.

Two measures of other rivalries, using the same specification as before, are coded 1 if a state is engaged in rivalries other than nationalistic rivalry with some other state; 0 otherwise. If it were found that rivalries other than nationalistic rivalry increase the ratio of military expenditure to GDP per capita, it would question the validity of the ratio as a measure of nationalist mobilization. The number of the observations where rivalry exists in the country-year data is 1,888 for nationalistic rivalry, 2,088 for other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), and 2,605 for other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006).

Nuclear states are coded 1 if a state has nuclear weapons; 0 otherwise, according to Gartzke and Kroenig's (2009) data. States possessing nuclear weapons are likely to spend more on the military sector to maintain them. Democratic states are coded 1 if a state has a Polity 2 score equal to or more than six; 0 otherwise. Democratic states should be more constrained to use budget for the military, as plural public opinions are more likely to be reflected. Finally, the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita (the data from Gleditsch 2002) is included. On the one hand, wealthier states might be more

mobilization and revisionist behavior. It is expected that the relationship between the number of nationalistic rivalries and the level of nationalist mobilization is far more complex than a linear relationship. For example, a larger number of nationalistic rivalries would either encourage the state to further nationalist mobilization or lead it to stop military buildup due to a higher risk of arms race with rivals. I leave this point for future research.

efficient on budget management and, therefore, a lower ratio of military spending to GDP per capita. On the other hand, wealthier states might be a proxy for major powers and, therefore, a higher ratio of military spending to GDP per capita.

Figure 3-3: Partial correlogram of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio of the United States



Country-years are the unit of analysis, since the ratio of military expenditure to GDP per capita is a country-level dependent variable. All country-years from 1946-2001 are included in the observations. Generalized estimating equation (GEE) models are used, as GEE allows for panel data analysis with controlling for temporal autocorrelations by identifying an autoregressive process. As a representative case, the partial correlogram of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio of the United States is presented in Figure 3-3, indicating that the first and second lags are significantly correlated. Thus, GEE models specify the second order of autoregressive process.[24] As the dependent variable is normally

[24] The use of the first or third order of autoregressive process does not affect the main argument

distributed, the Gaussian distribution and the identity link function (y=y) are used. Semi-robust standard errors are specified.

Results of Testing Hypothesis 5

The results of testing Hypothesis 5 are displayed in Table 3-7. Model 3-17 includes only nationalistic rivalry, and Models 3-18 and 3-19 adds other rivalries measured by either by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) or by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) while including ethnonation-state incongruence, democracy, nuclear states, and the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita. Across all models, nationalistic rivalry is statistically significant and also has a substantively significant effect on the ME-to-GDPpc ratio, as nationalistic-rivalry dyads have an approximately 13% higher ME-to-GDPpc.[25] Thus, Hypothesis 5 is supported. If a state is engaged in nationalistic rivalry with another state, it promotes nationalist mobilization.

Other rivalries have no statistical significance, measured either by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) or by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), indicating that the ME-to-GDPpc ratio adequately captures nationalist mobilization. Ethnonation-state incongruence is statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that ethnonation-state incongruence leads to nationalist mobilization in a society only through the medium of nationalistic

here. One alternative approach to GEE models is fixed-effect models including lagged dependent variables (one-year, two-year, or three-year lags) as regressors and utilizing robust standard errors clustered on dyads. The results regarding nationalistic rivalry does not change and are consistent with the main argument. The control variables except for democracy are statistically insignificant in most models. For all regression tables, see Appendix C.

[25] As the ME-to-GDP pc ratio is transformed to the natural logarithm form in the statistical models, the exponentiated value of the coefficient of nationalistic rivalry (a binary independent variable) is the ratio of the geometric mean for nationalistic-rivalry dyads over the geometric mean for non-nationalistic-rivalry dyads (Institute for Digital Research and Education, n.d.).

rivalry, given that ethnonation-state incongruence is a cause of nationalistic rivalry. As expected, nuclear states need more budgets for the military sector, and democracies have a lower level of military expenditure. GDP per capita is statistically insignificant, suggesting that wealthier states may have a lower or higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio, as the aforementioned two conflicting explanations indicate.

Table 3-7: GEE regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio

	Model 3-17	Model 3-18	Model 3-19
Nationalistic Rivalry	0.118***	0.122***	0.119***
	(0.0297)	(0.0310)	(0.0295)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.0878	0.0877
		(0.0684)	(0.0683)
Other Rivalries		0.0110	
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012)		(0.0357)	
Other Rivalries			0.0242
(Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)			(0.0219)
Democracy		-0.109***	-0.110***
		(0.0360)	(0.0359)
Nuclear State		0.137***	0.139***
		(0.0522)	(0.0516)
Real GDP per capita		0.0800	0.0815
		(0.0866)	(0.0866)
Constant	4.002***	3.768***	3.754***
	(0.164)	(0.725)	(0.724)
Observations	6,646	6,133	6,133
Number of Countries	178	158	158

Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Research Design for Testing Hypothesis 6

Next, to examine whether nationalist mobilization results in revisionist behavior within

nationalistic rivalry (Hypothesis 6), the chapter estimates the effect of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio on revisionist behavior in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The dependent variable is the binary variable of revisionist behavior, coded 1 if a state is a revisionist and resorts to a militarized action against another state in a year. The observations one-year ahead (t+1) are used to control for the endogeneity of simultaneity bias. The independent variable is the ME-to-GDPpc ratio. As control variables, ethnonation-state incongruence, contiguity, the capability difference and its squared term, democratic actors, democratic targets, and democratic dyads are included, to empirically check whether the effect of these factors changes in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads in comparison with the subset of directed-dyad disputes.

It might be argued that, rather than focusing on the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads, all dyads should be analyzed and the interaction term between nationalistic rivalry and the ME-to-GDPpc ratio is used. This criticism would be plausible if and only if I argued that nationalist mobilization increases revisionist behavior *only in the case of nationalistic rivalry* (i.e., that the coefficient of the ME-to-GPDpc ratio is positive conditional on the presence of nationalistic rivalry; otherwise zero or negative; see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). However, I do not argue so; not all types of nationalist mobilization are covered by the theory of nationalistic rivalry, and nationalist mobilization can occur outside nationalistic rivalry as well. For example, the United States has mobilized its society to address terrorist networks, but target states such as Iraq or Afghanistan have been too weak to be rivals. The effect of nationalist mobilization on revisionist behavior in this kind of case might be even higher than in the case of nationalistic rivalry. What this section aims to do is not to show that nationalistic rivalry is the sole condition of nationalist mobilization causing revisionist

behavior, but to empirically identify the causal mechanism between nationalistic rivalry and revisionist behavior.

Probit regression is used to estimate the binary-response dependent variable of revisionist behavior. The unit of analysis here is directed dyad-years in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads, rather than directed-dyad disputes unlike the models designed to test Hypothesis 4, for two reasons. First, the compared subjects here are not states with nationalistic rivalry and those without such rivalry but the temporal trend of a revisionist propensity among states engaged in nationalistic rivalry. Therefore, the selection bias discussed in testing Hypothesis 4 is irrelevant. Second, whereas the main independent variable to test Hypothesis 4 was a binary indicator of nationalistic rivalry, the main independent variable here, the ME-to-GDPpc ratio, is a continuous variable. Hence, to examine its full variation (i.e., to identify the timing when revisionist behavior occurs between rivals depending on the level of nationalist mobilization), not only the observations of militarized disputes but also those of no militarized disputes need to be included. Otherwise, the estimation of the effect of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio could be biased. For example, even if a higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio increased the probability of revisionist behavior among militarized disputes, an even higher ratio might be associated with the absence of disputes. If only militarized disputes were included in the observations, a wrong conclusion would be reached that a higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio increases revisionist behavior.[26]

To control for the temporal dependence of the observations of no revisionist behavior,

[26] This concern did not apply when I tested Hypothesis 4, because the dyad-years of nationalistic rivalry are by definition more prone to militarized disputes and, therefore, cannot be associated with a higher probability of peace than dyads without such rivalry. In addition, the selection models using dyad-year observations supported the main argument anyway.

the cubic polynomials of a peace year counter for revisionist behavior are included (Carter and Signorino 2010). The ongoing years of revisionist behavior are dropped to control for the temporal dependence of the dyad-years of revisionist behavior (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 661). Both dispute originators and joiners, and both dispute initiators and targets are included, as any of them can be a revisionist in militarized disputes. Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are implemented to control for within-group correlations.

Results of Testing Hypothesis 6

The results of testing Hypothesis 6 are presented in Table 3-8. Model 3-20 includes only the ME-to-GPDpc ratio and the peace year variables, and Model 3-21 adds the remaining control variables. The ME-to-GDPpc ratio is statistically significant and has a positive effect in both models, indicating that a higher ratio of military expenditure to GDP per capita increases the probability of revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry. Thus, Hypothesis 6 is supported. As both Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 have been accepted, the empirical findings of this section fit the causal mechanism from nationalistic rivalry through nationalist mobilization to revisionist behavior.[27]

Some of the control variables demonstrate the same effect as the models in Table 3-3. Democratic actors are less likely to engage in revisionist behavior against autocratic

[27] Additionally, I examined whether the social structure of nationalistic rivalry really causes both hawkish and dovish leaders similarly prone to revisionist policy. Horowitz and Stam (2014) find that if leaders have the experience of military service but no combat experience, they are more likely to initiate militarized disputes. Thus, such leaders are regarded as hawkish, and I added the dummy variable to identify them in Models 3-20 and 3-21. Conforming to the theory of nationalistic rivalry, those hawkish leaders have no statistically significant effect, whereas the ME-to-GDPpc ratio remains statistically significant (see Table C-8 in Appendix C).

states. Contiguity, the squared term of the capability difference, and democratic dyads are statistically insignificant.

Table 3-8: Probit regression of revisionist behavior in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads

	Model 3-20	Model 3-21
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio	0.0601***	0.0549**
	(0.0188)	(0.0248)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.150
		(0.0939)
Contiguity		0.249
		(0.161)
Capability Difference		-0.824
		(0.897)
Capability Difference^2		-0.874
		(11.88)
Democratic Actor		-0.228**
		(0.0969)
Democratic Target		0.0249
		(0.105)
Democratic Dyad		0.124
		(0.181)
Peace Years	-0.197***	-0.194***
	(0.0251)	(0.0243)
Peace Years^2	0.00900***	0.00916***
	(0.00171)	(0.00169)
Peace Years^3	-0.000111***	-0.000115***
	(2.83e-05)	(2.77e-05)
Constant	-0.772***	-1.005***
	(0.151)	(0.231)
Observations	2,169	2,121

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

On the other hand, the remaining control variables show different effects from the previous models. Ethnonation-state incongruence is statistically insignificant, indicating that if states are already engaged in nationalistic rivalry, ethnonation-state incongruence is not a distinctive factor in causing revisionist behavior. A more fine-grained measure of transstate-ethnic nationalism within nationalistic rivalry is proposed when testing Hypotheses 7-9 in the next section. The capability difference is statistically insignificant, suggesting that a dyadic power balance is not relevant within nationalistic rivalry. This is possibly because nationalistic rivalry causes states to behave not simply based on an objective assessment of material power relations but according to the cognitive bias of the chauvinist thought. It may lead a society to believe that revision to its own advantage is possible, whether the rival is stronger or weaker in terms of a purely objective assessment. Democratic targets also become statistically insignificant, indicating that democratic states are not more likely to be a target of revisionist behavior by autocratic states, if they are engaged in nationalistic rivalry.

The statistical insignificance of democratic dyads here has a different implication from the previous models. When it was found that democratic dyads are statistically insignificant in explaining a revisionist propensity in the observations of directed-dyad disputes, I inferred that a foreign policy calculus changes among democratic states once a militarized dispute occurs. Here, observations are nationalistic-rivalry dyad-years, and it is also plausible to suspect that nationalistic rivalry in particular (rather than militarized disputes in general) also influences a foreign policy calculus of democratic states. This point will be revisited in Chapter 5.

To understand the substantive effect of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio on the probability of revisionist behavior, predicted probabilities are estimated based on Model 3-21, holding

all other factors at the mean or mode. The results are presented in Figure 3-4. For the ease of interpretation, the original form rather than natural logarithm form of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio is used in the graph. An increase in the ratio drastically raises the probability of revisionist behavior if the ratio is quite small. Meanwhile, as the ratio becomes larger, its effect on the probability of revisionist behavior diminishes. In other words, if states engaged in nationalistic rivalry have barely resorted to nationalist mobilization before but initiates to do so, the size of the impact on a revisionist propensity is much bigger than when states engaged in nationalistic rivalry have already conducted nationalist mobilization to some extent before and have increased it. This finding suggests that the sudden emergence of a nationalist tendency is more dangerous than its long-term presence.

Figure 3-4: Predicted probabilities of revisionist behavior, given the ME-to-GDPpc ratio



The solid lines are the mean; the dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals
The ratio is calculated by using military expenditure at current US thousands of dollars and GDP per capita at current US dollars

Empirical Analysis of the Dichotomy

Finally, this chapter empirically examines the remaining Hypotheses 7-9, derived from the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The first part explains research design. The second presents and discusses the results of analysis, including robustness checks of whether civic nationalism, or state-territorial nationalism in democratic regime, is less prone to revisionist behavior, as the original civic-ethnic dichotomy suggests.

Research Design

As in the last statistical models, the dependent variable is revisionist behavior, and the observations one year ahead (t+1) are used to control for the endogeneity of simultaneity bias.

The explanatory variables are the binary indicators of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms within nationalistic rivalry, as follows. To test monadic-level Hypothesis 7, state-territorial nationalism is coded 1 if an actor state does not have a transstate ethnic issue vis-à-vis a target state; otherwise 0. Thus, the baseline category is transstate-ethnic nationalism. The use of transstate ethnic issues is more fine-grained than ethnonation-state incongruence to measure the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms. The presence of such issues directly captures the concern and motivation of states for irredentism or national unification movement, whereas ethnonation-state incongruence is a structural condition for them.

To test dyadic-level Hypotheses 8 and 9, mutually state-territorial nationalisms are coded 1 if neither state has transstate ethnic issues vis-à-vis the other. Mutually transstate-ethnic nationalisms are coded 1 if both states have transstate ethnic issues

vis-à-vis the other. State-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalisms are coded 1 if an actor state does not have a transstate ethnic issue while a target state has such an issue. Finally, transstate-ethnic vs. state-territorial nationalisms are coded 1 if an actor state has a transstate ethnic issue whereas a target state does not have such an issue.

Table 3-9 displays the descriptive statistics of the type of nationalism within nationalistic rivalry at the non-directed dyad-year level. Mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry amounts to 33.2% to the total observations, mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry 23%, and state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry (i.e., either state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalisms = 1 or transstate-ethnic vs. state-territorial nationalisms = 1) 43.8%. Overall, state-territorial nationalism is the majority case. This is unsurprising, given that the pursuit of preserving the exiting statehood is consistent with the norm of sovereignty, while the seeking of a transstate ethnic policy violates the principle of nonintervention into other sovereign states.

Table 3-9: Descriptive statistics of the type of nationalism within nationalistic rivalry

type of nationalistic rivalry	# of the observations	% to the total observations (2,774)
mutually state-territorial	920	33.2%
mutually transstate-ethnic	638	23.0%
state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic	1,216	43.8%

As before, the following factors are controlled for in explaining revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry: the ME-to-GDPpc ratio; the capability difference and its squared term; contiguity; and democratic actors, democratic targets, and democratic dyads. The unit of analysis is directed dyad-years, and the observations are a subset of

nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The estimation method is probit regression as the dependent variable is binary. To control for the temporal dependence of the observations of no revisionist behavior, the cubic polynomials of a peace year counter for revisionist behavior are included (Carter and Signorino 2010). The ongoing years of revisionist behavior are dropped to control for the temporal dependence of the dyad-years of revisionist behavior (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 661). Both dispute originators and joiners, and both dispute initiators and targets are included. Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are implemented to control for within-group correlations.

Results

Table 3-10 presents the results of the monadic-level analysis to test Hypothesis 7, and Table 3-11 displays the results of the dyadic-level analysis, where the baseline category is either mutually transstate-ethnic nationalisms or transstate-ethnic vs. state-territorial nationalisms, to test Hypothesis 8 and Hypothesis 9 respectively. In each type of the models, the results with and without the control variables are presented (the peace year time controls are included across all models).

First, the monadic-level analysis indicates that state-territorial nationalism is statistically significant and decreases the likelihood of revisionist behavior. Thus, Hypothesis 7 is supported.

Second, the dyadic-level analysis using mutually transstate-ethnic nationalisms as the baseline category shows that mutually state-territorial nationalisms do not have any statistical significance. The predicted probability estimation later also produces the results that there is no substantive difference either. In other words, the difference between state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism is unlikely to be

relevant to differentiating a revisionist propensity, if both states in nationalistic-rivalry dyads have the same type of nationalism. Hypothesis 8 is supported.

Table 3-10: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in the subset of nationalistic rivalry (monadic models)

	Model 3-22	Model 3-23
State-Territorial Nationalism	-0.229***	-0.154*
	(0.0847)	(0.0895)
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.0553**
		(0.0248)
Contiguity		0.264
		(0.164)
Capability Difference		-0.628
		(0.825)
Capability Difference^2		2.897
		(10.14)
Democratic Actor		-0.203**
		(0.101)
Democratic Target		0.0244
		(0.107)
Democratic Dyad		0.0999
		(0.191)
Constant	-0.288***	-0.884***
	(0.0933)	(0.225)
Observations	2,274	2,121

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses
Peace year variables suppressed
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table 3-11: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in the subset of nationalistic rivalry (dyadic models)

	Model 3-24	Model 3-25	Model 3-26	Model 3-27
Mutually State-Territorial	-0.0638	0.00648	-0.276**	-0.262**
Nationalisms	(0.0937)	(0.101)	(0.120)	(0.128)
Mutually Transstate-Ethnic	*baseline*		-0.212*	-0.269**
Nationalisms	*category*		(0.119)	(0.128)
State-Territorial vs.	-0.231*	-0.0719	-0.443***	-0.340**
Transstate-Ethnic Nationalisms	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Transstate-Ethnic vs.	0.212*	0.269**	*baseline*	
State-Territorial Nationalisms	(0.119)	(0.128)	*category*	
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.0642***		0.0642***
		(0.0243)		(0.0243)
Contiguity		0.270		0.270
		(0.176)		(0.176)
Capability Difference		-0.762		-0.762
		(0.782)		(0.782)
Capability Difference^2		3.502		3.502
		(9.179)		(9.179)
Democratic Actor		-0.218**		-0.218**
		(0.102)		(0.102)
Democratic Target		-0.0545		-0.0545
		(0.104)		(0.104)
Democratic Dyad		0.194		0.194
		(0.185)		(0.185)
Constant	-0.399***	-1.071***	-0.187	-0.802***
	(0.0914)	(0.243)	(0.124)	(0.238)
Observations	2,274	2,121	2,274	2,121

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Finally, the dyadic-level analysis using transstate-ethnic vs. state-territorial nationalisms as the baseline category indicates that state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic

nationalisms are statistically significant and decreases the probability of revisionist behavior. Hence, Hypothesis 9 is accepted. These results mean that the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms really matters, but only in the case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry.

The results of the control variables are substantively the same as in the last section. The ME-to-GDPpc ratio is statistically significant, and a higher ratio increases the probability of revisionist behavior. Democratic actors are statistically significant and less likely to engage in revisionist behavior. Contiguity, the capability difference and its squared term, democratic targets, and democratic dyads are statistically insignificant.

As explained in the last chapter, in some cases, the alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues is possible. The results of using it for coding the type of nationalism are presented in Tables C-9, 10, 11, and 12 in Appendix C. Most of the findings are robust, whether the original coding or alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues is used to code the type of nationalism. The only exception is that state-territorial nationalism loses statistical significance in the monadic-level analysis if the alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues is used and the control variables are included. A possible reason for this is that the monadic models do not capture the nuance of dyadic interactions unlike the dyadic models. The dyadic models have found that transstate-ethnic nationalism is more prone to revisionist behavior only in the case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry and not in the comparison between mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. Hence, the effect of state-territorial nationalism is diminished in the monadic models which do not differentiate those different cases of dyadic interactions within nationalistic rivalry. Thus, it may be said that Hypothesis 7 is less robust and only

weakly supported.

To understand the substantive effect of the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms, the predicted probabilities of revisionist behavior are estimated based on Model 3-25. The control variables are fixed at their mean (if continuous measures) or mode (if binary measures). The results are presented in Table 3-12. Mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry produce substantively the same results, supporting Hypothesis 8. Meanwhile, in the asymmetrical case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, the type of nationalism leads to a meaningful difference. In a relative term, the difference between state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism is .07 (.09 vs. .16), which is substantively large. The probability of .16 is also significantly high in an absolute term, as it means that the transstate-ethnic nationalism side in the dyad of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry is 16% probable to behave in a revisionist manner against the state-territorial nationalism side per year.

Table 3-12: Predicted probabilities of revisionist behavior, given the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in nationalistic rivalry

		target					
		state-territorial			transstate-ethnic		
		mean	95% CI		mean	95% CI	
actor	state-territorial	.11	.08	.14	.09	.06	.14
	transstate-ethnic	.16	.12	.22	.11	.08	.14

The findings of this section indicate that it is necessary to separate the symmetrical and asymmetrical combination of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms

within nationalistic rivalry, in order to correctly differentiate the effect of these nationalisms. Thus, it is too naïve to argue that transstate-ethnic nationalism is more probable to cause revisionist behavior than state-territorial nationalism in *any case*. Rather, it is confined to the case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, and this point suggests that not only the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms but also the nature of dyadic interactions of these nationalisms matters in explaining the relationship between nationalism and revisionist behavior.

Finally, for a robustness check, it is examined whether state-territorial nationalism in combination with democracy, or so-called civic nationalism, is less prone to revisionist behavior than the other cases. Democratic state-territorial nationalism should mitigate a propensity for revisionist behavior even under the condition of nationalistic rivalry, if the common belief that civic nationalism is peaceful were correct.

To check this possibility, I add the interaction term between democratic actors and state-territorial nationalism in the monadic-level analysis, and the ones between democratic actors and mutually state-territorial nationalisms and state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalisms in the dyadic-level analysis. Table 3-13 presents the results of monadic models and Table 3-14 those of dyadic models (for the results using the alternative coding, see Tables C-11 and C-12 in Appendix C). The interaction terms have no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of revisionist behavior in any of these models. In short, the common belief that civic nationalism is peaceful does not apply to the condition of nationalistic rivalry.

Table 3-13: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on civic nationalism in the subset of nationalistic rivalry (monadic models)

	Model 3-28	Model 3-29
State-Territorial Nationalism	-0.190**	-0.157*
	(0.0907)	(0.0911)
State-Territorial Nationalism	0.0117	0.0151
* Democratic Actor	(0.196)	(0.202)
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.0553**
		(0.0248)
Contiguity		0.264
		(0.165)
Capability Difference		-0.623
		(0.818)
Capability Difference^2		2.804
		(10.27)
Democratic Actor	-0.200	-0.214
	(0.167)	(0.192)
Democratic Target		0.0246
		(0.107)
Democratic Dyad		0.102
		(0.195)
Constant	-0.266***	-0.883***
	(0.0948)	(0.224)
Observations	2,239	2,121

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table 3-14: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on civic nationalism in the subset of nationalistic rivalry (dyadic models)

	Model 3-30	Model 3-31	Model 3-32	Model 3-33
Mutually State-Territorial	-0.0344	0.00422	-0.240*	-0.265**
Nationalism	(0.0998)	(0.105)	(0.126)	(0.129)
Mutually State-Territorial	0.00623	0.00471	0.00623	0.00471
Nationalism * Democratic Actor	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.216)
Mutually Transstate-Ethnic	*baseline*		-0.205*	-0.269**
Nationalism	*category*		(0.124)	(0.128)
State-Territorial vs. Transstate-Ethnic	-0.189	-0.0638	-0.394**	-0.332*
Nationalisms	(0.149)	(0.156)	(0.177)	(0.172)
State-Territorial vs. Transstate-Ethnic	0.0147	-0.0285	0.0147	-0.0285
Nationalisms * Democratic Actor	(0.255)	(0.261)	(0.255)	(0.261)
Transstate-Ethnic vs.	0.212*	0.205*	*baseline*	
State-Territorial Nationalisms	(0.119)	(0.124)	*category*	
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.0644***		0.0644***
		(0.0243)		(0.0243)
Contiguity		0.270		0.270
		(0.176)		(0.176)
Capability Difference		-0.753		-0.753
		(0.775)		(0.775)
Capability Difference^2		3.640		3.640
		(9.210)		(9.210)
Democratic Actor	-0.190	-0.211	-0.190	-0.211
	(0.182)	(0.197)	(0.182)	(0.197)
Democratic Target		-0.0538		-0.0538
		(0.103)		(0.103)
Democratic Dyad		0.188		0.188
		(0.182)		(0.182)
Constant	-0.374***	-1.072***	-0.169	-0.804***
	(0.0940)	(0.241)	(0.128)	(0.234)
Observations	2,239	2,121	2,239	2,121

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Conclusion

This chapter has empirically examined all nine hypotheses formulated in the last chapter: the causes of nationalistic rivalry, the effects of nationalistic rivalry, and the implications of the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms. The statistical analyses have found that all of these hypotheses are empirically supported (see Table 3-15). Thus, the thesis has now achieved its first goal: theorize and empirically investigate the causal mechanisms whereby states develop nationalistic rivalry and engage in revisionist behavior. The following two chapters address the other goal of the thesis: investigate whether two major conflict-mitigating factors, nuclear deterrence and liberal peace, can reduce a revisionist propensity within nationalistic rivalry.

Table 3-15: Results of hypothesis testing

	Causes of nationalistic rivalry	
H1	The higher the absolute level of ethnic heterogeneity in a less ethnically heterogeneous state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry.	supported
H2	The higher the absolute level of political instability in a more politically stable state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry.	supported
H3	If the power holder ethnic group of the state has transborder ethnic kin in another state, the dyad is more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry.	supported
	Effects of nationalistic rivalry	
H4	If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry.	supported
H5	If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to nationalist mobilization than those without such rivalry.	supported
H6	If states have a higher level of nationalist mobilization within nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior.	supported
	Implications of the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms	
H7	In nationalistic-rivalry dyads, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism.	weakly supported
H8	Mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry make a similar propensity for revisionist behavior.	supported
H9	In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism.	supported

Chapter 4

Nationalistic Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence

The thesis has found so far that states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior. Is nuclear deterrence, a realist conflict-mitigating factor, able to mitigate this effect of nationalistic rivalry? Nuclear deterrence theory argues in terms of a pure cost-benefit calculation that it would be unreasonable for nuclear states to engage in war, because there would be no benefit that outweighs the cost of nuclear exchange (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 8-9, 11; Mearsheimer 1984/85, 21; Powell 1985; Rauchhaus 2009).[1] If states seek survival, war under the mutual possession of nuclear weapons (nuclear symmetry) is too risky, even if the probability of nuclear exchange is so small that the expected utility of war and that of peace will come closer to each other.

This chapter argues that this strategic calculation based on nuclear deterrence theory can be biased by the lens of nationalistic rivalry. Nationalistic rivalry leads states to overestimate one's deterrence power and underestimate the other's resolve to counteract aggression. Hence, the strategic implication of nuclear deterrence is interpreted in a

[1] Theories and empirics on the relationship between nuclear weapons and interstate conflict also expand to the systemic effect of nuclear proliferation (Asal and Beardsley 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982; Intriligator and Brito 1981; Sagan 2003; Waltz 2003), nuclear asymmetry (Geller 1990; Rauchhaus 2009), the period of nuclear possessions (Asal and Beardsley 2007; Horowitz 2009; Sobek, Foster, and Robison 2012), the stability-instability paradox (Bajpai 2009; Rauchhaus 2009; Saideman 2005), extended nuclear deterrence (Huth 1990; Weede 1983), nuclear postures (Narang 2013), and endogeneity (Gartzke and Jo 2009). Nonetheless, the chapter focuses on the traditional theory of nuclear deterrence because it is the most widely known theory, not only among academics but also among policy makers, to explain the causality of nuclear weapons to reduce interstate conflict.

different way from what nuclear deterrence theory expects, and states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are unlikely to be deterred by nuclear symmetry.

The chapter first highlights the theory of nuclear deterrence and discusses how nationalistic rivalry biases the interpretation of nuclear deterrence by actors, expecting that nuclear symmetry within nationalistic rivalry does not have any significant effect on the likelihood of revisionist behavior in interstate war. Next, the chapter presents statistical findings showing the null effect of nuclear symmetry within nationalistic rivalry. As this result is an outlier for nuclear deterrence theory and null findings do not guarantee the absence of an effect, the chapter then proceeds to a case study of India-Pakistan to support the hypothesized causal mechanism.

Nuclear Deterrence and Nationalistic Rivalry

Powell (1985) explicates the two "theoretical foundations" of nuclear deterrence. First, when a nuclear dyad (a pair of nuclear states) does not have a second strike capability, it finds itself in the "spectrum of risk." Both sides in the dyad know that nuclear war destroys the whole state. Because neither can ever get rid of this risk, it is reluctant to take the risk of conflict escalation (77-78). The spectrum of risk will prevail when states believe the possibility of accidental and irrational use of nuclear weapons (84-85). Thus, "[s]omewhat paradoxically, nuclear deterrence, which had often been criticized for assuming rationality, actually presupposed irrationality" (80).

Second, when a nuclear dyad has a second strike capability, it finds itself in the "spectrum of violence." The mutual second strike capability clarifies that neither side can go to war so that both could conduct escalation against each other with the assurance of no nuclear war (78-82). However, even in this case, nuclear deterrence

works to deter war. First, states might still fear the possibility of accidental and irrational use of nuclear weapons, thereby fulfilling the logic of the spectrum of risk (83). Second, even only in terms of the spectrum of violence, neither side wants to, or can, use nuclear weapons to forestall each other, because both sides know that the expected benefits of escalation will not outweigh the expected costs of nuclear war due to mutual second strike capabilities (83). Powell argues that nuclear dyads capable of a second strike escalate crises by the rational calculation of strategic interaction as far as the cost of escalation does not exceed that of submission (87-92), which results in the stability-instability paradox (Bajpai 2009; Rauchhaus 2009; Saideman 2005). Thus, Hagerty (2009, 109-110) notes, "Not even the most optimistic of deterrence optimists claims that nuclear weapons deter *every single kind or degree of military aggression*" (emphasis added). In short, in terms of the spectrum of violence, limited conflict may be possible but war is too dangerous.

In short, the crucial demarcation of nuclear deterrence theory is whether nuclear deterrence works because of the risk of irrational and accidental nuclear war (the spectrum of risk), or because of the rational calculation of strategic interaction over the possibility of nuclear war and that of the adversary's submission (the spectrum of violence). In terms of both rationality and psychology, nuclear symmetry has a credible deterrence effect on conflict escalation to war, if not inhibiting any kind of conflict behavior.

Empirical findings have been mixed so far. While nuclear deterrence theory largely draws on the US-USSR Cold War rivalry which avoided escalation to war, in quantitative research Rauchhaus (2009) argues that nuclear symmetry reduces the likelihood of war whereas Bell and Miller (2013) point out that Rauchhaus's (2009)

research design is flawed and nuclear symmetry actually does not have any statistically significant effect on the probability of war. Yet, these quantitative empirical studies implicitly assume that the strategic implication of nuclear symmetry is the same across all dyads, as they include all dyads in statistical models. This neorealist-like assumption that all states are equal in the system is not necessarily warranted, given that a variation in the characteristics of states and dyads are now widely recognized in the IR literature.[2] Hence, it is plausible to reason that the logic of nuclear deterrence may not equally apply to all dyads. In terms of this chapter, the question here is whether states engaged in nationalistic rivalry interpret the strategic implications of nuclear symmetry in the same way as those without such rivalry.

Nuclear deterrence works if and only if the expected utility of escalation to war is lower than that of non-escalation. As discussed above, nuclear deterrence theory assumes that with or without second-strike capabilities, the expected utility of escalation to war is always lower than that of non-escalation, because the cost of nuclear war exceeds any benefit from war (whereas limited conflict could be pursued in the spectrum of violence). This reasoning can be seen as an objectivist assessment of nuclear weapons.

However, nationalistic rivalry can bias such an assessment. Chapter 2 has noted that states engaged in nationalistic rivalry perceive themselves as righteous and stronger while the other as threatening but weaker. The implication of this argument for nuclear deterrence is that if states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are both nuclear-armed, they should see each other as even more threatening but still possible to defeat by one's own

[2] For example, the thesis mentioned the distinction between revisionists and non-revisionists or the one between rivals and non-rivals in Chapter 1.

nuclear strength. In other words, the strategic implications of nuclear deterrence are interpreted through the cognitive biases of nationalistic rivalry, in favor of oneself and in opposition to the other.

Because nuclear deterrence hardens the image of the threatening "other" while causing overconfidence in one's military might, one is still likely to attempt to engage in revisionist behavior in war (e.g., destroying all nuclear facilities of the rival). The hardened threat perception increases deterrence credibility of the other, but this increased credibility is cancelled out by one's overconfidence in its national nuclear capabilities. Thus, all in all it is expected that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on a revisionist propensity in war within nationalistic rivalry. I do not consider the probability of revisionist behavior in lower levels of militarized disputes than war, as nuclear deterrence theory mainly focuses on the likelihood of war.

Statistical Analysis

To examine the effect of nuclear symmetry on a revisionist propensity in war, this chapter firstly conducts large-N statistical analysis. This section is structured as follows. The first explains a research design, and the second presents and discusses the results of analysis.

Research Design

The dependent variable here is not revisionist behavior in any kind of militarized disputes unlike the last chapter, as nuclear deterrence theory expects that nuclear symmetry deters war and not any level of hostility. Instead, this chapter focuses on revisionist behavior in war (hereafter, "revisionist war"), a binary variable coded 1 if a

state in a dyad is a revisionist and engages in war against another state (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). The definition of war is a militarized interstate dispute whose total casualties exceed 1,000. The observations one year ahead (t+1) are used to control for the endogeneity of simultaneity bias.

The explanatory variables of interest in this chapter are as follows. To measure the effect of nuclear weapons, nuclear actors are coded 1 if an actor in a dyad has nuclear weapons; 0 otherwise, and nuclear targets are coded 1 if a target in a dyad has nuclear weapons; 0 otherwise. These two variables are interacted to compose nuclear dyads and capture the effect of nuclear deterrence.

Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that the probability of states possessing nuclear weapons is endogenous to the probability of interstate conflict. In other words, states under threats are more likely to develop nuclear weapons and a propensity for conflict is not the consequence of nuclear weapons *per se* but the presence of threats. To remedy this endogeneity issue, they propose the use of a propensity score for the acquisition of nuclear weapons as instruments, and argue that controlling for this endogeneity, the possession of nuclear weapons has no effect on the probability of conflict initiation. This endogeneity problem is irrelevant here, because the unit of analysis here is nationalistic-rivalry dyad-years and nationalistic rivalry is by definition a measure of threat perception. In other words, threat perception is a constant within nationalistic rivalry. Therefore, if it is not the possession of nuclear weapons but the presence of threats that determines a propensity for revisionist war, the above three nuclear variables should be statistically insignificant in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads.

The effect of the period of nuclear possession is measured by the actor's nuclear years and the target's nuclear years (Sobek, Foster, and Robison 2012; Horowitz 2009).

To create these variables, I firstly count years since an actor state acquired nuclear weapons and those since a target state acquired nuclear weapons. 0 is assigned to all non-nuclear states, and the count of nuclear years begins with the value of 1, because the non-nuclear states and the nuclear states which just acquired nuclear weapons should be substantively different. Then, the values of nuclear years except for 0 are transformed to the exponents to the negative values of nuclear years, namely $e^{-\text{Actor's Nuclear Years}}$ and $e^{-\text{Target's Nuclear Years}}$, to capture the proposition that new nuclear states are more likely to engage in conflict than both non-nuclear states and old nuclear states (Sagan 2003, 53-72). Information on all nuclear states is from Gartzke and Kroenig (2009), as summarized in Table 4-1.[3]

Table 4-1: Information of nuclear states

year	nuclear states
1945-1948	US
1949-1951	US, USSR
1952-1959	US, USSR,UK
1960-1963	US, USSR,UK, France
1964-1966	US, USSR, UK, France, China
1967-1981	US, USSR, UK, France, China, Israel
1982-1987	US, USSR, UK, France, China, Israel, South Africa
1988-1989	US, USSR, UK, France, China, Israel, South Africa, India
1990	US, USSR, UK, France, China, Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan
1991-	US, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan

Source: Gartzke and Kroenig (2009)

The chapter also controls for other factors explaining a revisionist propensity in

[3] For why Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and North Korea are not coded as nuclear states, see Gartzke and Kroenig (2009, 154).

nationalistic rivalry: the ratio of military expenditure to GDP per capita (the ME-to-GDPpc ratio); ethnonation-state incongruence; the capability difference, or an actor state's CINC minus a target state's CINC (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987), and its squared term; contiguity, a binary variable coded 1 if states in a dyad are contiguous through land or the water which is equal to or less than 150 miles (Stinnett et al. 2002); and democratic actors, democratic targets, and democratic dyads, coded 1 if respectively an actor state, a target state, and both states in dyads are democracies (Marshall 2013). To control for temporal dependence, the cubic polynomials of a peace year counter for revisionist war are included (Carter and Signorino 2010) and the ongoing years of revisionist war are dropped (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 661). The unit of analysis is directed dyad-years as revisionist war is the most escalated form of one state's revisionist behavior towards another state, i.e., revisionist behavior in the militarized disputes which cause at least 1,000 battle deaths. The total observations are the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The estimator of choice is probit regression, since the dependent variable is binary, and robust standard errors are clustered on dyads to control for within-group correlations.

Results

The results are presented in Table 4-2. Model 4-1 includes only the nuclear actor, the nuclear target, and nuclear dyads (as well as the peace year time controls) to see whether the inclusion of the control variables changes the results significantly. Model 4-2 adds the actor's and target's nuclear years, as the possession of nuclear weapons and the period of nuclear possession are correlated and, therefore, the results might be significantly altered depending on whether they are included or not. Models 4-3 and 4-4

add the remaining control variables.

In all models, nuclear symmetry is statistically insignificant and its coefficient is positive. As expected, there is no evidence that nuclear symmetry reduces the probability of revisionist war within nationalistic rivalry. The results echo Gartzke and Jo (2009), who suggest that the possession of nuclear weapons and the probability of interstate conflict are both the effect of existing threats. In other words, given that the subset of nationalistic rivalry makes threat perception a constant, the mere possession of nuclear weapons does not influence a propensity for revisionist war. Meanwhile, there has been no revisionist war between nuclear states outside nationalistic rivalry, during the period of 1946-2001 across all available dyads based on the COW State Membership data. Put differently, without the observations of nationalistic-rivalry dyads, nuclear symmetry predicts the absence of revisionist war perfectly. This point indicates the distinctive nature of nationalistic-rivalry dyads in comparison with other rivalries or non-rivalries.

As for the control variables, nuclear actors, nuclear targets, and their nuclear years are statistically insignificant, suggesting that not only nuclear symmetry but also nuclear asymmetry and the period of nuclear possession do not matter in explaining revisionist war within nationalistic rivalry. The ME-to-GDPpc ratio is statistically significant and a higher ratio is associated with a higher probability of revisionist war. The higher nationalist mobilization, the more likely the state is to engage in revisionist war in particular, not only in revisionist behavior in general as already shown in Chapter 3.

Table 4-2: Probit regression of revisionist war on nuclear deterrence

	Model 4-1	Model 4-2	Model 4-3	Model 4-4
Nuclear Dyad	0.363	0.351	0.400	0.365
	(0.484)	(0.498)	(0.580)	(0.595)
Nuclear Actor	0.216	0.265	0.148	0.219
	(0.301)	(0.308)	(0.362)	(0.382)
Nuclear Target	0.0623	0.0833	-0.182	-0.157
	(0.256)	(0.261)	(0.327)	(0.340)
Actor's Nuclear Years		-2.843		-2.858
		(2.205)		(1.973)
Target's Nuclear Years		-1.072		-1.175
		(0.852)		(1.059)
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio			0.0829**	0.0821**
			(0.0396)	(0.0401)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence			0.476***	0.486***
			(0.144)	(0.146)
Contiguity			-0.0326	-0.0346
			(0.344)	(0.345)
Capability Difference			-1.566	-1.727
			(2.591)	(2.605)
Capability Difference^2			-0.114	-1.666
			(41.40)	(41.09)
Democratic Actor			0.183	0.184
			(0.179)	(0.181)
Democratic Target			0.419**	0.420**
			(0.174)	(0.175)
Democratic Dyad			-0.493	-0.427
			(0.360)	(0.386)
Constant	-2.291***	-2.286***	-3.293***	-3.292***
	(0.198)	(0.200)	(0.458)	(0.458)
Observations	2,542	2,534	2,379	2,379

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Ethnonation-state incongruence is statistically significant this time and increases a propensity for revisionist war, conforming to the existing literature on the relationship between transstate ethnicity and a higher likelihood of war (e.g., Miller 2007). Contiguity, the capability difference and its squared term, and democratic dyads are all statistically insignificant, as in the models explaining revisionist behavior in general within nationalistic rivalry in Chapter 3. The insignificance of contiguity and the capability difference and its squared term suggests that these materialist factors fail to explain a propensity for revisionist war within nationalistic rivalry, and the ME-to-GDPpc ratio as the measure of nationalist mobilization is more explanatory instead.

The results of democratic actors and democratic targets significantly change this time in comparison to those in the models which explain revisionist behavior in general within nationalistic rivalry in the last chapter. On the one hand, democratic actors are statistically insignificant while they were found to be less revisionist-prone in the last chapter. This result means that if the target state is an autocracy, democratic actors are not less likely to engage in revisionist war. On the other hand, democratic targets are statistically significant, indicating that democratic states are more likely to be the target of revisionist war behavior by autocratic states, although the last chapter found that democratic states are not more likely to be a target of revisionist behavior in general by autocratic rivals. This finding suggests that autocratic states take advantage of democratic states which, as noted in the last chapter, are more constrained from embarking on revisionist attempts in general (if not revisionist war in particular) against autocratic states, only if these autocratic states are committed to war efforts for a revisionist aim.

While the statistical analysis identifies no statistically significant effect of nuclear symmetry, the null finding does not mean that the null hypothesis is accepted. To increase the validity of the statistical findings, the following section presents a case study examining how nationalistic rivalry led India and Pakistan to interpret the strategic implication of nuclear deterrence in a different way from what nuclear deterrence theory would lead us to expect.

Case Study: India-Pakistan

India-Pakistan is the only dyad which has been the originator of revisionist war under nuclear symmetry.[4] Thus, it is an obvious outlier to nuclear deterrence theory and should be examined in greater detail by qualitative analysis (Bennett and Elman 2007, 176-178; Lieberman 2005).[5]

India and Pakistan fought war in 1999 over part of India's Kashmir, Kargil. Although the scale of war was limited, several regional experts agree that it was actually "war" in the conventional sense, i.e., a militarized dispute exceeding the threshold of 1,000 battle deaths in total (e.g., Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 143; Ganguly and Kapur 2009). This section first describes the history of the dyad, and then explains the Kargil War. Next, it discusses how nationalistic rivalry influenced the interpretation of nuclear deterrence and foreign policy choice in the dyad, empirically illuminating the causal mechanism between nuclear symmetry and revisionist war under the condition of nationalistic

[4] According to the dataset generated by EUGene, the only other case where states engaged in revisionist war under nuclear symmetry is China against Russia in the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. Russia is coded as a dispute joiner on the side of Vietnam.

[5] For qualitative analysis and case studies in political science, see Brady and Collier (2004), George and Bennett (2005), and Gerring (2007).

rivalry. Finally, it provides insight into the future of the Indo-Pakistani nationalistic rivalry.

Historical Overview

Both India and Pakistan originally composed British India before their independence. The origin of the India-Pakistan rivalry can be traced back to a communal strife between majority Hindus and minority Muslims along with the rise of nationalism in British India. The Indian National Congress, a political party led by Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, planned the independence of India as a secular democratic state to govern a multiethnic society (Paul 2005, 6). However, Muslims feared that such an independent state would threaten their political position, and claimed separate electorates and established the Muslim League Party (Paul 2005, 6). After the Congress rejected the idea of separate electorates, the League then proposed two-nation theory and the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim homeland. Meanwhile, ethnic violence between Hindus and Muslims had increased, and the United Kingdom reached "the conclusion that the creation of Pakistan was inevitable" (Paul 2005, 7).

In the process of independence and partition, princely state Jammu and Kashmir became the focal point of conflict between Hindus and Muslims. The majority of the population was Muslim but the ruler was Hindu, Maharaja Hari Singh (Paul 2005, 7-8). The United Kingdom suggested that the princely state be merged with either India or Pakistan (Varshney 1991, 1007). However, Singh refused to be merged with either (Ganguly 2001, 16), and then Pakistan initiated an armed invasion into Kashmir in 1947. Asked for help by Singh, India counterattacked Pakistan, which resulted in the first Kashmir war. The United Nations mediated India and Pakistan in 1948 (Paul 2005, 8),

and a cease-fire line was established by the Karachi agreement in 1949 (Khan, Lavoy, and Clary 2009, 71). The line was set to divide Kashmir into India's part and Pakistan's one, later called the Line of Control (LoC) (Paul 2005, 8; see Figure 4-1). Since then, however, the LoC has remained the focal point of the India-Pakistan nationalistic rivalry. In other words, after independence, intrastate conflict between Hindus and Muslims in British India was transformed to interstate conflict between India and Pakistan (Suzuki 2011).

India and Pakistan engaged in the second Kashmir war in 1965, and also fought a war over the independence of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) from Pakistan in 1971. Although the latter war was not directly related to the Kashmir issue, it still had a significant implication for the wider context of the Indo-Pakistani nationalistic rivalry. For example, Gokcek (2011, 292) points out that, for India, "the potential gain was tremendous, as supporting the Bengali secessionist movement would weaken Pakistan by jeopardizing its territorial integrity." Meanwhile, the 1971 war led Pakistan to "believe that India's role in Bangladesh stands as irrefutable proof that India will intervene whenever Pakistan presents any vulnerability" (Khan, Lavoy, and Clary 2009, 73). The war also "reinforced the belief that 'Islamic' Pakistan faced constant threats to its identity and that 'Hindu' India was committed to undoing partition" (Pande 2011, 42). Both India and Pakistan interpreted the war in terms of a wider context of their nationalistic hostility.

Figure 4-1: Map of Kashmir

Source: Wikimedia Commons (2010)

Kashmir relates to irreconcilable national identities between the two countries, because it matters for state legitimacy – India as a multi-ethnic secular state and Pakistan as the homeland of Muslims in South Asia (Hagerty 1998, 67). For Pakistan, Kashmir is a land to be redeemed, and "Pakistan portrays Kashmir as part of the broader 'Hindu-Muslim' conflict dating back to partition" (Pande 2011, 32). For India, Kashmir

is a symbol of multi-ethnic democracy, and India fears that allowing Kashmir to leave would have a domino effect on other disaffected groups (Ganguly 2001, 129). Thus, "Kashmir is a zero-sum test for each state's legitimating ideology: one's validity invalidates the other" (Hagerty 1998, 67). Because both Pakistan and India are culturally and socially divided societies (Basrur 2008, 39), the decline of state legitimacy can risk the territorial integrity of the "Indian" and "Pakistani" nations.

As Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 68) point out, "Pakistanis generally believe that the status quo in Kashmir is illegitimate" and "[t]he outcome of the partition…, in their view, was neither fair nor just." This sentiment among Pakistanis about the illegitimate treatment of their nation was one of the major drivers for Pakistan to engage in revisionist attempts against India. Pakistan believes that India has mistreated Muslims, namely Pakistani ethnic kin, in Kashmir. Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 69) write that "Pakistanis, on the streets and in uniform, look across the LoC and see a long history of vote rigging, arbitrary arrest, torture, and rape by an occupying Indian force." In addition, "India's heavy-handed policies over the Kashmiri populace are taken as proof that only through extensive oppression can the Indian state suppress the desire for Kashmiri self-determination" (Khan, Lavoy, and Clary 2009, 69). Thus, Pakistan sees India's control of Kashmir as illegitimate and humiliating to the Pakistani nation.

Along with the continuation of nationalistic rivalry, India and Pakistan began to develop nuclear weapons. According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005, 10), India's first nuclear device testing was in 1974. Meanwhile, Pakistan developed the capability of assembling a nuclear bomb by 1987 though it did not conduct a nuclear test at that time (Narang 2009/10, 48-49). Gartzke and Kroenig (2009, 154) report that India has possessed nuclear weapons since 1988 and Pakistan since 1990. India's motivation for

nuclearization was derived from China's acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964, whereas Pakistan's desire for developing nuclear weapons was to offset the imbalance of conventional military power which resulted from the breakup of Pakistan to (West) Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971 (Pande 2011, 50-51). The nuclearization of the sub-continent reached completion in 1998 when India conducted nuclear tests, followed by Pakistan's nuclear tests (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 10; The ICB Data Viewer). The public in both states widely supported the nuclear tests by its own government (Hoyt 2009, 147). The history of nuclearization in the sub-continent, however, makes it more puzzling why India and Pakistan engaged in the Kargil War in 1999, after they "announced their arrival as overt nuclear weapon states" (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 10).

The Kargil War

In 1999, members of the Pakistani military including Army Chief of Staff General Pervez Musharraf conducted an unofficial military operation to infiltrate into a mountain town called Kargil on the Indian side of Kashmir. In order to fully understand why the war occurred, it is important to examine the pre-war situations in Kashmir. According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005, 146), "indigenous, ethno-religious insurgency" broke out in the Indian part of Kashmir in December 1989, and "shortly after its genesis…Pakistan became quickly involved in shaping the direction, scope, and intensity of the insurrection." However, the Indian government was successful in cracking down on the insurgency, and a major indigenous insurgent group, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, abandoned armed struggle while the harsh treatment of local people by foreign militants resulted in the decline of local support for insurgency

(Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 147-148). Thus, the insurrection diminished.

However, Pakistan did not like this situation. Ganguly (2001, 122) argues, "The Pakistani leadership feared that this emergent normalcy in the Valley, once consolidated, would foreclose the possibility of further incitement to the insurgency"; therefore "Pakistan concluded that, if it wished to remain a relevant player in the Kashmir problem, it had to revive the insurgency." The Pakistani military – which had a powerful influence on Pakistani politics and on the civilian government (Aziz 2007)[6] – was particularly dissatisfied with India's relative success in inhibiting the Kashmiri insurgency. This dissatisfaction within the military was because India's successful crackdown on the Kashmiri insurgency was "clearly intolerable to the Pakistani politico-military establishment that had invested considerable blood and treasure in supporting the insurgency in Kashmir" (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 152). Even when the Pakistani and Indian governments were taking an initiative in reconciling with each other, the Pakistani military kept using force toward India's Kashmir (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 149-150).

Meanwhile, the nuclear tests in 1998 provoked criticisms from the international community, which pressured Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to search for a rapprochement (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 150-151). The two leaders publicized "the Lahore Declaration, which among other matters called for a series of nuclear-related confidence building measures and reaffirmed the two sides' wish to resolve the Kashmir dispute through peaceful means" (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 151).

[6] General Pervez Musharraf "described the military as 'the central gravity in Pakistan'" (*BBC News*, December 30, 2013).

The possibility of a rapprochement between India and Pakistan, however, was erased by the infiltration of Pakistani forces and Kashmiri insurgents into Kargil in April 1999. The Kargil operation was mainly planned by a few military senior officers, including General Pervez Musharraf, Lieutenant-General Mahmud Ahmed, Lieutenant-General Muhammed Aziz, and Major-General Javed Hassan (Qadir 2002, 25-26). The Kargil operation was authorized just weeks before Vajpayee visited Lahore, and Sharif did not cancel the operation even after the reconciliation process took place (Kahn, Lavoy, and Clary 2009, 86). It remains moot how much Sharif was involved in deciding the operation (Joeck 2009, 140n10) whereas Pakistani military leaders were worried that Prime Minister Sharif "might naively agree to measures ultimately harmful to Pakistan's security" (Hoyt 2009, 155). Given the weak institution of civilian rule and the strong military establishment in Pakistan, it may be inferred that the military pressured the civilian government to accept the Kargil operation.

Pakistani forces succeeded in occupying several areas by the end of April.[7] When Indian troops noticed the intrusion in early May, they thought that they were Kashmiri insurgents, and also underestimated their size. As Indian troops were unprepared for this unexpected intrusion, their reaction to the infiltration was slow and inefficient, and the initial attempts to retrieve the territory were unsuccessful. Faced with this problem, the Indian military introduced air forces to push back the intruders in late May. The use of air forces allowed the Indian troops to gradually overwhelm the Pakistani ones. Meanwhile, seeing a little sign of de-escalation of hostility, the United States pressured Pakistan to withdraw the troops. Pakistan failed to persuade great powers and the

[7] The summary of the process of the Kargil War in this paragraph draws from Ganguly and Hagerty (2005, 153-157) and Lavoy (2009, 20-23).

United States to support its position. Faced with these failures in both battlefield and diplomacy, Sharif sent a special envoy to New Delhi for negotiation to end the war. At first, the Indian government showed little interest, but agreed later. Afterwards, Sharif appeared in a nation-wide television and called for the withdrawal of insurgents from India's Kashmir. The intruders began to withdraw and the war ended in mid-July.

For Pakistan, the Kargil operation was another attempt to challenge the status quo of Kashmir, as it "repeatedly has resorted to asymmetric military means to resolve the Kashmir dispute with India on the belief that India would refuse to negotiate a just solution for the Kashmiris" (Khan, Lavoy, and Clary 2009, 66; see also 69). Thus, the operation evidences the presentation of Pakistan's transstate-ethnic nationalism over its ethnic kin in Kashmir. In short, as Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 69) point out, it "must be seen as an extension of Pakistan's decades-long quest to make headway on the Kashmir issue."

Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 74) also argue, "Contributing to the decision to execute the Kargil plan was the Pakistan army's feeling of grievance resulting from India's seizure of the Siachen Glacier in 1984 and a history of border skirmishes along the northern LoC." In particular, the crisis over the Siachen Glacier in 1984 was "a major scar" for the Pakistani army (Khan, Lavoy, and Clary 2009, 75). In the crisis, India initiated the operation to seize the glacier, a contested territory since the Karachi agreement (Cheema 2009, 54). The operation succeeded, which caused the Pakistani army to be "deeply embarrassed" (Cheema 2009, 54-55). As Cheema (2009, 55) points out, "this loss reinforced the central lesson to the Pakistani armed forces that vulnerable areas, even of questionable strategic value, must be defended at all costs." Thus, Pakistani transstate-ethnic nationalism was coupled with the national grievance of this

history, thereby triggering the Kargil War.

Interestingly, the MID dataset codes both India and Pakistan as revisionists in the Kargil War. Until then, in most MIDs, only Pakistan was coded as a revisionist. Why did India become a revisionist in this case? One plausible inference is that the rise of Hindu nationalism caused the Indian society to be dissatisfied with Pakistan's support of Kashmiri insurgency. Varshney (1991, 1002) points out, "Nurtured by a widespread feeling among the Hindu middle classes that India's secular state has gone too far in appeasing minorities (Sikhs in Punjab and Muslims in Kashmir and Muslims in general), Hindu nationalism has gained remarkable strength." Saideman (2005, 216) also argues that the rise of Hindu nationalism and Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) "made it increasingly difficult for Indian elites to pursue moderate policies and increased the sense of threat and alienation perceived by Muslims in Kashmir and elsewhere in India." Hence, it is possible to infer that India's counterattack in Kargil was not only for the self-defense purpose but also for altering the situation in Kashmir, i.e., stopping Pakistani support for Kashmiri insurgency.

Nuclear Deterrence vs. Nationalistic Rivalry

Nuclear deterrence theorists argue that the mutual possession of nuclear weapons deters states from engaging in war, because the costs of nuclear war would be more than its benefits as nuclear war would cause huge damage. The Kargil War is the most anomalous case for nuclear deterrence theory. The year of 1999 was when it became apparent that both sides had secured nuclear capabilities. Hence, it was the most-likely case where nuclear symmetry should have prevented any war operation, especially initiated by Pakistan, the weaker side in a conventional sense, in the history of the

India-Pakistan nationalistic rivalry. Nonetheless, Pakistan embarked on the revisionist attempt to occupy part of Indian Kashmir, and the dyad escalated the crisis to war. In comparison with the past Indo-Pakistani wars, the Kargil War was limited in terms of casualties but not necessarily in terms of duration (see Table 4-3).

Table 4-3: Comparative statistics of the Indo-Pakistani wars

War	Beginning date	End date	Battle deaths
First Kashmir	October 26, 1947	January 1, 1949	India: 2,500
			Pakistan: 1,000
Second Kashmir	August 5, 1965	September 23, 1965	India: 3,261
			Pakistan: 3,800
Bangladesh	December 3, 1971	December 17, 1971	India: 3,241
			Pakistan: 7,982
Kargil War	May 8, 1999	July 17, 1999	India: 474
			Pakistan: 698

Source: Sarkees and Wayman (2010)

The statistical finding that nuclear deterrence has no significant effect on the likelihood of revisionist war is consistent with the variation in the propensity of India-Pakistan for war over time. The dyad has had nationalistic rivalry since their independence in 1947, and engaged in three wars until 1989 while one war since 1990 (the year the mutual possession of nuclear weapons was indicated) until 2001, the latest year of observations in the dataset. Among them, there has been one occasion of India's revisionist war behavior in the War of Bangladesh in 1971 and two occasions of Pakistan's (the First and Second Kashmir Wars) for the period of 42 years without nuclear symmetry, and mutual revisionist war behavior in the Kargil War for the period of 11 years with nuclear symmetry. These simple statistics show that nuclear symmetry

was not associated with a lower likelihood of revisionist war at all in the Indo-Pakistani history. The period of nuclear asymmetry from 1988-89 saw no revisionist war, but two years are too short to determine whether nuclear asymmetry had an effect to inhibit revisionist war in the dyad.

Why did Pakistan resort to revisionist war against India under nuclear symmetry? Lavoy (2009, 25-26) argues that the strategy of asymmetric warfare allowed Kargil planners to believe that it is possible to win Kargil even under the condition of conventional military imbalance with India. However, strategy itself does not explain a motivation.

Ganguly (2001, 122) attributes Pakistan's motivation for initiating the asymmetric warfare to its "false optimism."[8] Ganguly argues that Pakistan simply assumed that once the dispute began, the United States and other great powers would intervene on the side of Pakistan, because they would fear the potentiality of nuclear war in the sub-continent. Furthermore, Ganguly even points out that "Pakistani decision-makers had convinced themselves that their achievement of rough nuclear parity with India now enabled them to probe along the LoC with impunity." Bajpai (2009, 163) agrees: nuclear weapons "led Pakistani leaders, civilian and military, to think that it [became] easier for their country to support terrorism and insurgency." The strategic purpose of Pakistan was to draw international attention onto Kashmir by provoking fear of a nuclear war in the sub-continent among Western states (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 152). Thus, Pakistan's calculation of the strategic implications of nuclear deterrence was different from what nuclear deterrence theory would assume. Namely, rather than being deterred by India's nuclear weapons, Pakistan predicted that its nuclear weapons would

[8] False optimism itself is theorized by Van Evera (1999).

deter India from counterattacking. The strategic implications of nuclear deterrence were interpreted in a way which favors what Pakistan desired to believe in order to satisfy its own political goal.

This false optimism of Pakistan parallels what nationalistic rivalry nurtures in the belief system: the rival is "more threatening than it really is yet more easily defeated by united opposition than the true probabilities may warrant" (Snyder 2000, 50). Pakistan has always feared that "Hindu" India would embark on aggression to reverse the partition and eliminate Pakistan although major Indian leaders have stated that they accepted the partition (Pande 2011, 29-31). This fear has been promoted by the minority of Hindu right-wing nationalists in India who have claimed that Pakistan must be annexed to India (Pande 2011, 56). Pande (2011, 57-58) argues that the fear for India's ambition to undo the partition has not disappeared even after the nuclearization of Pakistan, because "it is not a fear rooted in realistic analysis but rather is psycho-political in nature." Having this fear as a background, primary Kargil planners believed before the war operation that India might be preparing for aggression against Pakistan (although available evidence suggests that India had no such an intention) and, therefore, decided to preempt this risk (Lavoy 2009, 27). They perceived India as more threatening than it actually was. Pakistan's interpretation of India was largely shaped by nationalistic hostility and fear, and not by purely strategic, objectivist cost-benefit calculations.

On the other hand, Pakistan has believed in general that Pakistanis are a stronger race than Hindu Indians (Pande 2011, 48), as suggested by the statement that "one Muslim Pakistani was equal to five Hindu Indians" (quoted in Pande 2011, 48). More specifically in the context of the Kargil War, Pakistan thought that asymmetric warfare

would allow it to make military achievements (Lavoy 2009, 26), especially due to the fear of nuclear war (Bajpai 2009, 163). Kargil planners underestimated India's capability and willingness to defend. As Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 86-87) point out, these planners assumed that India could not launch massive counterattacks due to the difficult terrain of Kargil, could not respond to Pakistan's infiltration quickly enough to enable effective counteroffensives, and would not be willing to escalate the conflict to general war due to Pakistan's nuclear weapons. In short, Pakistan perceived India as easier to defeat than it actually was.

Pakistan's motivation for aggression against India can be explained by elite-led nationalist mobilization for political survival in terms of both interstate and intrastate politics. In terms of interstate political survival, nationalistic rivalry with India made Pakistan locked in a threat perception. As Lavoy (2009, 27) points out, "primary Kargil planners were convinced that India's hostility toward Pakistan was a permanent fact of life in the subcontinent."

In terms of domestic political survival, Mansfield and Snyder (2005, 241) argue that in Pakistan "the gap between demands for mass political participation and weak state institutions has repeatedly created incentives for both civilian and military politicians to play the nationalist card to gamble on establishing a base of mass legitimacy." Tremblay and Schofield (2005, 233) point out that the Kargil War "was over an issue of significant symbolic value, carried out with widespread public support in Pakistan." In culturally diverse Pakistan, its national identity has been significantly founded on Islam (Pande 2011, 21-22; Richter 1979, 550; Smith 1991, 113). The significance of Islam also applies to the military, which is so powerful and influential an institution in Pakistani politics that Aziz (2008, 1) calls it a "parallel state." Nasr (2005, 191) argues, "Since

1977 [when a military coup ended the civilian rule since 1972,] Islam has been important to legitimating military rule in Pakistan." Hence, he continues, "the military needs Islamic identity to maintain its commanding position in Pakistan's politics – which in turn is necessitated by the imperative of defending Pakistan in its rivalry with India" (see also Pande 2011, 22).

The Pakistani civilian government was ineffective on controlling the military. Sharif attempted to find a "face saving device" to end the war by visiting US President Bill Clinton, which did not produce any substantive achievement (Ganguly 2001, 119). Ganguly (2001,119) argues, "Although Sharif's visit to Washington underscored his realization of the scope of his misadventure, various Kashmir groups who were participating in the Pakistani effort in Kargil showed little inclination to bring their fighting to a close." Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 89) also point out that "the Sharif government attempted to disassociate itself from the Kargil operation" whereas "the military seethed over a Washington-brokered withdrawal that did not allow for the safe retreat of Pakistani forces." Finally, Sharif did not consult details with the army staff as well as his cabinet before going to the US (Rizvi 2009, 344). In short, the Kargil War made the divide between the civilian government and the military establishment even wider, and contributed to the overthrow of the Sharif government by the army in October.[9] This episode suggests that showing a dovish posture towards the rival nation risks the loss of political power, as nationalistic rivalry theory predicts.

India also had false optimism, which led it to interpret the strategic implications of

[9] According to Rizvi (2009, 341-342), Sharif's decision to withdraw from Kargil also caused massive disappointment among the masses and political actors as well, because the government at first exaggerated to the public the successful operation of Kashmiri freedom fighters against India and therefore it appeared contradictory to withdraw Pakistani support.

nuclear deterrence in the way which is comfortable with its own image. One year before the Kargil, India conducted nuclear tests. It was motivated not by security concerns as IR realists expect but by the BJP's nationalist ambition to "make a 'strong' Indian nation" (Vanaik and Islamia 2002, 323-326).[10] From this observation it can be inferred that the nuclear tests gave the BJP-led government (over)confidence of national strength endorsed by nuclear weapons to deter Pakistan. Along the tide of the rapprochement at the political level, Indian decision makers and analysts expected and believed, as does nuclear deterrence theory, that India's apparent nuclear capability would make it improbable for the dyad to engage in conventional armed conflict (Ganguly 2001, 123-124; Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 153).[11] On March 15, 1999, just before the Kargil War began, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee stated:

> Now both India and Pakistan are in possession of nuclear weapons. There is no alternative but to live in mutual harmony. The nuclear weapon is not an offensive weapon. It is a weapon of self-defence. It is the kind of weapon that helps in preserving the peace. If in the days of the Cold War there was no use of force, it was because of the balance of terror (quoted in Karat 1999).

The majority of the public also supported the nuclear tests (Hoyt 2009, 146-147). Thus,

[10] For a summary of the political discourse of nuclearized strong India, see Chaulia (2002, 221). It is noteworthy that while the BJP-led government claimed that it changed the traditional course of foreign policy by a realpolitike model, actually previous governments also used such a model (Vanaik and Islamia 2002, 330-331).

[11] In fact, Indian military leaders recognized that Pakistan would resort to conventional war even under the condition of nuclear symmetry (Hoyt 2009, 154). This fact suggests that contrary to Pakistan, the established institution of civilian rule did not benefit Indian national security.

both the elites and the masses agreed that the nuclear tests were a good thing for India, particularly for its security.

India's nationalism led to false optimism in that the national capability of overt nuclear weapons misled India to underestimate the risk of Pakistan's aggression. In other words, the possession of nuclear weapons allowed India to expect that united opposition with nuclear weapons would overwhelm Pakistan and the potentiality of national nuclear retaliation would be clear enough to deter Pakistan from resorting to adventure against India.

The presence of India's threat perception is not as straightforward to identify as Pakistan's, however. India assumed that the rapprochement after the nuclear tests in 1998 improved its relation with Pakistan (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 159), and that given this rapprochement as well as operational difficulties in the mountains of Kargil, Pakistan would not have a motivation for launching aggression (Wirtz and Rana 2009, 220). A simpler explanation is that India believed that Pakistan would remain threatening but would be weak enough to be deterred by nuclear weapons. A more complicated explanation is that India really perceived Pakistan as *less* threatening than it actually was, because India and Pakistan were on the way to rivalry termination before the Kargil War, at least at the level of the civilian governments. As far as available evidence is concerned, the Kargil operation was primarily organized by the Pakistani senior army officers rather than Sharif's civilian government (Hagerty 2009, 102). This variable of the Pakistani "hybrid regime" (Tremblay and Schofield 2005) is what the theory of nationalistic rivalry fails to capture.

Even if the second explanation were correct, the mitigation of India's threat perception of Pakistan would have been an exception in their history. Actually, the

Kargil War rather supports the structural causal effect of nationalistic rivalry on a revisionist propensity. Even if one side in a nationalistic-rivalry dyad begins to search for a peaceful settlement, the other side will exploit and take advantage of it, as Pakistan did. This situation can be summarized as the Prisoners' Dilemma game; if India chose to cooperate, Pakistan chose to defect as the best response, because Pakistan's highest payoff was to annex the Indian part of Kashmir (the rational choice defined by transstate-ethnic nationalism), and not to cooperate with India and accept the status quo of Kashmir. Pakistan believed that it could engage in the revisionist attempt because of nuclear deterrence. Once India realized that Pakistan defected, it could no longer keep cooperating with Pakistan and counterattacked in the battlefield. As already discussed, the status quo of India's Kashmir is essential for Indian national identity. Some nationalists have even hoped for the annexation of Pakistan's Kashmir and the BJP, among other political parties, has been least satisfied with a divided Kashmir (Vanaik and Islamia 2002, 337-338). Thus, Pakistan's occupation of Kargil was unacceptable to India by any means. Once the rapprochement was betrayed by Pakistan, India realized that Pakistan was untrustworthy (Basrur 2009, 321-323).

In short, both Pakistan and India expected that their rival would be deterred by their own nuclear weapons. The way of interpreting the strategic implications of this expectation, however, was different between them because of their own national goals. For Pakistan, the national goal was to overturn India's anti-insurgency program and to annex Kashmir, the land to be redeemed. For India, it was to keep cracking down on the insurgency and to secure territorial integrity for its national identity and state legitimacy, though also making an effort to mitigate nationalistic hostility in the dyad. To achieve these national goals, even under the condition of nuclear symmetry, firstly Pakistan

initiated the Kargil operation whereas India had to counteract it, which resulted in the Kargil War.

Ganguly and Hagerty (2005, 160-162) suggest that the mutual possession of nuclear weapons inhibited even the Hindu nationalist BJP-led government from expanding the war (if not resorting to limited war), for fear that escalation would cause Pakistan's use of nuclear weapons. This argument implies that even nationalists might be rational enough to fear nuclear war, and nuclear deterrence might prevent *escalation* of revisionist behavior to full-scale war, although it did not inhibit a limited scale of war. This argument has two problems, however. First, it is unclear how one can define war as limited or full-scale in a clear manner. Unless a clear demarcating line is drawn between limited and full-scale wars, many empirical cases would be interpreted as "evidence" for the argument, depending on the position of analysts. Second, and more important, Prime Minister Vajpayee was actually oriented more to the Nehruvian tradition of prudent foreign policy than to the party's position of hawkish foreign policy (Chaulia 2002, 224-226). It can be inferred that this government-party divide helped the Kargil war to be constrained. If the government and political party had been monolithically hardliners, the result might have been different.

Primed for Peace?

Despite the violent history, the level of conflict escalation has certainly decreased over time since the nuclearization of the subcontinent. While the dyad experienced two other violent crises in 2001-02 after the Kargil War (Suzuki and Loizides 2011), the level of violence was more limited. Afterwards, India and Pakistan began a peace process in 2004 when the leaders of both countries met in a SAARC meeting (Mukherjee 2009,

437n1; Patil 2008, 2).

Mukherjee (2009) argues that the reasons for the peace process are threefold. First, they are now aware that war is an infeasible option, especially in the age of nuclear weapons (411-412). On the one hand, former Australian defense attaché in Islamabad, Brian Cloughley, says: “Musharaff has never been a nuclear hawk. As a soldier he realizes more than most the terrible consequences of a nuclear exchange” (quoted in Tremblay and Schofield 2005, 236). Given this point as well as the aforementioned arguments, Musharaff’s initiative in the Kargil operation was motivated by false optimism based on expected nuclear deterrence and not by adventurism towards nuclear war. Once he realized that India would counteract Pakistan’s aggression even under the condition of nuclear symmetry, Musharaff’s optimism seems to have declined over time, as the 2001-2002 crises under his incumbency did not escalate to war.

On the other hand, after the Kargil War, India learned that nuclear symmetry itself would not be sufficient to deter Pakistan, and reached a conclusion that limited war is possible with Pakistan under the shadow of nuclear symmetry (Basrur 2009, 327-328). India reviewed its strategy and tactics vis-à-vis Pakistan in the context of nuclear symmetry, and was able to respond quickly in the 2001-2002 crises (Hoyt 2009, 162-165). However, this hardline attitude weakened later. Former Indian National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra, states: “it is only after the mobilization of 2002 that the peace process could begin. This was the realization: Having gone to the brink, a more rational view prevailed” (quoted in Stolar 2008, 31). The experience of conflict under nuclear symmetry updated India’s belief on how to manage its relationship with Pakistan: initially, being more efficient and firmer, and later, not being too hardline.

According to Hoyt (2009, 158), nuclear rhetoric between India and Pakistan at an

early stage of overt nuclearization was "*ad hoc*, uncoordinated, and somewhat confused" as in the Kargil War and in the subsequent crises in 2001-2002, but they "took steps to tighten control over nuclear rhetoric in future crises." In short, it is implied that the probability of revisionist war should decline after the first revisionist war under the condition of nuclear symmetry, possibly due to the learning of danger of conflict escalation between nuclear-armed states. Some studies point out that newer nuclear states are more likely to engage in conflict (Horowitz 2009; Sagan 2003). Yet, not only the period of nuclear possession but also the nature of experience may matter, as the experience of armed conflicts in the shadow of nuclear symmetry enabled India and Pakistan to learn how dangerous conflict escalation is – and also how to manage it more effectively (see Hoyt 2009, 161-169).

The second reason for the initiation of the peace process is that both India and Pakistan are faced with the changing situations of internal and external threats. These changes include local and transnational terrorism, the US and NATO operations in Afghanistan, and the rise of China (Mukherjee 2009, 412-415). The third reason is that the sign of economic interdependence created an incentive for further cooperation (Mukherjee 2009, 416-417).

However, it may be too early to conclude that India and Pakistan have now overcome their nationalistic hostility. They still experience a series of fatal militarized disputes. As both have accused each other, threat perception has certainly lingered on both sides. After all, the Kashmir issue remains unresolved. Lavoy (2009, 10) warns, "Pakistan would be willing to sacrifice even more than it did in 1999 to defend its stake in Kashmir and more generally protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity." In India, while moderate Indian National Congress led the government since 2004 up to

early 2014, the BJP has now come back to power with Narendra Modi as Prime Minister, who was "the chief minister of the western state of Gujarat" and was "accused of doing little to stop the 2002 religious riots when more than 1,000 people, mostly Muslims, were killed" (*BBC News*, May 16, 2014). At this stage, it is difficult to argue that India and Pakistan, two nuclear states in the sub-continent, will no longer engage in nationalistic rivalry and revisionist war, let alone revisionist behavior in general.

Conclusion

The chapter has examined the efficacy of nuclear deterrence in inhibiting revisionist war in nationalistic rivalry. The theory of nuclear deterrence argues that the mutual possession of nuclear weapons deters war due to the tremendous cost of nuclear war. However, the chapter argues that nationalistic rivalry biases this objectivist assessment of nuclear weapons, and it is expected that nuclear symmetry does not have any significant effect on the probability of revisionist war within nationalistic rivalry. The statistical analysis does not find any statistically significant effect of nuclear symmetry. The case study of the Kargil War between India and Pakistan endorses the hypothesized causal mechanism. To conclude, it is implausible to expect that nationalistic-rivalry dyads will enjoy nuclear peace if both states in such dyads are nuclear-armed.

The chapter points out that the strategic implication of nuclear symmetry for nationalistic-rivalry dyads is significantly different from what nuclear deterrence theory expects. From this point, it is possible to draw an implication for the literature on nuclear weapons and interstate conflict in general. Although previous empirical research has implicitly assumed that all dyads are influenced by nuclear weapons in the same way, it may be another potential direction of research to distinguish the type of dyads to

examine the effect of nuclear weapons on interstate conflict in different contexts. Depending on the type of dyads, nuclear weapons might have a conflict-provoking, conflict-mitigating, or null effect on conflict.

Chapter 5

Nationalistic Rivalry and Liberal Peace[1]

The last chapter has found that the realist conflict-mitigating factor, nuclear deterrence, fails to reduce the probability of revisionist war within nationalistic rivalry. If realism cannot provide an approach to mitigating the effect of nationalistic rivalry on a revisionist propensity, can liberalism do so? This chapter discusses whether liberal peace theory is capable of reducing the probability of revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry.

Liberal peace advocates have long argued that joint democracy, economic interdependence, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) reduce interstate conflict (Russett and Oneal 2001; Oneal and Russett 2001; Oneal 2003; Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett 2010; Dafoe 2011; Dafoe, Oneal, and Russett 2013). Many scholars have challenged this liberal peace argument,[2] yet liberal peace advocates have robustly responded to these criticisms and have defended their arguments.[3]

[1] Part of the chapter (theoretical discussion on economic interdependence and the case study of China-Japan) is going to be published as Suzuki (forthcoming).

[2] For joint democracy, Gartzke (2007), Gartzke and Weisiger (2013), Gibler and Tir (2010), McDonald (2010), and Mousseau (2009, 2013); for economic interdependence, Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny (2004), Keshk, Reuveny, and Pollins (2010), and Kim and Rousseau (2005); for intergovernmental organizations, Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004).

[3] See, for example, Dafoe (2011) as a reply to Gartzke's (2007) capitalist peace argument; Dafoe, Oneal, and Russett (2013) as a reply to Mousseau's (2013) contract-intensive economy argument and Gartzke and Weisiger's (2013) dynamic difference argument; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett (2010) as a reply to Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny's (2004) and Kim and Rousseau's

Somewhat surprisingly, none of these previous studies have seriously taken into consideration the implication of nationalism for interstate conflict. Yet, nationalism can be seen as the source of preference in the rational choice term and the source of identity in the constructivist term, both of which shape state behavior. Hence, this chapter aims to bring nationalism into the ongoing debate on liberal peace. As revisionist behavior is the major source of instability in the interstate system, if liberal peace is meant to reduce interstate conflict, it must decrease revisionist behavior first of all.

The chapter argues that none of joint democracy, economic interdependence, and IGOs is likely to reduce revisionist behavior. The rationale is that nationalistic rivalry makes it a rational choice for states to prioritize resolving a nationalist issue to their own advantage, and prevents a transnational identity which is essential for cooperation from emerging due to the saliency of national identification. This argument explains the reason why democratic dyads were statistically insignificant in explaining revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry in Chapter 3. The inefficacy of liberal peace is shown empirically by both large-N statistical analysis of all nationalistic-rivalry dyads and small-N case studies of Greece-Turkey for joint democracy and IGOs and Japan-China for economic interdependence.

Liberal Peace and Nationalistic Rivalry

Joint Democracy

The arguably firmest leg of liberal peace is joint democracy, or the dyad of two democratic states. A strong negative correlation has been found between joint

(2005) criticism of the pacifying effect of economic interdependence; and Pevehouse and Russett (2006) to provide a more robust measure of intergovernmental organizations.

democracy and interstate conflict, and Levy (1988, 662) even states that the "absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations." While some have recently replaced this "democratic peace" with capitalist peace (Gartzke 2007; Mousseau 2009, 2010, 2013), liberal peace advocates have refuted these amendments (Dafoe 2011; Dafoe, Oneal, and Russett 2013).[4]

Up to date, a large number of theories have been created to explain the democratic peace correlation (see a literature review by Gartzke 2007, 167-169; Hayes 2011; Ungerer 2012). This causes a challenge for critics who want to introduce a new dimension into the debate. As Gartzke (2007, 169) properly points out, it is "an impossible task" to "show that every conceivable attribute of democracy cannot possibly influence the propensity toward interstate violence," because "[g]iven the malleability of assumptions, one should be able to develop numerous logically coherent explanations for almost any given empirical relationship."

In his case, Gartzke (2007) emphasizes the findings from empirical models to compare the democratic peace argument and the capitalist peace one, rather than engaging in the endless battle among different but logically coherent theories which all aim to explain the same empirical pattern between democratic dyads and interstate conflict. In this chapter, normative and structural explanations (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001) are used as a theoretical basis to consider the implication of nationalism for democratic peace, because they have been major pillars of democratic

[4] McDonald (2010) also argues that capitalist peace prevails over democratic peace, but his main empirical models take into consideration only a country-level regime type and not dyadic-level joint democracy. His supplementary analysis actually finds the pacifying effect of joint democracy (165).

peace accounts around which many other theories have developed (see Hayes 2011). Thus, the use and critique of these two explanations should have implications for the widest range of the literature of the democratic peace research program.

The normative explanation is that since democracies share the democratic norms of peaceful conflict settlement unlike non-democracies having the nondemocratic norms of violent coercion, they "are able to effectively apply democratic norms in their interaction, thereby preventing most conflicts from escalating to a militarized level" (Maoz and Russett 1993, 625). Democratic states are likely to fight with non-democracies, because the latter do not share democratic norms and therefore the former need to prevent the latter from taking advantage of their peaceful posture and conducting aggression (Maoz and Russett 1993, 625).

The structural explanation is that a democratic political system constrains leaders from resorting to conflict more than a nondemocratic system "due to the complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a broad base of support for risky policies" (Maoz and Russett 1993, 626). More specifically, Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues illustrate the rationalist mechanisms of structural constraints. According to Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992, 155-160), on the one hand, democratic dyads are unlikely to fight with each other, because democratic states mutually expect each other to be constrained from going to violent conflict by their democratic institutions. On the other hand, democracies are likely to fight with non-democracies, because the former expect the latter to be not as constrained as democracies from conducting aggression and, therefore, are willing to use force to avoid exploitation by those non-democracies. In addition, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) argue that democratic states are likely to try hard to win war and are not likely to fight a war they expect to lose, because defeat

causes constituencies to remove incumbent leaders from the government. Because democratic states expect that fellow democracies make a great effort to win war, they are unlikely to fight war with other democratic states, and prefer the settlement of conflict by negotiation.

The chapter identifies two explanations of how nationalistic rivalry thwarts these pacifying effects of joint democracy. First, Gibler and Tir (2010) argue that the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes causes both peace and democracy. In other words, the absence of territorial disputes is a confounder for the negative correlation between joint democracy and interstate conflict. Gibler and Tir explicate that in the presence of a threat to a homeland territory, states build large standing land armies. This practice requires the centralization of authority, and allows the army to gain power in domestic politics through the need of homeland defense or the army's high capability of repressing other domestic actors. Therefore, territorial disputes lead to the autocratization of regime or the maintenance of autocracy. Meanwhile, once territorial disputes are peacefully resolved and there is no threat to the homeland territory anymore, states do not need large land armies and, therefore, the power of the army declines. Consequently, the decentralization of power follows, and so does democratization if the other factors meet the prerequisites of democracy (955-958). Gibler and Tir conclude that "both democracy *and* peace in a dyad may be a function of settling territorial threats to the state" (965, emphasis original).

In nationalistic rivalry, one of the major issues is territorial disputes (including ethnic ones due to irredentism and national unification movements) as seen in the rivalry descriptions in Appendix B. If the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes is the cause of both peace and democracy, democratic dyads in nationalistic rivalry are unlikely to

be the consequence of this causal pathway and, therefore, unlikely to experience peace.

Second, Hayes (2011, 776) contends that neither structural nor normative explanation is able to explain "how threat is constructed," even though the "democratic peace is at its core about threat construction or the lack thereof." On the other hand, constructivist and psychological approaches to democratic peace indicate that democracies do not see each other as a threat if – and only if – they have a shared identity of democracy, namely a transstate/transnational identity based on perceived democratic norms (Hayes 2011, 779-782; Peceny 1997; Widmaier 2005).

These constructivist and psychological explanations of democratic peace suggest what role nationalistic rivalry plays in democratic dyads. States engaged in nationalistic rivalry perceive each other as a threat to their own nationhood, due to a nationalist issue. In such a situation, national identification is strongly hardened and the difference between "self" and "other" is clearly highlighted. Hence, there is little room for a transnational identity to emerge in nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The absence or weakness of transnational identity between democratic states means that they do not really see each other as the same "genuine" democracy (even if outside observers "code" them as democracies).[5] In such a case, democratic peace cannot be fulfilled by the normative expectation of peaceful conflict resolution or by the rationalist expectation of institutional constraints or war-winning capabilities, because neither side in democratic dyads can expect that the other side, perceived as a "fake" democracy, has the same democratic norms or institutions as one's own.

In short, according to the territorial-dispute explanation and the

[5] For example, India and Pakistan are coded as democracies in the Polity IV dataset (Marshall 2013) from 1988-1998, but Pakistan believed that India's control of Kashmir was unjustifiable and oppressive to Muslims there. Thus, India's "democracy" was not democratic to Pakistan.

constructivist/psychological explanation, if democratic states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, joint democracy is unlikely to reduce revisionist behavior. For example, as will be illustrated later, Greek-Turkish joint democracy did not inhibit nationalist attitude and revisionist behavior within their nationalistic rivalry. The nationalistic rivalry mainly developed over territorial disputes, and Turkish democracy needed to coordinate with the military. The public in both states perceived the other as a threat rather than a trustable democratic partner. As expected by the territorial-dispute explanation and the constructivist/psychological explanation, these conditions constrained the theoretically expected pacifying effects of joint democracy.

Economic Interdependence

Another leg of liberal peace is economic interdependence. Liberal peace theorists propose two causal mechanisms whereby deeper interdependence reduces the likelihood of interstate conflict (Russett and Oneal 2001, 127-131). First, according to the rationalist argument, economic incentives for profits from interdependence make conflict an irrational option, since conflict hinders economic activities. For most business sectors, conflict is an undesirable and uncertain factor that makes business harder to operate. For example, manufacturers need economic partner countries to provide them with raw materials and to buy their final products. This means that economic interdependence creates domestic constituencies which oppose conflict with these economic partners, for fear that conflict will damage their business (Mansfield and Pollins 2003, 3). Second, in terms of the constructivist argument, economic interdependence promotes interstate communication at both governmental and nongovernmental levels (Mansfield and Pollins 2003, 3) and creates a shared identity

(Russett and Oneal 2001, 130). This shared identity then prompts trust and cooperation.

The rationalist argument of economic interdependence is underlain by the assumption that states prefer economic profits to other things. However, in interstate anarchy (i.e., the absence of a supranational governing body), not economic prosperity but survival is the primary goal of states, and good economy is one means to achieve national survival (and interdependence is one means to boost economy). In anarchy, states must protect themselves from threats by themselves in order to survive (Waltz 1979, 91, 111). Therefore, if states perceive each other as a threat to their own nationhood, or are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, the primary rational choice is not to pursue economic profits by interdependence but to secure nationhood from the threat (i.e., to resolve a nationalist issue to one's own advantage).

It is possible that rival states are economically interdependent, but if seeking economic profits from interdependence with the rival can endanger nationhood at some point, they will sacrifice these profits to secure nationhood. The lens of nationalistic rivalry leads these states to expect that economic cooperation with the rival is dangerous due to the "relative-gains problem" (Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993, 729), as a threat perception hardens the relative gains concern (Rousseau 2002). That is, in the presence of nationalistic rivalry, the worry that the partner will gain more is more severe than in the absence of such rivalry.[6] This belief may even distort the *objective* assessment of gains. In other words, even if gains are equally distributed to both states from an objective viewpoint, the belief that the other is threatening will cause these states to *subjectively* assess that the other's gain is more than its own, and/or national in-group

[6] In Grieco's (1990, 45; see also Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993, 731) term, "the coefficient for a state's sensitivity to gaps in payoffs – k" is high in nationalistic rivalry.

favoritism will lead them to think that the righteous "self" should have more gains than the threatening "other."

According to the constructivist argument, economic interdependence creates a shared identity, thereby promoting interstate trust and reducing interstate conflict. In other words, the presence of shared identity by interdependence is a necessary step to peace. Again, since states engaged in nationalistic rivalry perceive each other as a threat along the line of national identity, it is difficult for a transnational identity to emerge, no matter how much communication these states exchange.

In short, in terms of both rationalist and constructivist arguments, economic interdependence is unlikely to reduce the probability of revisionist behavior under the condition of nationalistic rivalry. For example, as will be described later, China and Japan have engaged in revisionist behavior, particularly over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, despite their high economic interdependence. It has been rational for both governments to take a firm stance against each other, even though such an action has damaged profitable bilateral economic relations. National identification vis-à-vis the other has been hardened in both states, and no clear sign of a shared identity has been observed.

Intergovernmental Organizations

The last leg of liberal peace is intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Russett and Oneal (2001, 163-166) argue that IGOs can cause interstate peace through any of the following functions: "coercing norm-breakers"; "mediating among conflicting parties"; "reducing uncertainty by conveying information"; "problem-solving, including expanding states' conception of their self-interest to be more inclusive and longer term";

"socialization and shaping norms"; and "generating narratives of mutual identification." Liberal peace advocates later admitted that the third leg of liberal peace was less empirically supported than joint democracy and economic interdependence. Yet, they have developed a more robust indicator of IGOs. They argue that if IGOs largely consist of democracies (hereafter "democratic IGOs"), credible commitment, dispute settlement, and socialization are more likely (Pevehouse and Russett 2006). In other words, the pacifying effects of IGOs are enhanced by the incorporation of the democratic peace effect among member states, and in this sense, democratic IGOs can be seen as part of the democratic peace research program.

The functions of IGOs can be largely classified into two types: rationalist and constructivist. The rationalist functions are coercion, mediation, information exchange, self-interest expansion, and credible commitment; and the constructivist ones are socialization and identification. The rationalist functions suggest that coercion and self-interest expansion alter the payoffs of each state behavior choice whereby the primary goal becomes cooperation – or even coordination – with other states, and mediation, information exchange, and credible commitment facilitate this alteration and the achievement of cooperation/coordination (e.g., Keohane 2005). The constructivist functions imply that socialization and identification create a shared identity and reduce a threat perception between states as members of the same group (e.g., Wendt 1999, ch.6).

If the rationalist functions are to mitigate nationalistic rivalry, they have to reduce the payoffs of revisionist behavior and increase those of non-revisionist behavior in nationalistic-rivalry dyads. None of existent IGOs, however, is likely to achieve this task, because no IGO can assure the national security of individual states perfectly. Even the UN Security Council, the only IGO which has legitimacy to authorize use of

force in the interstate system, often becomes the political arena where a Permanent Five state exercises veto if a resolution is against its interest. Intergovernmental institutions do not have an independent effect on state behavior but are the product of the interests of individual states (Mearsheimer 1994/95, 1995). This is especially so in the field of security, because the anarchic nature of the interstate system imposes a self-help imperative, as already noted. The primary interest of states engaged in nationalistic rivalry is to secure nationhood by resolving a nationalist issue to their own advantage, even if they share IGOs.

If the constructivist functions are to mitigate nationalistic rivalry, they have to reduce a threat perception in nationalistic-rivalry dyads through socialization and identification. As explained in the case of joint democracy and economic interdependence, states engaged in nationalistic rivalry experience the hardening of national identification and the further differentiation between the righteous "self" and the threatening "other." Hence, the constructivist functions of IGOs are compromised, and IGOs are unlikely to reduce revisionist behavior in nationalistic rivalry.

As will be discussed later, Greek-Turkish relations were constrained rather than improved by two significant democratic IGOs, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. Those IGOs became the place where the two states engaged in disputes, due to their conflicting national interests around those IGOs and to the saliency of their national identification vis-à-vis the other.

To recapitulate, none of the liberal peace factors are expected to decrease the likelihood of revisionist behavior within nationalistic-rivalry dyads. Thus, statistical models expect to find no statistically significant relationship between each of the liberal peace factors and the probability of revisionist behavior in the subset of

nationalistic-rivalry dyads.

Statistical Analysis

This section conducts large-N statistical analysis to examine the above arguments. First, it explains a research design. Next, it presents and discusses the results of analysis.

Research Design

Unlike the case of nuclear deterrence, liberal peace theory covers not only war but also short-of-war disputes as the target of pacifying effects. Hence, the dependent variable of interest is the same measure of revisionist behavior as in Chapter 3, coded 1 if a state is a revisionist and resorts to a militarized action against another state; 0 otherwise.

The effect of liberal peace is measured by the following variables. First, to test the democratic peace proposition, democratic actors, democratic targets, and democratic dyads are coded 1 if the Polity 2 score of respectively an actor state, a target state, and both states in a dyad are equal to or greater than six; otherwise 0 (Marshall 2013).

Second, the effect of economic interdependence is estimated by examining how much the national economies of dyads depend on bilateral trade. To this end, an actor state's ratio of bilateral trade to its GDP per capita (the actor's trade dependence) and a target state's one (the target's trade dependence) are included in statistical models. Then, the interaction term between these two variables measures the effect of trade interdependence. Trade data draw from the Correlates of War Trade Dataset version 3.0 (Barbieri and Keshk 2012; Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009) and GDP per capita data come from the GDP and population data 5.0 beta by Gleditsch (2002). Both figures use current prices of US dollars.

Third, the effect of democratic IGOs is measured by the number of democratic IGO memberships (Pevehouse and Russett 2006). Democratic IGOs are those whose average Polity score among all member states is equal to or more than the threshold of democracy in the Polity IV project (981). Pevehouse and Russett (2006) use a threshold of seven in the Polity score for democracy in the main analysis, but the Polity IV project actually employs a threshold of six to identify democracy. The chapter uses a threshold of six in the Polity score to measure the number of democratic IGO memberships.[7]

As in the previous empirical chapters, the control variables are the ratio of military expenditure to GDP per capita (the ME-to-GDPpc ratio); ethnonation-state incongruence; the capability difference, or an actor state's CINC minus a target state's CINC (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987), and its squared term; and contiguity, a binary variable coded 1 if states in a dyad are contiguous through land or the water which is equal to or less than 150 miles (Stinnett et al. 2002). Finally, to control for temporal dependence, the cubic polynomials of a peace year counter for revisionist behavior are included (Carter and Signorino 2010) and the ongoing years of revisionist behavior are dropped (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 661). The unit of analysis is directed dyad-years as revisionist behavior is one state's action towards another state, and the total observations are the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The estimation method is probit regression as the dependent variable is binary, and robust standard

[7] I thank Jon Pevehouse for sharing the replication data, which contain both Polity ≥ 6 and Polity ≥ 7 thresholds of democratic IGOs. Unlike Pevehouse and Russett (2006), I do not include the number of shared IGO memberships in the statistical models for the following reasons. First, the number of shared IGO memberships conceptually overlaps with the number of shared democratic IGO memberships (see Ray 2003, 15-19). Second, as liberal peace advocates now admit that ordinary IGOs do not reduce conflict, they are redundant. Finally, the inclusion brings more missing values.

errors are clustered on dyads to control for within-group correlations.

Results

The results are presented in Table 5-1 for the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads, and for the sake of comparison, in Tables 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4 for respectively the subset of other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), that of other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), and all directed dyad-years excluding nationalistic-rivalry dyads (hereafter, non-nationalistic-rivalries).

The three democracy variables (democratic actors, targets, and dyads) and democratic IGOs are separately used in each model, because the former and the latter are actually the overlapped measures of democratic peace and, therefore, should not be included together in one model (Ray 2003, 15-19). If an IGO largely consists of democratic states, its member states are more likely to be democracies *by definition*. Unsurprisingly, the correlation coefficient between democratic dyads and democratic IGOs in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads is 0.61, which raises the concern of multicollinearity. Because the empirical models of the advocates of democratic IGOs, Pevehouse and Russett (2006, 984), do not suppose that democratic IGOs and democratic countries need to be interacted to produce their pacifying effect, it is more plausible to use the measure of democratic states and that of democratic IGOs separately for the statistical reason of avoiding multicollinearity.

Table 5-1: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on liberal peace in the subset of nationalistic rivalry

	Model 5-1	Model 5-2	Model 5-3	Model 5-4
Democratic Actor	-0.221**	-0.241**		
	(0.107)	(0.111)		
Democratic Target	0.0591	0.0239		
	(0.126)	(0.114)		
Democratic Dyad	0.0837	0.160		
	(0.183)	(0.183)		
Actor's Trade Dependence	0.251	0.170	0.269	0.186
	(0.213)	(0.184)	(0.214)	(0.178)
Target's Trade Dependence	-0.0563	-0.190	-0.133	-0.266*
	(0.150)	(0.157)	(0.160)	(0.152)
Trade Interdependence	-0.0822	-0.0507	-0.0848	-0.0538
	(0.0701)	(0.0585)	(0.0712)	(0.0574)
Democratic IGO Membership			0.00902	0.0128
			(0.00765)	(0.00783)
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.0564*		0.0533*
		(0.0300)		(0.0273)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.162		0.202**
		(0.104)		(0.0992)
Contiguity		0.0417		0.0177
		(0.177)		(0.186)
Capability Difference		-0.698		-0.307
		(1.462)		(1.379)
Capability Difference^2		11.57		9.397
		(16.85)		(17.39)
Constant	-0.391***	-0.845***	-0.420***	-0.856***
	(0.0947)	(0.249)	(0.0879)	(0.249)
Observations	1,806	1,786	1,824	1,801

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table 5-2: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on liberal peace in the subset of other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012)

	Model 5-5	Model 5-6	Model 5-7	Model 5-8
Democratic Actor	0.485**	0.0963		
	(0.196)	(0.167)		
Democratic Target	0.683***	0.423**		
	(0.178)	(0.204)		
Democratic Dyad	*dropped due to the perfect prediction of DV=0*			
Actor's Trade Dependence	-0.0991	-0.180	-0.0436	-0.141
	(0.0953)	(0.147)	(0.0815)	(0.127)
Target's Trade Dependence	-0.0492	-0.0884	-0.00669	-0.0542
	(0.0610)	(0.0894)	(0.0550)	(0.0806)
Trade Interdependence	0.0334	0.0544	0.0265	0.0531*
	(0.0244)	(0.0367)	(0.0204)	(0.0310)
Democratic IGO Membership			-0.0697	-0.109
			(0.0458)	(0.0671)
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.111***		0.139***
		(0.0318)		(0.0399)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		-0.448**		-0.515**
		(0.205)		(0.205)
Contiguity		0.475***		0.549***
		(0.116)		(0.113)
Capability Difference		0.797		-0.304
		(0.946)		(0.769)
Capability Difference^2		6.082		9.038**
		(4.541)		(3.666)
Constant	-1.512***	-2.467***	-1.099***	-2.486***
	(0.146)	(0.303)	(0.170)	(0.385)
Observations	2,006	1,871	2,152	2,003

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table 5-3: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on liberal peace in the subset of other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006)

	Model 5-9	Model 5-10	Model 5-11	Model 5-12
Democratic Actor	0.127	0.156*		
	(0.0846)	(0.0913)		
Democratic Target	0.295***	0.326***		
	(0.0802)	(0.0930)		
Democratic Dyad	-0.302**	-0.347**		
	(0.142)	(0.161)		
Actor's Trade Dependence	-0.0381***	-0.0494***	-0.0147	-0.0327**
	(0.0128)	(0.0134)	(0.0141)	(0.0146)
Target's Trade Dependence	-0.0433	-0.0530*	-0.0294	-0.0450*
	(0.0282)	(0.0280)	(0.0277)	(0.0270)
Trade Interdependence	0.0134***	0.0157***	0.00529	0.00898
	(0.00478)	(0.00494)	(0.00540)	(0.00546)
Democratic IGO Membership			0.0230***	0.0239***
			(0.00489)	(0.00497)
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.0222		0.0476**
		(0.0180)		(0.0193)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.0379		0.00726
		(0.0858)		(0.0865)
Contiguity		0.0134		-0.0465
		(0.0758)		(0.0749)
Capability Difference		0.370		-0.0834
		(0.444)		(0.434)
Capability Difference^2		-8.083**		-6.459*
		(3.342)		(3.507)
Constant	-0.879***	-0.998***	-0.770***	-1.023***
	(0.0789)	(0.146)	(0.0656)	(0.150)
Observations	3,745	3,632	3,859	3,707

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table 5-4: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on liberal peace in all directed dyad-years excluding nationalistic-rivalry dyads

	Model 5-13	Model 5-14	Model 5-15	Model 5-16
Democratic Actor	-0.0712	0.0737*		
	(0.0433)	(0.0418)		
Democratic Target	0.0739*	0.166***		
	(0.0412)	(0.0383)		
Democratic Dyad	-0.343***	-0.559***		
	(0.0670)	(0.0707)		
Actor's Trade Dependence	0.149***	0.0391***	0.152***	0.0400**
	(0.0252)	(0.0146)	(0.0223)	(0.0182)
Target's Trade Dependence	0.146***	0.0290	0.138***	0.0219
	(0.0238)	(0.0312)	(0.0197)	(0.0380)
Trade Interdependence	-0.0214***	-0.00325	-0.0236***	-0.00372
	(0.00752)	(0.00237)	(0.00618)	(0.00271)
Democratic IGO Membership			0.0120***	-0.00486
			(0.00254)	(0.00317)
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.167***		0.173***
		(0.0104)		(0.0109)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.167***		0.145**
		(0.0601)		(0.0604)
Contiguity		1.044***		1.017***
		(0.0410)		(0.0421)
Capability Difference		-2.483***		-2.677***
		(0.322)		(0.335)
Capability Difference^2		5.392***		5.507***
		(1.569)		(1.610)
Constant	-2.185***	-3.423***	-2.218***	-3.385***
	(0.0521)	(0.0741)	(0.0528)	(0.0733)
Observations	682,112	636,609	764,959	673,116

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

As for the results of the liberal peace elements, first, democratic dyads are statistically insignificant only in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. Democratic dyads are statistically significant in the subset of other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) and in non-nationalistic-rivalries, and reduce revisionist behavior. In the case of other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), democratic dyads even predict the absence of revisionist behavior perfectly.

Second, economic interdependence is statistically insignificant across all model specifications only in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads.[8] In the other subsets, one or more of model specifications produce a statistically significant effect of economic interdependence, although its direction is positive in the case of other rivalries and negative in that of non-nationalism-rivalries. The theory of nationalistic rivalry expects that nationalism compromises the pacifying effect of economic interdependence but does not argue that nationalism increases revisionist behavior the deeper economic interdependence becomes. It may be something else than nationalism that causes economic interdependence to increase revisionist behavior in the subset of other rivalries. One possible explanation is that in the case of other rivalries, rival states might engage in revisionist behavior for purely economic reasons. Higher economic interdependence is likely to create more economic disputes between states and,

[8] Since trade interdependence is the interaction term between the two continuous measures of trade dependence (i.e., the actor's trade dependence and the target's trade dependence), the regression tables give only part of the whole picture and the plot of the marginal effect is necessary to look at (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006, 73-77). However, it is found that the average marginal effect of the actor's trade dependence is statistically insignificant across all range of the target's trade dependence within nationalistic rivalry. Thus, there is no evidence that trade interdependence reduces revisionist behavior.

therefore, economically driven rivals might try to resolve those disputes by revisionist behavior.

Finally, democratic IGOs are statistically insignificant in both subsets of nationalistic-rivalry dyads and other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), whereas demonstrating a statistically significant, positive effect in the subset of other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), and in that of non-nationalistic-rivalries without the control variables. Again, according to the theory of nationalistic rivalry, nationalism compromises the pacifying effect of democratic IGOs, rather than increasing revisionist behavior as the number of shared democratic IGO memberships becomes larger. Hence, not nationalism but another factor should explain the statistically significant association between democratic IGOs and revisionist behavior in those subsets. Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to explain why democratic IGOs do not reduce revisionist behavior in other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), and why democratic IGOs lead to a higher revisionist propensity in other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) or non-nationalistic-rivalries. I must leave it to future research.

Nonetheless, all in all, only the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads produces the results which are consistent with the theoretical expectation of nationalist effects to thwart the pacifying effects of liberal peace. My theory expects neither that the three liberal peace factors increase revisionist behavior nor that only one of them is prevented from imposing a pacifying effect on dyads. The statistical findings indicate that only nationalistic rivalry reflects all theoretical expectations of nationalist effects on liberal peace. They suggest that the lens of nationalistic rivalry prevents society from interpreting the implications of shared democracy, economic interdependence, and (democratic) IGOs in the way in which liberal peace theorists expect. The saliency of

national identification makes it a rational choice to engage in revisionist behavior for the sake of resolving a nationalist issue to one's own advantage, and prevents a transnational identity from overcoming the differentiation between the righteous "self" and the threatening "other."

The statistical insignificance of democratic dyads and shared democratic IGO memberships in nationalistic rivalry poses a challenge to the democratic peace research program. It is particularly so because "[t]he democratic peace is thought to be most robust in the post-World War II period" (Gartzke 2007, 173), and the temporal scope of the analysis here is also the post-WWII period. Thus, the most-likely case of democratic peace cannot support the pacifying effect of joint democracy and shared democratic IGOs, if the unit of analysis is nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The pacifying effect of democratic actors against autocratic actors cannot be explained by democratic peace theory. Whereas some scholars argue that democracies are less conflict-prone than autocracies whatever the regime of target states is, democratic peace theory does not say that democracies are less conflict-prone only against autocracies. Rather, as discussed in Chapter 3, in democracy-autocracy dyads, a democratic state may expect that the autocratic target is more revisionistic and, therefore, more likely to reciprocate revisionist behavior if the democratic state makes a revisionist attempt. Hence, the democratic state may be more cautious to embark on a revisionist attempt. In short, there is no evidence that the liberal peace mechanisms reduce the probability of revisionist behavior if states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry.

Of course, the absence of statistical significance does not evidence the absence of the effect. Two arguments can be made regarding this point. First, given that most previous studies have found that democratic dyads have a statistically significant effect to reduce

conflict, it is rather surprising and alarming to come across the statistical insignificance of democratic dyads. Previous research has less agreed whether economic interdependence and IGOs decrease militarized interstate disputes; therefore, their statistically insignificant findings may be less surprising. Second, if another research method also indicates the same conclusion, it increases the validity of empirical analysis. The following two sections present a case study of Greece-Turkey, the most-likely case for democratic dyads and democratic IGOs, and China-Japan, the most-likely case for economic interdependence.

Finally, as for the control variables, one point should be discussed. It might be argued that the ME-to-GDPpc ratio is statistically significant and a higher ratio increases revisionist behavior not only in the subset of nationalistic rivalry but also in other subsets, questioning the specificity of the causal mechanism between nationalism and revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry. However, as already mentioned in Chapter 3, the thesis does not argue that a higher ratio of military expenditure to GDP per capita increases revisionist behavior only in the case of nationalistic rivalry. It can do so in other cases as well. Instead, Chapter 3 tried to empirically examine the causal mechanism from nationalistic rivalry through nationalist mobilization to revisionist behavior by using the ME-to-GDPpc ratio as a proxy for nationalist mobilization. The empirical analysis found that the presence of nationalistic rivalry significantly increases the baseline level of this ratio in comparison with the absence of nationalistic rivalry – the causal mechanism from nationalistic rivalry to nationalist mobilization (i.e., Hypothesis 5). Then, given this bottom-up of the baseline level, states having a higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio are more likely to engage in revisionist behavior – the causal mechanism from nationalist mobilization to revisionist behavior in nationalistic rivalry

(i.e., Hypothesis 6). In short, the point is not whether a higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio increases revisionist behavior only in the case of nationalistic rivalry but whether the causal mechanism between nationalist mobilization and revisionist behavior can be empirically supported. States without nationalistic rivalry may be more likely to engage in revisionist behavior when they have a higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio, but the baseline level of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio is significantly lower than states engaged in nationalistic rivalry, meaning that they are less nationalistically mobilized as a whole.

Case Study: Greece-Turkey and Democratic Peace

In terms of joint democracy and democratic IGOs, Greece-Turkey is the most interesting case. First, the dyad has experienced the highest number of revisionist behavior during the period of being democratic dyads and engaged in nationalistic rivalry (Greece resorted to revisionist behavior twice and Turkey seven times, excluding the ongoing years of revisionist behavior[9]).

Second, although Colombia-Venezuela has the highest number of shared democratic IGO memberships (the average of nineteen shared memberships during the period of nationalistic rivalry), the number of shared democratic IGOs in Greece-Turkey is the second highest (eleven by the same estimation) and a statistically significant deviation from the mean.[10] In addition, as liberal peace advocates admit, not all IGOs have the same level of influence on state behavior and of function as security institutions

[9] The original year of revisionist behavior is used to calculate rather than t+1, as the use of t+1 in the statistical models is due to the econometrical purpose of controlling for simultaneity bias and is irrelevant to qualitative analysis by case studies.

[10] The mean of the number of shared democratic IGOs in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads is 1.28 and the standard deviation is 4.39; eleven exceeds two standard deviations.

(Russett and Oneal 2001, 170). Russett and Oneal justify the use of the number of shared IGO memberships in large-N statistical analysis because "we lack a theory to guide us in assigning greater importance to different types of IGOs or in differentiating effective from ineffective institutions within particular categories" and "[a]ny prior weighting, therefore, would be arbitrary" (170). Although the above large-N statistical analysis also follows this justification, a case study can overcome this limitation by focusing on qualitative aspects of democratic IGOs.

Greece and Turkey have shared membership in NATO, a harbinger of highly institutionalized democratic IGOs. The two states have also been under the influence of the EU, the most densely democratic IGO (i.e., all member states are democracies), part of whose agenda is consolidating democracy and peace in Europe (see Higashino 2004, 352-353). Although Turkey has not been its formal member state, the EU began "active involvement" in the Greek-Turkish relations in 1999 after "neutrality" in 1959-1981 and "restricted neutrality" in 1981-1999 (Tzimitras 2008, 117). In other words, Turkey was granted candidacy status at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, a decade after its application for full membership to the European Community (EC) in 1987 was rejected in 1989 (Öniş and Yilmaz 2008, 124-125).[11] Membership is the most powerful "carrot" for the EU to influence outsider states (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006, 572; Rumelili 2007, 106) and, therefore, the EU should have had maximum leverage over Turkey since 1999. Following the logic of a most-likely case, it is crucial to examine why NATO and the EU have failed to inhibit revisionist propensities in the dyad. In short, in terms of both quantity and quality, Greece-Turkey is suitable to studying the causal mechanisms in the effect of democratic IGOs on revisionist behavior within nationalism rivalry.

[11] In-between, Turkey joined the EU Custom Union in 1995.

Historical Overview of Greek-Turkish Relations

The modern history of Greco-Turkish relations as states began with the Greek War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821-1828, followed by three other wars (the first Greco-Turkish War in 1897, the first Balkan War in 1912-1913, and the Second Greco-Turkish War in 1919-22).[12] After the Second Greco-Turkish war, the two states sought to reduce bilateral tensions for common strategic interests, and the beginning of the Cold War in particular gave them an opportunity of a rapprochement in order to cooperate to tackle the common Soviet threat under NATO (Kalaitzaki 2005, 107-110). Conforming to the theoretical expectation of democratic IGOs, Greece and Turkey enjoyed a relatively friendly relationship for a while.

However, the development of this rapprochement was halted by the Cyprus issue around the mid-1950s. Cyprus, administered by the UK since the late 19th century, experienced the intensification of ethnic conflict between Greek Cypriots, who sought unification with Greece (*enosis*), and Turkish Cypriots, who demanded the partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish areas (*taksim*) in the 1950s.

However, after the 1959 Zurich-London agreement among the UK, Greece, and Turkey, Cyprus became an independent state in 1960. Ethnic tension between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots remained (Papadakis, Perestianis, and Welz 2006, 2-3). Anastasiou (2009, 17) argues that "throughout the cold war, the fiercely anti-communist orientation of the American-backed governments of Greece and Turkey led them to support the most extreme rightwing nationalists among their respective ethnic counterparts in Cyprus." In particular, after the civilian government was overthrown by the military in Greece in 1967, the newly established Greek junta assisted Greek

[12] The war data are from Sarkees and Wayman (2010).

Cypriot hardliners, such as pro-*enosis* ultranationalist EOKA-B, to attempt a coup in 1974 (Papadakis, Perestianis, and Welz 2006, 3). In response, Turkey sent troops to Cyprus and occupied its northern part. The occupation resulted in the de facto partition of Cyprus into the Greek majority southern area and the Turkish majority northern one (see Figure 5-1). The latter declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, and basically only Turkey has recognized it as a legitimate state so far.

Figure 5-1: Map of Cyprus

Source: *The World Factbook 2013-14* (2013).

While Cyprus was the main nationalist issue between Greece and Turkey until the first half of the 1970s, territorial disputes over the Aegean Sea (see Figure 5-2) became the dominant nationalist issue since the latter half of the 1970s (Kalaitzaki 2005, 117, 119). The Aegean dispute includes the following three issues: (a) “the dispute about the sovereign rights over the Aegean continental shelf,” (b) “the question of the territorial sea limits claimed by each country,” and (c) “a dispute over military and civil air traffic

control zones in the Aegean sea" (Kalaitzaki 2005, 117n18). The partition of Cyprus made Greek-Turkish nationalistic hostility persistent and difficult to resolve, while the Aegean dispute added to it. For example, a survey research conducted in November 2001 shows that asked "what is the most important problem in Greek-Turkish relation," Turkish people regarded Cyprus as the most important whereas the Aegean Sea as the second (Carkoglu and Kirisci 2005, 138-139).

Figure 5-2: Map of Greece and the Aegean Sea

Source: *The World Factbook 2013-14* (2013).

Greece and Turkey have engaged in a series of revisionist behavior over time since 1958, the time they began nationalistic rivalry. In particular, Turkey was more prone to revisionist behavior than Greece, and the tendency did not change even when both states had democratized and when the number of shared democratic IGOs had increased (see

Figure 5-3).

Figure 5-3: Frequency of Greece's and Turkey's revisionist behavior over time



The y-axis is the number of shared democratic IGOs; joint democracy and revisionist behavior are measured as either present or absent

Source: for the number of shared democratic IGOs, Pevehouse and Russett (2006); for joint democracy, Marshall (2013); for revisionist behavior, Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer (2004); time period up to 2000 due to the availability of democratic IGO data

Nationalistic Rivalry and Democratic Norms and Institutions

The pacifying effect of joint democracy or of democratic IGOs is by no means clear from Figure 5-3. The presence of joint democracy and a higher number of democratic IGOs are irrelevant to the frequency of revisionist behavior.[13]

[13] While the original year of revisionist behavior is used in the figure, it is apparent that the use of t+1 (i.e., moving the X and O marks one year before) does not change the conclusion in any

In terms of democratic IGOs, quantitatively, its number has increased over time but there is no sign that revisionist propensities have diminished. Qualitatively, the shared NATO membership began in 1952. However, Krebs (1999) argues that NATO actually facilitated the Greek-Turkish conflict in three respects. First, security assurance from NATO for the Soviet threat allowed the two states to engage in bilateral conflict. Second, better military equipment through the alliance enabled them to escalate the conflict. Finally, the function of issue linkage helped to expand the range of conflict. These three suggest that the strategic implication of NATO was interpreted through the lens of nationalistic rivalry and conflict rather than cooperation became the norm. Put simply, NATO did not change the payoffs of state behavior in the dyad. This does not mean that the dyad would have been in peace without NATO (Krebs 1999, 369). In addition, NATO's mediation sometimes helped to deescalate hostility when crises broke out in the dyad (Kalaitzaki 2005). Nonetheless, its effect to resolve the nationalistic rivalry was clearly limited. Through seeing the handling of crises over Cyprus by the US from 1964-1974, Greece and Turkey "realized that NATO membership was not a panacea for all security contingencies" (Kalaitzaki 2005, 116), indicating NATO's failure of socializing the two states in the Western alliance system.

The effect of the EU on the dyad until 1999 was rather counterproductive as well. Being an EU member gave Greece a sense of being a member of the European civilization, thereby allowing it to highlight the difference between itself and Turkey, the "other" (see Tzimitras 2008, 125-126). Historically Greece invoked international law to "consolidate its position as a defender of international law and convince the international community that Greece's concerns enjoyed objective foundations" while

substantial way.

"trying to expose Turkey as an aggressively revisionist and expansive state, in constant violation of international law" (Tzimitras 2010, 133). The belief that Greece is a righteous, law-abiding state has shaped Greek national identity vis-à-vis Turkey, described as a revisionist, and it has been hardened even further by Greece's joining the EU and Turkey's being left out (Tzimitras 2010, 142-143).

Although Turkey joined the EU Custom Union in 1995, this partial development of institutional relations between Turkey and the EU, contrary to the constructivist argument, caused Greek-Turkish relations to deteriorate because of Turkey's liminal position, i.e., partly "self" and partly "other", with respect to the EU (Rumelili 2003, 216).[14] The ambiguity of identity difference between insider Greece and outsider Turkey threatened Greece's already precarious sense of "self" with respect to the EU,[15] and this threat perception led Greece to highlight the difference from Turkey (Rumelili 2003, 223). Greece's act of marginalizing Turkey as non-European in turn caused Turkey to sustain the perception of Greece as the threatening "other" and to emphasize its European identity while constructing Greece as "fake-European" (Rumelili 2003, 223-226). Thus, Europeanness became a reference point for their respective national identity to compete for, rather than a focal point for them to converge onto as a shared identity.

The institutional mechanisms of the EU served as a facilitator of conflict between Greece and Turkey. Rumelili (2007, 109) points out, "Given that EU Member States are

[14] For a more general theory and empirics on conflict between culturally similar states, see Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006).

[15] According to Rumelili (2003, 223), "as a state situated on the periphery of the European community, economically and politically as well as geographically, Greece has not enjoyed a secure European identity."

able to exercise significant control over EU policy towards non-member states, there is the risk that the EU framework may work against conflict resolution by encouraging the Member State to adopt more uncompromising positions." This is likely if an EU member and a non-member perceive each other as a threat to nationhood, like Greece and Turkey, rather than having a sense of shared "self" under the common institutional framework.

Rumelili (2007) observes domestic politics of nationalist competition for popular support in the dyad. Greece used the EC/EU to counteract Turkey and marginalized it vis-à-vis Europe, which was useful for popular support in Greek domestic politics (114-115). Rumelili finds from an interview that Prime Minister Costas Simitis (in office from 1996 to 2004) "advocated a fundamental change in Greek foreign policy towards supporting Turkey's European orientation" but "had to give in to the hardliners, who favoured the continuation of the exclusionary policies of negative conditionality" (115). Similarly, perceiving that the EU fell into the hands of Greece, Turkey could not choose a policy conforming to the EU, since it could have been criticized in domestic society as a concession to Greece (116). In other words, the social structure of nationalistic rivalry constrained the capabilities of moderates in each country.

Like Krebs, Rumelili (2003) does not argue that the Greek-Turkish rivalry would have disappeared without EU involvement (217). Rather, "the EU's community-building discourse reinforced and legitimated the already-existing representations in the two countries, and thereby ensured their sustenance in the context of the community formation process in Europe" (225).

The inability of NATO and the EU to mitigate revisionist behavior and resolve the Greek-Turkish nationalistic rivalry suggests that IGOs are more an effect than a cause of

international relations (Mearsheimer 1994/95, 1995). First, Greece and Turkey joined NATO due to the common Soviet threat. Second, Turkish candidacy in the EU was accomplished due to Greek-Turkish bilateral initiatives for cooperation (see Rumelili 2004, 5-6).

It may also be true that even though bilateral initiatives preceded the EU providing candidacy for Turkey, "in the absence of this EU intervention, the positive momentum in relations would have been, once again, short-lived" (Rumelili 2004, 9). Since 1999, the dyad has certainly reduced the intensity of nationalistic hostility at the discursive level (Rumelili 2004, 17-18). At the behavioral level, however, the latest version of the MID dataset (ver. 4.01; Palmer et al. 2015) shows that the dyad, particularly Turkey, has occasionally engaged in revisionist behavior even after 2001, although the dyad has managed these militarized disputes not to escalate nationalistic hostility (see Rumelili 2004, 8).

To recapitulate, NATO and the EU had both positive and negative effects on the Greek-Turkish relations. Thus, the case study indicates that the effect of democratic IGOs to reduce revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry is mixed, supporting the statistical findings that democratic IGOs do not have a statistically significant effect.

Joint democracy is not a sufficient condition for peace either. If the masses in democracy have nationalistic hostility against a rival, mass-led nationalist mobilization causes elites to adopt hawkish foreign policy. Hayes (2012, 69-70) argues that in democracy, a securitization move is the subject of political contention among political leaders, who are accountable to the public, and it is more difficult to describe fellow democratic states as a threat. However, if the public *already* perceives a nominally democratic state as a threat, leaders (who are accountable to the public) are compelled

to promote a securitization move.

This situation has been observed in Greek and Turkish democracies. Evin (2005, 8) points out, “A significant similarity between Greece and Turkey is that the foreign policies of both countries with respect to one another have been highly influenced by popular and populist constraints as well as public opinion.” The public in each state have been locked in a socially constructed perception of the threatening “other.” Both Greece and Turkey have nurtured selective memories of each other, in which the “other” is remembered as a threatening enemy to nationhood (Evin 2005, 5-8) and the history of peaceful cohabitation and shared affinities is purposively forgotten (Anastasiou 2009, 17; Heraclides 2012, 126).

There is suggestive evidence for this argument within both states. In the case of Greece, after an incident in February 1999 in which Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of Kurdish separatist group PKK, was apprehended on his way out of the Greek embassy in Kenya, Greek women cancelled a trip to the meeting of Woman’s Initiative for Peace, a civil society taking initiative for Greek-Turkish cooperation, in Turkey for safety reasons (see Rumelili 2004, 5).

In the case of Turkey, the aforementioned survey research of Turkish public opinion shows that Turkish people are most likely to associate the worst enemy with Greece (Carkoglu and Kirisci 2005, 127); in particular, “about 15 percent of the entire sample seem to think that Turkey might be attacked and that that attack might come from Greece” (Carkoglu and Kirisci 2005, 130). Threat perception among the masses pressures dovish elites to be hardliners and allows hawkish elites to exploit this perception for popular support. Carkoglu and Kirisci (2005, 148) find that “party-based preferences are not present in Greek-Turkish…foreign policy attitudes” among the

Turkish public, suggesting that nationalist political competition is non-partisan. In short, a necessary condition for democratic peace, the deconstruction of threat perception, was not fulfilled, due to the structural effect of nationalistic rivalry.

To recapitulate, the pacifying effect of democratic norms and institutions, either through democratic IGOs or joint democracy, is, at best, limited on the Greek-Turkish nationalistic rivalry. Rumelili (2004, 1) argues, "The longer-term democratization and socialization influences of the EU in Greece and Turkey have cascaded with Turkey's EU membership candidacy in 1999, enabling the pro-change domestic actors to convince the skeptics, mobilize coalitions, and to silence their opponents." In particular, when earthquakes hit Turkey first and Greece later in 1999, they reciprocated rescue operations, creating sympathy and solidarity among the public in both countries (Ganapati, Kelman, and Koukis 2010, 168-170). Nonetheless, the rapprochement has not been full-fledged to the extent of "the genuine self examination and critique indispensable to any meaningful problem-solving prospect" (Tzimitras 2008, 115). This echoes the finding of the aforementioned survey research, conducted in November 2001 (i.e., after the earthquakes), showing that Turkish people are most likely to associate the worst enemy with Greece (Carkoglu and Kirisci 2005, 127). Tzimitras (2008, 115) points out, "Even today, both sides retain the impression that they have made unilateral concessions that have not been matched" (115).

Why is it so? Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006, 585) argue, "The significance of Greek-Turkish rapprochement since 1999 lies not so much in the actual resolution of the various disputed issues, but rather in the societal diffusion of a sustained desecuritization agenda." Desecuritization is a process whereby issues deescalate from militarized to non-militarized levels. However, de-escalation is not equal to resolution.

If the disputed nationalist issues remain unresolved, nationalistic hostility can linger if not overtly but latently. To root out nationalistic rivalry, it is essential to resolve the issues of Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, and the de-escalation of nationalistic hostility is a prerequisite for this, not a sufficient condition for peace.

Domestic politics has a significant effect to make nationalistic rivalry persistent in Greek-Turkish relations. In Greece, "[s]oon after the Ocalan crisis, George Papandreou, an advocate of Greek-Turkish cooperation, was appointed as foreign minister and has since enjoyed continuously high levels of popular support in Greek polls" (Loizides 2002, 435). The appointment of George Papandreou made Greece ready for cooperation with Turkey. However, Turkish domestic politics was "more complicated," as "while the political system in Greece allows for stable single-party governments, forming a government in Turkey might involve as many as three parties and requires the consent of the military" (Loizides 2002, 436). Even if one side in nationalistic-rivalry dyads is eager for cooperation and reconciliation, if the other side is not, the former side will eventually abandon its cooperative attitude, or will be forced to do so due to the rise of hardliners in domestic politics, as was in the case of India-Pakistan which the last chapter discussed. It remains uncertain when the dyad will eventually resolve nationalistic rivalry, especially given that this rivalry emerged after years of bilateral cooperation.

Case Study: China-Japan and Economic Interdependence

The data show that China-Japan is the most economically interdependent nationalistic-rivalry dyad which has experienced revisionist behavior. Hence, it is a suitable subject for an in-depth case study of economic interdependence in nationalistic

rivalry.

The dyad has significant historical and contemporary implications for world politics. In terms of the historical implication, China and Japan fought two wars, one during the period of 1894-95 and the other during the period of 1937-1945 including part of WWII. This history has persistently shaped Chinese and Japanese nationalisms against each other. Meanwhile, in terms of the contemporary implication, on the one hand, the declining economy of Japan and the rising power of China have provided a fertile ground for the exchange of nationalistic hostility between the two states, especially over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.

Historical Overview of Sino-Japanese Relations

In history, China and Japan had never experienced any protracted conflict until the late 19th century. Alongside the decline of China's position and the rise of Japanese imperialism in the great power competition of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Japan and China engaged in interstate hostility, including the First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars (1894-1895 and 1937-1945). After Japan was defeated by the Allied Powers in WWII, the United States occupied Japan and governed post-war reconstruction. Meanwhile, in China, the Communists defeated the Nationalists to gain control and governance of the mainland.

In the post-WWII reconstruction process, in 1952 Japan signed a peace treaty with Taiwan, the state of the Chinese Nationalists, rather than with the People's Republic of China (hereafter China), the state of the Chinese Communists, in line with US Cold War policy. Meanwhile, the rivalry between China and Japan also disappeared: for almost five decades after the end of WWII, the two states had relatively peaceful relations and

did not pose a threat to each other (Iriye 1996, 51).

After the dramatic improvement of the relationship between the United States and China in 1971, the Japanese government normalized diplomatic relations with China in 1972. On the one hand, although the Chinese government still feared the revival of Japanese militarism, after the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations it preferred to cooperate with Japan from a strategic viewpoint as a means to deal with the Soviet threat, which accelerated diplomatic normalization (He 2009, 182-193). On the other, while the normalization was followed by a significant increase in bilateral trade (see Figure 5-4), Japan and China had been engaging with each other economically even before 1972 and this economic engagement was the basis of Japan's rapprochement with China (Yahuda 2014, 67-68).

Figure 5-4: Sino-Japanese bilateral trade in the decades before and after diplomatic normalization in 1972



Unit: current US millions of dollars

Sources: Barbieri and Keshk (2012); Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins (2009)

Sino-Japanese relations, however, began to deteriorate in the 1980s. First, in the early 1980s, China's anti-Japan nationalism began to escalate. At that time, the Chinese government experienced domestic problems such as resistance to economic reform and the declining legitimacy of the communist ideology (He 2007, 6). In the context of social and political instability, nationalism is an important policy tool for governments to mobilize public support (Solt 2011; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Gagnon 1994/95). Conforming to this theoretical expectation, the Chinese government used nationalism as an alternative foundation for regime legitimacy (He 2007, 6; see also He 2009, 214-215) and nurtured nationalist sentiment by emphasizing the history of victimization in war by imperial powers, especially Japan (He 2007, 6-8). Second, bilateral relations underwent considerable change as a result of altered world and interstate politics in the 1990s: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of Chinese power, and the decline of Japanese power. The first meant that the two states did not have a shared threat to tackle cooperatively anymore, and the latter two indicated that power transition, a source of conflict (Organski and Kugler 1980), was occurring in the China-Japan dyad.[16]

The bilateral relation did not immediately escalate to intensive conflict. Analyzing disputes in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 1990 and 1996, Downs and Saunders (1998/99, 145) argued that "fears that nationalism will interact with rising Chinese power to produce aggressive behavior are overstated, or at least premature." According to their analysis, the Chinese government, while using nationalism to increase regime

[16] Statistical models in Chapter 3 indicated that the capability ratio is statistically insignificant in explaining the probability of nationalistic rivalry. I am not arguing that power transition between China and Japan was the major cause of their nationalistic rivalry. Rather, power transition influenced the course of bilateral relations by complexly interacting with other relevant factors such as China's patriotic education program, the nationalist history of war, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. This complexity is what my statistical models cannot capture.

legitimacy, actually restrained its conflict behavior toward Japan to avoid disrupting its economic ties with Japan and Western states (124-139).

Yet, at the time of the 1996 dispute, these two states initiated nationalistic rivalry. This inference can be endorsed by qualitative analysis. While the Chinese government was experiencing domestic and interstate difficulties at the time of the 1990 dispute, by 1996 it had recovered (Downs and Saunders 1998/99, 127-133; see also He 2009, 277), which enabled China to gain competitor status vis-à-vis Japan. In addition, the Taiwan issue contributed to inducing a mutual threat perception. On the one hand, "the 1996 agreement on new guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation" provoked "Chinese fears that Japan still [sought] to exercise influence over the fate of Taiwan" (Yahuda 2006, 167). On the other, China's aggressive behavior in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis increased Japan's concerns (He 2009, 253; Yahuda 2006, 171). Thus, 1996 was when both China and Japan began to perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies.[17] The Sino-Japanese rivalry has been derived from the competing national (and nationalist) views of war history (He 2009) and is, therefore, nationalism-induced. Since the beginning of this nationalism-induced rivalry, the frequency of revisionist behavior has risen significantly, despite coinciding with the highest ever levels of trade interdependence (see Figure 5-5). This fact makes a stark contrast with Russo-Japanese relations, which have shared similar problems such as the history of war and territorial disputes but have been calmer despite their much lower trade interdependence. In other words, economic interdependence seems irrelevant to nationalistic rivalry and revisionist behavior within it.

[17] For an excellent summary of growing Sino–Japanese mutual threat perception in the 1990s, see Yahuda (2014, 30-36).

Figure 5-5: Sino-Japanese economic interdependence and revisionist behavior



The y-axis is the ratio of bilateral trade to GDP per capita; revisionist behavior is measured as either present or absent

Unit: current US millions of dollars

Source: for trade data, Barbieri and Keshk (2012) and Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009); for GDP per capita data, Heston, Summers, and Aten (2012); for data on revisionist behavior after 2001, the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset ver. 4.01 (Palmer et al. 2015); trade-to-GPDpc ratio for 2010 is missing due to data availability

Nationalistic Rivalry and Economic Interdependence

Then, the puzzle is why economic interdependence has not prevented China and Japan from engaging in revisionist behavior. To solve this puzzle by the theory put forward earlier, the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis is examined in detail.

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located in the southern part of the East China Sea and are claimed by Tokyo and Beijing, as well as Taipei (see Figure 5-6). After the first

Sino-Japanese war, Japan annexed the islands, and after WWII, the US administered them (He 2009, 194). The territorial dispute began when Washington made the islands over to Tokyo, along with returning the sovereignty of Okinawa to Japan, in 1971 (He 2009, 194). However, Beijing did not escalate the dispute for a while since it needed to cooperate with Japan to tackle the Soviet threat. Once the Soviet threat disappeared, the sovereignty dispute began to dominate Sino-Japanese relations.

Figure 5-6: Map of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

Source: VOA Photo (2012)

The 2010 crisis was “the most serious and dangerous bilateral incident since 1952” (Wan 2011, 73). On September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishing boat sailing around the islands collided with Japanese Coast Guard vessels after the latter had warned the boat to leave. The captain of the fishing vessel was arrested “on charges of obstructing

official duties" (*The New York Times,* September 14, 2010). In response, the Chinese government strongly criticized the Japanese government and demanded the immediate release of the captain (*The New York Times*, September 11, 2010). In protest, Beijing put off a negotiation for joint gas field development in the East China Sea (*The Japan Times*, September 13, 2010). Tokyo released the crew on September 13, but made a decision to extend the detention of the captain for another 10 days on the 19th. After this decision, Beijing threatened to take "strong countermeasures" (Fackler and Johnson 2010a). Four Japanese employees of a private company were detained under the allegation of "entering a military zone in Hebei Province without authorization and videotaping military targets" (Matsutani and Takahara 2010), and the export to Japan of rare earths, which are crucial to Japanese manufacturers, was blocked. The Japanese government released the captain on September 24. Yet the tension between Tokyo and Beijing remained: Beijing called for apology and compensation from Tokyo, which Tokyo refused to do (*The Japan Times*, September 26, 2010). China released three of the detained employees on September 30 and the remaining one on October 9, and the tension abated.

Three significant observations of the crisis can be pointed out. First, both China and Japan were revisionists according to the MID dataset (see Figure 5-5). While China has challenged Japan's control of the Senkaku Diaoyu Islands and, therefore, is necessarily a revisionist, Japan's behavior in the 2010 crisis was also coded as revisionistic, possibly for the following reasons. Japan had become more and more dissatisfied with the fact that China has made more and more assertive claims on the islands. In addition, Japan resorted to the unconventionally strong measure of arresting and detaining the Chinese captain, unlike in previous times when Tokyo would have quietly detained the

fisherpersons and released them shortly afterwards (Yahuda 2014, 55).

Second, during the period of the Great Recession since late 2000s, the crisis escalated to halt economic activities for both highly economically interdependent states. As already mentioned, China postponed negotiations for joint gas field development and restricted the exports of rare earths to Japan, even though "Japan [had] been the main buyer of Chinese rare earths for many years" (Bradsher 2010). In addition, it allegedly tightened custom procedures for bilateral trade (*The Japan Times*, September 28, 2010).

Finally, nationalism and nationalistic hostility among the masses escalated in both states, with anti-Japan street protests in China and anti-China demonstrations in Japan (*Agence France Presse*, October 18, 2010; Fackler and Johnson 2010b; *The New York Times*, October 18, 2010; *The Sankei Shimbun & Sankei Digital*, October 16, 2010).

These three observations suggest that, as Wan (2011, 79) points out, "the two governments have limited ability to manage emotionally-charged bilateral diplomatic disputes." Rather than purely economic concerns, potential or actual nationalistic emotion in the public led both governments to behave in a way which is irrational in terms of economic interdependence but rational in terms of nationalistic rivalry. Japan's and China's nationalistic hostility, deeply rooted in the political history of bilateral relations,[18] led them to strive to cope with the nationalist issue by coercive measures and not to behave according to the theoretical expectation of economic interdependence.

For China, as He (2007, 17-19) points out, the Chinese government needs to show to the nationalistic masses that it is the defender of the Chinese nation. It cannot prioritize economic profits over nationalist sentiments for fear of being accused of treason (see He

[18] For a detailed analysis of the political history of China's anti-Japan and Japan's anti-China nationalisms, see He (2009).

2007, 17-19). Thus, Gries (2005, 849) argues that the Chinese government's "Japan policies…are increasingly reactive to nationalist opinion, rather than proactive to China's national [economic] interest."[19] The nationalist accusation of treason has been prevalent in Chinese society, particularly in online communities, and public figures and intellectuals who appeared close to Japan have been harshly criticized (Gries 2005, 832-839).

Chinese people have interpreted Japan's behavior through the lens of threat perception and nationalistic hostility (see He 2007, 10). An episode which illustrates this is Chinese people's opposition to the use of private Japanese companies for a railroad project to connect Beijing and Shanghai in 2003 (He 2007, 19-20; Gries 2005, 843-844). According to He (2007, 21), one of the reasons for the opposition "was that, if the project were granted to such large industrial conglomerates as Mitsubishi that were also big players in the Japanese defense industry, it would greatly boost Japanese military power and eventually threaten Chinese national security." This suggests that Chinese people viewed the potential profit for Japanese private companies, and therefore for Japan, as a threat to Chinese nationhood. The same logic would not apply to, for instance, Japan-US; Japanese people would not imagine that Japanese airlines buying Boeing airplanes would eventually threaten Japanese nationhood, although Boeing makes military planes as well. Thus, the interpretation of another's intention and behavior deeply depends on one's perception of, and identity vis-à-vis, the "other." Engaged in nationalistic rivalry, hardened Chinese national identity highlights the difference and threats from Japan, thereby creating the image of Japan as a threatening

[19] I add "economic" because national interest in Gries's context is related to the economic and technical assessment of using Japanese companies for a Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway project.

"other."

An irony is that the anti-Japan nationalism, first fostered among the masses by the Chinese government, now constrains the government's policy towards Japan (see He 2009, 229-230). This causes a dilemma with which the government must struggle. That is, it "[needs] to maintain stable relations with Japan to ensure China's continued economic growth, but also [fears] appearing weak before nationalists at home" (Gries 2005, 848; see also He 2009, 280). This dilemma was apparent in the 2010 crisis. According to Fackler and Johnson (2010b), "the fact that the detention took around the anniversary of Japan's 1931 invasion of northeast China, spurred scattered street protests and calls by nationalistic Chinese bloggers to take a firm stand against Tokyo." As expected, Beijing severely criticized Japan's arrest of the captain (Johnson 2010). However, it also stated that Japan's action would exacerbate the difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations (*The New York Times*, October 18, 2010), thus signaling a concern for bilateral relations. This suggests that while the Chinese government cannot make a concession regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute for fear that the rise of nationalism among the masses would cause domestic unrest and criticism of the government, it does not want to endanger economic relations with Japan either.

In Japan, anti-China nationalism among the masses has escalated to the extent that the government faces "public anger at . . . [being] weak in response to a rising China" (Wan 2011, 79) and "the Japanese popular antipathy to China [has] generated strong public opposition to conciliatory policy on bilateral disputes" (He 2009, 285). In the context of the 2010 crisis, the government was reluctant to disclose the video which recorded the scene of the collision between the Coast Guard vessels and the Chinese fishing boat, arguably due to the concern that it would fuel China's anger further, while

opposition lawmakers urged the government to disclose it (*Jiji Press Ticker Service*, November 1, 2010). However, even after the 2010 crisis deescalated at the government level, protesters not only showed anger at China's coercive attitude but also criticized the government for not disclosing the video (*Japan Economic Newswire*, November 6, 2010; *The Sankei Shimbun & Sankei Digital*, November 6, 2010).

Figure 5-7: Japanese feelings of being close and not close to China



Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2013)

The exacerbation of the negative public perception of China over time is evident in survey data by the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan (see Figure 5-7). In 1996, when the nationalistic rivalry began, the proportion of "not close" responses exceeded those of "close" and more than half of the respondents answered that they do not feel

close to China.[20] This trend declined slightly in the next few years, but "not close" has constantly been a majority since 2001. Given the duration of nationalistic rivalry and the frequency of revisionist behavior since 1996, the survey data suggest that the image of China as a threatening "other" has been increasing over years in Japanese society.

The rise of Japanese nationalism is not merely due to China's assertive foreign policy. Japanese society has suffered from economic depression since the mid-1990s (the "lost decades").[21] In addition, after the Koizumi administration of 2001-2006, Japan has also experienced political instability, such as the approximately annual change of Prime Minister. Alongside this, "Japan's new nationalism" has emerged, and "various nationalist positions once considered radical are no longer thought outlandish" (Matthew 2003, 77). Japanese conservative politicians have used nationalism for popular support (see He 2009, 124-125). For example, some Japanese ministers and MPs often visit the Yasukuni shrine, where war criminals from WWII are among those enshrined. In particular, 2001-2006 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's persistence in visiting Yasukuni every year "won him considerable public admiration" (He 2009, 239).

The theory of nationalistic rivalry argues that in a competition over national superiority, both sides believe that one is righteous and the other is illegitimately challenging it, thereby creating mutual threat perception and nationalistic hostility. As

[20] The survey answers consist of "feel close," "feel close if any," "feel not close if any," "feel not close," and "don't know." In Figure 4, "close" is the aggregated data of "feel close" and "feel close if any," and "not close" that of "feel not close if any" and "feel not close" (see He 2009, 201).

[21] As in the case of power transition, it was found from statistical models in Chapter 3 that the economic growth rate is statistically insignificant in explaining the probability of nationalistic rivalry. It seems that the Japanese economic downturn influenced the course of bilateral relations, conditional on other idiosyncratic factors and contexts.

China has believed that it is the legitimate owner of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and has seen Japan as the threatening "other," Japan has perceived China making an illegitimate claim on its own territory. In the 2010 crisis, the arrest and detention of the Chinese captain were regarded as righteous according to the rule of law,[22] and China's anger at it was seen as indicative of its disrespect for Japanese sovereignty and as evidence of its threatening character.

Just as Japan has been an external target of Chinese nationalism, China has become an external target of Japanese nationalism, and China's assertive foreign policy has been seen as a major threat to Japanese nationhood. These days, Japanese national interest vis-à-vis China has been defined primarily in terms of settling the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute according to Japan's position, rather than earning economic profits from interdependence. After Beijing put off a negotiation for joint gas field development in the East China Sea, Japanese officials mentioned that they hoped the crisis would not escalate to worsen bilateral relations (*The Japan Times*, September 13, 2010). This suggests that, like Beijing, Tokyo knew that good bilateral relations with China – its "largest trading partner" since 2007 (Yahuda 2014, 64) – were important for the economy, especially given that the Japanese economy had deteriorated due to the Great Recession. Nonetheless, the government took a firmer, more nationalistic stance in the crisis than before; its handling of the crisis was a significant departure from the convention by which Tokyo would have quietly detained the fisherpersons and released them shortly afterwards (Yahuda 2014, 55). Furthermore, despite the government taking a firmer stance than ever, the secretary general of the major opposition party even

[22] After being summoned by Beijing, the then Japanese ambassador to China, Uichiro Niwa, stated, "We have maintained the position that we will solemnly handle the case in strict accordance with domestic law" (cited in *The Japan Times*, September 26, 2010).

claimed that the release of the captain was "diplomatically tone-deaf and a historic blunder" (cited in *The Japan Times*, September 27, 2010). The 2010 crisis indicates that, like the Chinese government, the Japanese state was unable to prioritize economic profits over nationalist sentiments vis-à-vis China due to the prevalence of nationalistic anti-China hostility in Japanese society.

In short, as expected by the theory put forward in this chapter, nationalistic rivalry thwarted the pacifying effect of economic interdependence in the 2010 crisis. Given their respective domestic political situations, neither the Chinese nor the Japanese government could hold a weak position regarding the territorial dispute involving strong nationalistic feelings. In terms of the rationalist argument, the primary rational choice was to address the territorial dispute, not to seek economic profits, because of the mutual threat perception produced by nationalistic rivalry. In terms of the constructivist argument, "the countries' mutual image deteriorated despite the boom in mutual contacts" (He 2009, 265) due to the reinforcement of national identity, which made it impossible to promote a shared identity for cooperation.

It may be premature to conclude that economic interdependence does not contribute to reducing interstate conflict at all. Koo (2009, 207) argues that while both Beijing and Tokyo used interstate crises over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to mobilize political support, they did not escalate them to the extent that "contending Sino-Japanese nationalisms could snowball into a larger, possibly destabilizing movement that would undermine bilateral economic ties." In other words, economic interdependence prevented conflict *escalation*, even if it did not prevent conflict *initiation*.

However, its effect may have become weaker over time as it seems that the Sino-Japanese conflict has become more intense in the last few years. Currently there is

no sign of a rapprochement in the dyad either. In November 2013, the Chinese defense ministry announced that it had established a new air defense identification zone over the East China Sea, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and Beijing stated that all airlines going through the zone must file flight plans to the Chinese authority. In response, the Japanese government asked Japanese private airliners, Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways, not to do so (Kachi and Takahashi 2013). In April 2014, Tokyo decided to build a military radar station in Yonaguni Island, near the disputed islands, and approximately 150 personnel will be deployed there within two years (*BBC News*, April 19, 2014). Both actors remain locked in lasting reciprocal nationalistic hostility and threat perception.

Conclusion

The chapter has discussed whether the liberal peace factors mitigate revisionist behavior when states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry. It is theorized that none of joint democracy, economic interdependence, and IGOs can demonstrate its pacifying effect within nationalistic rivalry. Both large-N statistical analysis and small-N case studies endorse the inefficacy of the liberal peace elements. This finding, in combination with Chapter 4, suggests that the effect of nationalistic rivalry on state behavior is hard to mitigate.

The chapter has significant implications for liberal peace theory. While nationalism has been omitted from the scope of liberal peace theory, it actually has a powerful impact on the theory. As theoretically and empirically discussed, if nationalism dominates society and shapes state behavior as the source of rational choice and of identity, the causal mechanisms between each liberal peace element and peace fail to

work. To advance our knowledge of conflict management, it is necessary to take nationalism into consideration as a key confounding factor in theorizing liberal peace.

Conclusion

Nationalistic Rivalry and Beyond

The main purpose of the thesis is to give an answer to the research question of what conditions cause nationalism to be a force of revisionist behavior in interstate politics. To this end, the thesis has developed the theory of nationalistic rivalry and has tested its empirical implications.

The first three chapters aimed to theorize and empirically investigate the causal mechanism whereby states develop nationalistic rivalry and engage in revisionist behavior. Chapter 1 illustrated the theoretical grounds for the core argument of the thesis that nationalism causes revisionist behavior through nationalistic rivalry. Theories on revisionist states, interstate rivalry, nationalism, and intergroup conflict were reviewed and discussed. Based on those theoretical grounds, Chapter 2 developed the theory of nationalistic rivalry and operationalized it for empirical analysis. Then, it hypothesized that ethnically heterogeneous society, political instability, and ethnonation-state incongruence increase the probability of dyads experiencing nationalistic rivalry; nationalistic rivalry increases revisionist behavior through the nationalist mobilization of society; and state-territorial nationalism is less revisionist-prone than transstate-ethnic nationalism only in the asymmetrical case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. Chapter 3 conducted a series of empirical analyses to test the hypotheses using statistical techniques, indicating that all hypotheses were supported (see Table 3-15).

Having found that nationalistic rivalry increases revisionist behavior, Chapters 4 and

5 attempted to examine whether well-known conflict-mitigating factors, nuclear deterrence and liberal peace, could reduce the probability of revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry. Empirical analysis by large-N statistical models and small-N case studies indicated that neither nuclear deterrence nor liberal peace contributes to a lower propensity for revisionist behavior.

The remaining sections of this concluding chapter discuss the limitations of the thesis and the implications of nationalistic rivalry theory for the wider literature and for policy-making in contemporary world politics.

Limitations of the Research

While I believe that this thesis has advanced our understanding of the causality between nationalism and revisionist foreign policy, it is also important to note its limitations. First, the operational definition of nationalistic rivalry poses a challenge to predict future state behavior, due to its retrospective nature as was discussed in the last paragraph of the section on operationalizing nationalistic rivalry in Chapter 2. To recapitulate, the coding scheme cannot include the dyads which have engaged only in one dispute, but which will have experienced another dispute within fifteen years following the year of the first dispute in the future. Only if we could know the future, could we code those dyads as nationalistic rivalry from the year of the first dispute (provided that they fulfill the other criteria of nationalistic rivalry).

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine typically depicts this limitation. Until Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was overthrown by the pro-Europe opposition, no nationalistic rivalry had been observed. The initiation of reciprocal nationalistic hostility and mutual threat-competitor perception between the two states

was driven by the Ukraine crisis in 2014. As the current situation is a continuation of the first militarized dispute between Russia and Ukraine since the crisis broke out, it cannot be coded as nationalistic rivalry yet according to the coding scheme. If mutual threat-competitor perception continues over nationalist issues (such as territoriality in Eastern Ukraine) and the dyad experiences another militarized dispute within fifteen years (the maximum temporal threshold for the dispute-density rivalry criterion), it will be possible to argue *ex post* that the dyad will have been engaged in nationalistic rivalry since Yanukovych was overthrown, according to the operationalization of nationalistic rivalry. Unless we know what will happen in the future, the raw data of nationalistic rivalry would not give a sufficient guide for policy makers to compare the potential risk of each non-nationalistic-rivalry dyad.

However, this limitation can be mitigated, as it is possible to estimate the predicted probability of dyads experiencing nationalistic rivalry by using the estimates of empirical models in Chapter 3. For example, Model 3-1 estimates the probability of nationalistic rivalry by four regressors – the smaller number of PREGs in dyads, the larger Polity 2 score in dyads and its squared term, and ethnonation-state incongruence (as well as time controls). If we insert the value of these variables in the Russo-Ukraine dyad, we can calculate how probable the dyad was to initiate nationalistic rivalry in 2014. Due to the data availability, the latest observation of the smaller number of PREGs and ethnonation-state incongruence is respectively 2010 and 2009, whereas that of the larger Polity 2 score is 2013. Based on these observations, it is estimated that the dyad was 0.23% probable to experience nationalistic rivalry. This probability might appear very small, but is much larger than the average predicted probability that dyads without nationalistic rivalry will initiate nationalistic rivalry in a year (0.033%). Thus,

the predicted probability estimation using the empirical model can provide significant insight into how to compare the potential risk of non-nationalistic-rivalry dyads developing nationalistic rivalry.

Another limitation of the thesis is that it cannot explain any kinds of cases in which nationalism becomes the cause of revisionist foreign policy. The theory of nationalistic rivalry is focused on the dyads in which states engage in competition for national superiority. If power asymmetry is huge, the dyad may not have competition but the stronger state may revise the status quo of the weaker state by asymmetric warfare. For example, the United States overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. These US war operations were certainly influenced by nationalism. Americans were shocked by the 9.11 terrorist attacks and the sense of threat from terrorist organizations was salient. At least some Americans believed that the overthrow of the Taliban and Hussein was necessary to secure the national homeland. The sense of threat also hardened the identifications among Americans. The binary of the righteous Americans and the threatening “other” states was observed in American discourse, as typically signified by George W. Bush’s remark of the “Axis of evil.” In short, to explain nationalist motivations for hugely asymmetric revisionist warfare, it will be necessary to develop a different theory.

Finally, when coding nationalistic-rivalry dyads, it was found that a number of cases had multiple issues (see Appendix B). The data of nationalistic-rivalry dyads itself does not intend to count the number of issues in each dyad, because the thesis does not have a theoretical motivation for that. However, future research might consider if a larger number of issues makes any significant difference or the quality rather than quantity of

issues matters in explaining a revisionist propensity.[1]

Despite these limitations, however, the theory and data of nationalistic rivalry have useful analytical features, as the thesis has advanced an understanding of the causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior through examining a variety of relevant factors. In addition, the thesis also has significant academic and policy implications, as discussed in the following section.

Implications

The thesis has five important implications for broader literature. First of all, the systematic finding that nationalistic rivalry increases the probability of revisionist behavior advances our understanding of the causes of revisionist states, and encourages the literature on revisionist states to incorporate quantitative analysis into their empirical approaches.

Second, the theory of nationalistic rivalry advances the current literature on interstate rivalry. The theory is different from, though partly drawing on, existent rivalry theories in the following respect. That is, its primary purpose is to understand the implication of nationalism for interstate conflict by using the concept of interstate rivalry, rather than to offer an alternative general theory of rivalry. The existent literature on interstate rivalry certainly indicates some similar points to this thesis. Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007) find that high capabilities and geographic proximity increase the probability of rivalry, and that rivalry causes more interstate conflicts. Colaresi (2004) and Mitchell and Prins (2004) argue that interstate rivalry influences domestic political dynamics. It has also been discovered that territorial disputes significantly increase the

[1] Dreyer (2010) studies this point in terms of interstate rivalry in general.

probability of interstate rivalry (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001; Tir and Diehl 2002), particularly if they involve "issues of ethnic irredentism or national unification" (Huth 1996, 19-20). Finally, rivals over territorial issues are more prone to frequent conflicts and severe rivalry (Tir and Diehl 2002) and more inclined to war (Vasquez 1996) than those over non-territorial issues. Nonetheless, the general implications of nationalism for interstate rivalry have barely been theorized in those studies.[2] Thus, general rivalry theories are insufficient to answer the question of this thesis, and the theory of nationalistic rivalry is a distinctive category of rivalry theories.

Third, quantitative conflict studies should focus not only on the initiation or onset of militarized interstate disputes but also on specific state behavior in these disputes. If revisionist behavior is the major source of the security dilemma, it may not necessarily be plausible to ignore a type of state behavior in militarized disputes. For example, would it be theoretically adequate to treat both the attempt to annex foreign territory and the effort to defend one's own territory just as the same "conflict onset"? By directing theoretical attention to state behavior, the thesis suggests a new direction of research in quantitative conflict studies.

Finally, the theory of nationalistic rivalry suggests how IR literature can be enriched by taking nationalism more seriously. Some IR scholars have recognized the importance of nationalism in interstate politics (e.g., Mearsheimer 1990; Posen 1993), yet nationalism remains undertheorized (Griffiths and Sullivan 1997, 55). However, the concept of nationalism has a potential to enrich our understanding of state behavior. Specifically in terms of this thesis, the theory of nationalistic rivalry indicates that

[2] The literature closest to this point is a study of rivalry over different identities. See, for example, Huth (1996) and Dreyer (2010).

simply materialist assumptions, such as taking material capabilities or economic profits as the basis of given preferences, do not always hold in explaining a revisionist propensity. Rather, conditioned by nationalistic rivalry, society is locked in the biased image of the righteous "self" and the threatening "other" and will not estimate the costs and benefits of revisionist attempts in terms of a purely objective calculation.[3] Nationalism may drag states into engaging in revisionist attempts, even if such an action is risky and unreasonable purely in terms of strategic cost-benefit calculations (e.g., the Kargil War between India and Pakistan under the shadow of nuclear deterrence as explained in Chapter 4; see also Roy 1997). The statistical findings in Chapter 5 also illustrate the significance of nationalism as a key factor, as democratic peace, whose empirics have been established largely by quantitative analysis, failed to demonstrate its primary theoretical expectation of the pacifying effect of joint democracy in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. Although quantitative research on interstate conflict has mainly relied on realpolitik and/or rationalist models, the variable of nationalism may help to produce novel hypotheses, as in the case of this thesis.

More generally speaking, when states behave in a nationalist manner, not only material factors such as geography and military capabilities but also ideational factors such as fear and hostility in domestic society may influence state behavior. This is because nationalism entails both material and psychological aspects. For instance, a neighboring state's greater military power would pose a graver threat to a nation residing in another state, if the national identification between them were salient. In other words, the interpretation of the neighbor's military power would depend on the

[3] For other arguments on rationality and nationalism, see Kaufmann (2005) and Varshney (2003).

level of commonality and differentiation between nations. The perception of the threat would in turn provoke fear and hostility in the national society of the latter state. These psychologies would inform national members there of what to do vis-à-vis the threatening "other." Nationalist mobilizations for the collective behaving as the state would require some individuals to sacrifice their self-interest (even life) to national survival, due to psychological ties evoked by nationalism (Stern 1995). That is, taking nationalism into consideration gives one way to combine the materialist and ideationalist explanations of interstate relations.

Explanations using only material aspects and ignoring identity cannot explain why individuals act collectively as the nation. Nationalism is the key explanatory factor for this question. It enables collective behavior in a society by generating national identity, because "[n]ational identity and the nation signify bonds of solidarity among members of communities united by shared memories, myths and traditions" (Smith 1991, 15). Put differently, "a sense of national identity provides a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world, through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive culture" (Smith 1991, 17). An individual cares about the fate of co-nationals, exactly because they are the members of *the same nation*. He/she identifies them with him/herself through the lens of national collectivity. From the elites' viewpoint, in turn, this feature of national identity assumes an instrumental value, because they can appeal to national identity in order to legitimize "social order and solidarity" (Smith 1991, 16) and to mobilize supports and resources for their own interest (which they may disguise as the "national interest").

The nation is not a materialistically efficient unit as it is too big an organization to manage business unlike a corporation, and too small a market to make a profit unlike

the global market. Nonetheless, it persists as the most fundamental collectivity of human beings, even in the current globalizing world. The formation of nations-states might have been motivated partly by material interests to win war (Posen 1993), but the fact that nationalism often defined an unpopular language as a national language (e.g., Hebrew for Jews, see Hobsbawm 1992, 110) calls into question the purely materialist explanation of human collective behavior, since choosing the most widely spoken language for the national language would have been most efficient. Human collectivities, especially since modernization, are too complex to explain simply by materialism.

More specifically in the context of conflict studies, without considering nationalism, it is difficult to explain the causal mechanism whereby people lead their society to rivalry and conflict.[4] For example, while Vasquez (1995, 282) argues that "[w]hy human collectivities are more prone to fight over territory in the modern global system than other issues, even highly salient ideological issues, is not obvious," the theory of nationalism can give an answer to this question. According to Smith (1991), nationalism contains the "concept of unity" (75) and "is about 'land'" (70), as "nations are inconceivable without some common myths and memories of territorial home" (40). Territorial integrity is a prerequisite for nationhood and, therefore, nations fight severely over their national territory.[5]

Vasquez (2009, 367) argues that the explanation based on nationalism has a limitation because "nationalism and the ideational construction of national identity are fairly recent phenomena (nineteenth century), and war is very ancient." Vasquez (2009, 367)

[4] In a similar respect, Kaufmann (2005) points to the necessity to take ethnic identity into consideration in the context of criticizing the rational choice models of ethnic conflict which assume that ethnic identity does not matter.

[5] For a similar point, see Miller (2007, 6).

attributes the origin of territorial conflict to human biological nature, which he leaves "exogenous in the explanation because the topic lies in the purview of biology, ethology, psychology, and the other life sciences."

This argument has two problems. First, it is debatable whether it is plausible to attribute the origin of territorial conflict to human biological nature, to claim that nationalism appears only since the 19th century, and to assume that a theory can explain war across time and space rather than focusing on narrower temporal/spatial domains. Second, more importantly, human biological nature cannot explain collective behavior. Why would one individual react to the invasion of some other individual's land? To answer this question, the concept of collective/group identity is necessary. Among others, religious and ethnic identities often play a powerful role to connect people as an imagined community (Anderson 2006), as they entail emotional and cultural appeals (Smith 1991, 3-6). Although national identity may be a modern creation, ethnic and religious identities enabled collective behavior through creating an imagined community of ethnicity or religion before the age of nationalism. Once nationalism emerged and spread in the world, it has often utilized ethnicity and religion as the basis of national identity (e.g., Serbia's nationalism largely shaped by ethnicity and Pakistan's nationalism significantly referring to Islam). It is implausible to reduce collective actions for territorial conflict to mere human biology. Group identity is essential to explain collective behavior, and the concept of nationalism is particularly important to explain state behavior in contemporary world politics, as the political norm of nationalism has been institutionalized in the interstate system in the post-WWII era.

In short, nationalism is one of the essential terms in the equation to explain state behavior. This is because nationalism is, as noted several times throughout the thesis,

the principal source of payoffs in rational choice terms or of identity in constructivist terms.

The chapter finally presents the policy implications of the thesis. Nationalistic-rivalry dyads are highly dangerous for international peace and security, because they disproportionately produce revisionist behavior in the interstate system. Hence, it is apparent that the international community should pay attention to these dyads. Because revisionist behavior is a major source of dyadic, regional, or even global instability, the international community must devise a policy to inhibit revisionist propensities within nationalistic rivalry. However, as far as the findings of this thesis are concerned, this is not an easy task. Chapters 4 and 5 have found that most well-known conflict-mitigating factors in the literature, nuclear deterrence and liberal peace, are ineffective to curb revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry. It has been found that democratic states are less prone to revisionist behavior against autocratic targets within nationalistic rivalry. Yet, it would be controversial to allow only either of the states to be a democracy in order to reduce the probability of revisionist behavior.

Meanwhile, it is also important to consider how we could root out nationalistic rivalry *per se*. Chapter 3 has indicated that robust predictors of nationalistic rivalry are ethnically heterogeneous society (measured by the smaller number of PREGs in dyads), political instability (measured by the larger Polity 2 score in dyads and its squared term), ethnonation-state incongruence, the distance between states, and the absolute capability of a weaker state in dyads. It is difficult to manipulate ethnically heterogeneous society, ethnonation-state incongruence, the distance between states, and the absolute capability of a weaker state in dyads. To reduce ethnic heterogeneity and ethnonation-state incongruence, it is necessary to change status-quo territorial configuration in the

interstate system. However, it is difficult to draw borders perfectly along the lines of all ethnonational groups, as members of one group often live together with those of other groups in one region. Perfect separation might require population transfer, which is morally controversial. In addition, because ethnic groups and nations are socially constructed, there is always the possibility that even the previously perfect separation of all ethnonational groups will be broken due to the rise of new ethnonational groups.

It is also unrealistic to either put a large distance between all states or reduce the material power of all states drastically. The former solution is almost impossible because the land on earth is limited. So is the latter because states fear aggression from other states in interstate anarchy and, therefore, they would be unwilling to decrease their power (perhaps unless some global police force were created).

One relatively feasible option to reduce the probability of nationalistic rivalry is to address political instability in countries. Either complete democracy or complete autocracy is less likely to engage in nationalistic rivalry than inconsistent regimes. In particular, complete democracy is least likely to experience nationalistic rivalry. Hence, what the international community could do is to help incomplete democracy to achieve full democratization.

Apart from systematic causes of peace, idiosyncratic external shocks may increase the chance of mitigating nationalistic rivalry. The case study of Greece-Turkey supports this point: the earthquakes and reciprocal rescue activities helped to promote a rapprochement, even if positive peace has yet to come in the dyad. The external shocks are random events, and anyone who is interested in conflict resolution should not just wait for them to occur but should strive to find an alternative solution all the time. However, once such a shock occurs, it should be utilized to the maximum extent to

mitigate, and hopefully resolve, nationalistic rivalry.

More theoretically speaking, a high capability of agency for peace will be a significant factor in terminating nationalistic rivalry. Nationalistic rivalry is a social structure which institutionalizes nationalist mobilization towards revisionist behavior within national society. However, social structure does not always dominate agency. If leaders were strong and committed enough to counteract the social structure of nationalistic rivalry, they could successfully end the exchange of hostility. Future research might want to examine what kind of leadership will be more conducive to ending nationalistic rivalry.

All in all, it seems difficult to find easy, quick solutions to nationalistic rivalry. It will need long-term efforts among national and international leaders as well as local communities. Thus, to resolve nationalistic rivalry, to borrow Max Weber's (1994, 369) phrase, we will have to do "slow, strong drilling through hard boards, with a combination of passion and a sense of judgement."

Appendix A

List of Rivalries

The list of all rivalries in each dataset is displayed in Table A-1. Dyad IDs in the first column consist of the smaller one and the larger one of the COW state code of two states. The second column is the name of rivalry. The third column specifies the rivalry periods by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), in which "ongoing" means whether a rivalry is ongoing after 2010. The fourth column presents the rivalry periods by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006). The beginning year of rivalries can be before 1946 if they existed throughout both pre- and post-1945.

Table A-1: List of all rivalries in Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) in the post-WWII period

Dyad ID	Rivalry	TD period	KGD period
2020	United States of America-Canada		1974-1997
2040	United States of America-Cuba	1959-ongoing	1959-1996
2093	United States of America-Nicaragua		1982-1988
2130	United States of America-Ecuador		1952-1981
2135	United States of America-Peru		1955-1992
2315	United States of America-Czechoslovakia		1953-1961
2345	United States of America-Yugoslavia		1992-2000
2360	United States of America-Romania		1940-1951
2365	United States of America-Russia	1945-1989 2007-ongoing	1946-2000
2620	United States of America-Libya		1973-1996
2630	United States of America-Iran		1979-1997
2645	United States of America-Iraq		1987-2001
2651	United States of America-Egypt		1956-1968

2652	United States of America-Syria		1970-1996
2700	United States of America-Afghanistan		1998-2001
2710	United States of America-China	1949-1972	1949-2001
		1996-ongoing	
2731	United States of America-North Korea		1950-2000
2816	United States of America-Vietnam		1961-1973
20345	Canada-Yugoslavia		1998-2000
20365	Canada-Russia		1999-2000
41042	Haiti-Dominican Republic		1986-1994
52101	Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela		1996-1999
80090	Belize-Guatemala	1981-1991	1993-2001
90200	Guatemala-United Kingdom		1972-1977
91092	Honduras-El Salvador	1840-1992	1969-1993
91093	Honduras-Nicaragua	1844-1961	1957-2001
		1980-1987	
93094	Nicaragua-Costa Rica	1948-1990	1948-1957
			1977-1998
93100	Nicaragua-Colombia	1979-1990	1994-2001
100101	Colombia-Venezuela	1831-ongoing	1982-2000
101110	Venezuela-Guyana	1966-ongoing	1966-1999
110115	Guyana-Suriname		1976-2000
130135	Ecuador-Peru	1830-1998	1891-1955
			1977-1998
135155	Peru-Chile		1976-1977
140160	Brazil-Argentina	1817-1985	
145155	Bolivia-Chile	1836-ongoing	
155160	Chile-Argentina	1843-1991	1952-1984
160200	Argentina-United Kingdom	1965-ongoing	1976-1983
160345	Argentina-Yugoslavia		2000-2000
200345	United Kingdom-Yugoslavia		1992-2000
200365	United Kingdom-Russia	1778-1956	1939-1999
200395	United Kingdom-Iceland		1958-1976
200645	United Kingdom-Iraq		1958-2001
200651	United Kingdom-Egypt		1942-1958
200678	United Kingdom-Yemen Arab Republic		1949-1967
200710	United Kingdom-China		1950-1968

200713	United Kingdom-Taiwan		1949-1955
200850	United Kingdom-Indonesia		1951-1966
210345	Netherlands-Yugoslavia		1992-2000
210645	Netherlands-Iraq		1990-1999
210850	Netherlands-Indonesia	1951-1962	1951-1962
211345	Belgium-Yugoslavia		1992-2000
211490	Belgium-Democratic Republic of the Congo		1991-1993
220255	France-Germany	1756-1955	
220345	France-Yugoslavia		1992-2000
220365	France-Russia		1948-1961
220616	France-Tunisia		1957-1961
220620	France-Libya		1978-1987
220630	France-Iran		1985-1988
220645	France-Iraq		1990-1999
220710	France-China		1949-1953
220800	France-Thailand		1940-1952
230345	Spain-Yugoslavia		1992-2000
230600	Spain-Morocco	1956-1991	1957-1980
235345	Portugal-Yugoslavia		1998-2000
235433	Portugal-Senegal		1961-1973
235438	Portugal-Guinea		1962-1973
235551	Portugal-Zambia		1966-1973
235750	Portugal-India		1954-1961
255345	Germany-Yugoslavia		1992-2000
255645	Germany-Iraq		1991-1999
260265	German Federal Republic- German Democratic Republic	1949-1973	1961-1971
260315	German Federal Republic-Czechoslovakia		1984-1986
260365	German Federal Republic-Russia		1961-1980
290345	Poland-Yugoslavia		1999-2000
290365	Poland-Russia		1993-1997
305345	Austria-Yugoslavia		1991-2000
310345	Hungary-Yugoslavia		1938-1952 1991-2000
310360	Hungary-Romania	1918-1948	
316345	Czech Republic-Yugoslavia		1999-2000

325339	Italy-Albania		1952-1957
325345	Italy-Yugoslavia	1918-1954	1923-1956
			1992-2000
325645	Italy-Iraq		1990-1999
339343	Albania-Macedonia		1993-1997
339345	Albania-Yugoslavia		1992-2001
339350	Albania-Greece	1913-1996	1946-1949
			1994-1997
343345	Macedonia-Yugoslavia		1994-1999
344345	Croatia-Yugoslavia	1991-2002	1992-2000
344346	Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992-ongoing	1992-1996
345346	Yugoslavia-Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992-ongoing	1992-1994
345350	Yugoslavia-Greece	1879-1953	1992-2000
345355	Yugoslavia-Bulgaria	1878-1955	1913-1952
345360	Yugoslavia-Romania		1993-2000
345365	Yugoslavia-Russia	1948-1955	1998-2000
345368	Yugoslavia-Lithuania		1998-2000
345385	Yugoslavia-Norway		1998-2000
345390	Yugoslavia-Denmark		1998-2000
345395	Yugoslavia-Iceland		1998-2000
345640	Yugoslavia-Turkey		1992-2000
350355	Greece-Bulgaria	1878-1947	1913-1952
350640	Greece-Turkey	1955-ongoing	1958-2001
350645	Greece-Iraq		1982-1999
352640	Cyprus-Turkey		1965-2001
355640	Bulgaria-Turkey	1878-1950	1935-1952
			1986-1987
359365	Moldova-Russia		1992-1993
365367	Russia-Latvia		1994-1999
365369	Russia-Ukraine		1992-1996
365372	Russia-Georgia		1992-2001
365373	Russia-Azerbaijan		1993-1999
365380	Russia-Sweden		1952-1964
			1981-1992
365385	Russia-Norway		1956-2001
365630	Russia-Iran		1908-1987

365640	Russia-Turkey		1940-1962
			1993-2000
365666	Russia-Israel		1956-1974
365700	Russia-Afghanistan		1980-2001
365710	Russia-China	1816-1949	1862-1994
		1958-1989	
365713	Russia-Taiwan		1949-1958
365732	Russia-South Korea		1959-1983
365740	Russia-Japan		1861-2001
371373	Armenia-Azerbaijan	1991-ongoing	1992-2001
371630	Armenia-Iran		1993-1994
371640	Armenia-Turkey		1993-2000
404433	Guinea-Bissau-Senegal	1989-1993	
411481	Equatorial Guinea-Gabon	1972-ongoing	
432439	Mali-Burkina Faso	1960-1986	1974-1986
433435	Senegal-Mauritania	1989-1995	
435600	Mauritania-Morocco	1960-1969	1980-1987
437452	Ivory Coast-Ghana	1960-1970	
438450	Guinea-Liberia		1999-2001
438451	Guinea-Sierra Leone		1997-2001
438452	Guinea-Ghana		1966-1966
450451	Liberia-Sierra Leone		1991-2001
450475	Liberia-Nigeria		1998-1999
452461	Ghana-Togo	1960-1995	1961-1994
452475	Ghana-Nigeria	1960-1966	
471475	Cameroon-Nigeria	1975-ongoing	1981-1998
483517	Chad-Rwanda		1998-1999
483620	Chad-Libya	1966-1994	1976-1994
483625	Chad-Sudan	1964-1969	
		2004-ongoing	
484490	Congo-Democratic Republic of the Congo		1963-1997
484540	Congo-Angola		1995-1997
490500	Democratic Republic of the Congo-Uganda	1996-2009	1977-2001
490517	Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda	1996-2009	1996-2001
490540	Democratic Republic of the Congo-Angola	1975-1997	1975-1978
			1994-1997

490551	Democratic Republic of the Congo-Zambia		1971-1994
500501	Uganda-Kenya	1987-1995	1965-1997
500510	Uganda-Tanzania	1971-1979	1971-1979
500517	Uganda-Rwanda	1999-2009	1991-2001
500625	Uganda-Sudan	1963-1972	1968-2001
		1994-ongoing	
501520	Kenya-Somalia	1963-1981	1963-1989
501625	Kenya-Sudan	1989-1994	
510516	Tanzania-Burundi		1995-2000
510553	Tanzania-Malawi	1964-1994	
516517	Burundi-Rwanda	1962-1966	1964-1973
520530	Somalia-Ethiopia	1960-ongoing	1960-1985
522531	Djibouti-Eritrea	1996-ongoing	1995-1998
530531	Ethiopia-Eritrea	1998-ongoing	
530625	Ethiopia-Sudan	1965-ongoing	1967-1997
531625	Eritrea-Sudan	1993-ongoing	1994-1999
531679	Eritrea-Yemen		1995-1999
540560	Angola-South Africa	1975-1988	
541552	Mozambique-Zimbabwe	1975-1979	
541560	Mozambique-South Africa	1976-1991	1983-1987
551552	Zambia-Zimbabwe	1965-1979	1965-1979
551553	Zambia-Malawi	1964-1986	
551560	Zambia-South Africa	1965-1991	1968-1987
552560	Zimbabwe-South Africa	1980-1992	
552571	Zimbabwe-Botswana		1969-1979
560570	South Africa-Lesotho		1994-1994
560571	South Africa-Botswana		1984-1988
600615	Morocco-Algeria	1962-ongoing	1962-1984
616620	Tunisia-Libya		1977-1985
620625	Libya-Sudan	1973-1985	1972-1984
620651	Libya-Egypt	1973-1992	1975-1985
625651	Sudan-Egypt	1991-ongoing	1991-1996
630640	Iran-Turkey		1981-2001
630645	Iran-Iraq	1958-ongoing	1934-1999
630651	Iran-Egypt	1955-1971	
		1979-ongoing	

630666	Iran-Israel	1979-ongoing	
630670	Iran-Saudi Arabia	1979-ongoing	1984-1988
630700	Iran-Afghanistan	1996-2001	1979-1999
640645	Turkey-Iraq		1958-2001
640652	Turkey-Syria	1946-2004	1955-1998
645651	Iraq-Egypt	1943-ongoing	1959-1962
			1990-1999
645652	Iraq-Syria	1946-ongoing	1976-1991
645666	Iraq-Israel	1948-ongoing	1948-1998
645670	Iraq-Saudi Arabia	1932-1957	1961-2001
		1968-ongoing	
645690	Iraq-Kuwait	1961-ongoing	1961-2001
645692	Iraq-Bahrain		1986-1994
645696	Iraq-United Arab Emirates		1990-1999
645698	Iraq-Oman		1991-1994
651652	Egypt-Syria	1961-1990	
651663	Egypt-Jordan	1946-1970	1948-1962
651666	Egypt-Israel	1948-ongoing	1948-1989
651670	Egypt-Saudi Arabia	1957-1970	1962-1967
652660	Syria-Lebanon		1963-1969
652663	Syria-Jordan	1946-ongoing	1949-1982
652666	Syria-Israel	1948-ongoing	1948-2001
652670	Syria-Saudi Arabia	1961-1970	
660666	Lebanon-Israel		1948-2001
663666	Jordan-Israel	1948-1994	1948-1973
663670	Jordan-Saudi Arabia	1946-1958	
666670	Israel-Saudi Arabia		1957-1981
670678	Saudi Arabia-Yemen Arab Republic		1962-1980
670679	Saudi Arabia-Yemen	1990-2000	1994-1998
670694	Saudi Arabia-Qatar		1992-1995
678680	Yemen Arab Republic-Yemen People's Republic	1967-1990	
680698	Yemen People's Republic-Oman	1972-1982	1972-1982
692694	Bahrain-Qatar	1986-2001	
700702	Afghanistan-Tajikistan		1993-2001
700703	Afghanistan-Kyrgyzstan		1993-1997
700704	Afghanistan-Uzbekistan		1993-2001

700770	Afghanistan-Pakistan	1947-ongoing	1949-2001
704705	Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan	1991-ongoing	
710713	China-Taiwan	1949-ongoing	1949-2001
710731	China-North Korea		1993-1997
710732	China-South Korea		1950-1994
710740	China-Japan	1996-ongoing	1873-1958
			1978-1999
710750	China-India	1948-ongoing	1950-1987
710775	China-Myanmar		1956-1969
710790	China-Nepal		1956-1960
710800	China-Thailand		1951-1971
710812	China-Laos		1961-1979
710816	China-Vietnam	1973-1991	1975-1998
710817	China-Republic of Vietnam		1956-1974
710840	China-Philippines		1950-2001
710900	China-Australia		1950-1971
710920	China-New Zealand		1950-1971
713740	Taiwan-Japan		1995-1996
713816	Taiwan-Vietnam		1994-1995
713817	Taiwan-Republic of Vietnam		1965-1974
731732	North Korea-South Korea	1948-ongoing	1949-2001
731740	North Korea-Japan		1994-2001
732740	South Korea-Japan		1953-1999
750770	India-Pakistan	1947-ongoing	1947-2001
750771	India-Bangladesh		1976-2001
750780	India-Sri Lanka		1984-1992
750790	India-Nepal		1962-1969
800811	Thailand-Cambodia		1953-1998
800812	Thailand-Laos		1960-1988
800816	Thailand-Vietnam	1954-1988	1961-1995
811816	Cambodia-Vietnam	1976-1983	1969-1979
811817	Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam	1956-1975	1956-1967
812816	Laos-Vietnam		1958-1973
816817	Vietnam-Republic of Vietnam	1954-1975	1960-1975
816840	Vietnam-Philippines		1998-1999
820830	Malaysia-Singapore	1965-ongoing	

820840	Malaysia-Philippines		1968-1988
820850	Malaysia-Indonesia	1962-1966	1963-1965
850910	Indonesia-Papua New Guinea		1982-1990
910940	Papua New Guinea-Solomon Islands		1993-1996

Appendix B

Narratives of Nationalistic Rivalry, 1946-2001

This appendix provides the narratives of nationalistic-rivalry dyads and presents how each case is coded. The following sections are divided into six sections. The first five sections describe nationalistic-rivalry dyads in Europe, America, Middle-East, Asia, and Africa. The last section explains the dropped cases in the intersection of Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) due to the lack of a nationalist issue.

Inter-regional dyads are listed only in one of the two regions. The name of the rivalry dyads consists of *the smaller side of the COW state code* plus *the larger side*. The name of states follows the COW state membership dataset (Correlates of War Project 2011), but when different during the time of rivalry, the name known at that time is also specified in parentheses.

Europe

Europe is the region where nationalism resulted in a number of catastrophic wars, from the French Revolution through the two World Wars to the Yugoslav wars. Particularly the presence of transstate ethnic groups in the continental was the issue of nationalistic rivalry in the majority of the cases.

Albania-Greece

Period: 1946-1949, 1994-1996

Transstate-ethnic issues: Greece

Greece has its ethnic enclave in southern Albania (also known as Northern Epirus by Greek nationalists), which was the main issue for the hostility between Albania and Greece in the post-WWII era (as well as before) (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 88-89).

Armenia-Azerbaijan

Period: 1992-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: Armenia (1992-1994), Azerbaijan (1994-2001)

The pivot of the Armenia-Azerbaijan rivalry is Nagorno-Karabakh, which has the Armenian majority but is located in Azerbaijan (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 178-179). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, ethnic conflict erupted, and in 1994 Armenian forces occupied most of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as several neighboring areas where mainly Azeris live (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 178-179). Azerbaijan has not accepted Armenia's control of the area and attempted to retake it (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 179). In 2009, talking about a negotiation meeting hosted by the OSCE, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated that if the negotiation "ends without a result then our hopes in the negotiating process will be exhausted in which case we will not have any other choice," and continues that "[w]e have the full right to liberate our lands by military means" (quoted in Osborn 2009). This is a threat to use force. Thus, the rivalry can be seen as ongoing after 2001.

Bulgaria-Turkey

Period: 1946-1950

Transstate ethnic issues: Turkey

The Bulgaria-Turkey rivalry in the post-WWII era was due to a Turkish minority in Bulgaria (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94). When Bulgaria expelled a quarter million of them, the border between the two states was closed (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94).

Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina

Period: 1992-1996

Transstate ethnic issues: Croatia

The Croatia-Bosnia rivalry began after Bosnia's declaration of independence (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 90). Croatia sought transstate-ethnic nationalist policy for its ethnic kin within Bosnia, which threatened the national autonomy and integrity of Bosnia. Even after the end of the Bosnia conflict in 1995 by the Dayton Agreement, "Croatia appears to have continued its support of Bosnian Croats" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 90).

Croatia-Yugoslavia

Period: 1991-2000

Transstate ethnic issues: Yugoslavia (1991), both (1992-1995), Yugoslavia (1996-2000)

The rivalry began with the Croatian War of Independence in 1991 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94). A transstate ethnic issue emerged to Yugoslavia, as Croatian Serbs became an ethnic minority in the new state of Croatia. Yugoslavia sent troops into Croatia to occupy Serbian ethnic enclaves (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94-95). In 1992, however, the conflict spread to Bosnia, and Croatia supported Bosnian Croats while Serbia supported Bosnian Serbs. After the end of the Bosnia war in 1995, ethnic tensions between Serbia and Croatia remained (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 95), and

"Croatia's official position portrayed the return of Serb internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees as a threat to the country's fragile peace and political stability" (Djuric 2010, 1639). The return of Croatian Serbs was accelerated in 2000, when "the authoritarian and hardline nationalistic regimes of the 1990s were replaced by more democratically oriented and reformist governments" (Djuric 2010, 1650).

German Federal Republic-German Democratic Republic

Period: 1961-1971

Transstate ethnic issues: German Federal Republic

Germany was divided into West (German Federal Republic) and East (German Democratic Republic) after the end of WWII. West Germany sought to unify East Germany (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 103), which was a threat to East German state integrity.

Greece-Bulgaria

Period: 1946-1947

Transstate ethnic issues: Bulgaria

The Greece-Bulgaria rivalry developed over territorial competition in the Balkan region, including the two Balkan Wars and the two World Wars in the early 20th century (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 91-92). Bulgaria "sought to encompass populations considered to be Bulgarian" (a Greater Bulgaria idea), but it "would come at the expense of Greece and Serbia/Yugoslavia" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 91). After WWII, both Greece and Bulgaria claimed part of the other side's territory in the process of territorial settlement. According to Campbell (1947, 215), on the one hand, "Greece,

which still had the large appetite for territory it had displayed in 1919, claimed a broad band of territory in southern Bulgaria as necessary to protect its northern provinces, invaded three times within a generation." On the other hand, "Bulgaria countered by asking for western Thrace, the area between the Mesta and Maritza rivers, on the grounds that this outlet to the Aegean had been wrongfully taken from Bulgaria in the past" (216). Thus, Greece's territorial claim was mainly motivated by a strategic consideration for national security while Bulgaria's by irredentist nationalism aiming to recover and secure its lost territory.

Greece-Turkey

Period: 1958-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: both

The Greece-Turkey rivalry emerged largely because of the resurgence of the Cyprus issue (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 96). Ethnic conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was transferred into interstate rivalry between Greece and Turkey. The intensity of the rivalry culminated, when Turkey conducted military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 in the name of defending Turkish Cypriots after Greek Cypriot hardliners, who were seeking unification with Greece (*enosis*) and supported by the Greek junta, initiated a coup. The intervention resulted in the de facto partition of Cyprus. Since, the partition has remained despite several attempts to unify the two parts of Cyprus again, and inter-ethnic mistrust in Cyprus has helped to endure the Greece-Turkey rivalry. Even despite the UN's effort and institutional pressure from the EU, the Cyprus issue has remained unresolved. In short, the major issue of the Greek-Turkish rivalry is their respective ethnic compatriots in Cyprus. According to the

MID dataset ver. 3.1 (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004), the last dispute MID #4320 is ongoing after 2001. Thus, the rivalry is also regarded as ongoing after 2001.

Italy-Yugoslavia

Period: 1946-1954

Transstate ethnic issues: both (1946-1947), Italy (1948-1954)

In terms of nationalistic rivalry, the most important issue between Italy and Yugoslavia in the post-WWII period was territorial disputes in Fiume and Trieste, as they are the key to determining the nature of nationalisms between the two states. Fiume, which was mainly populated by Slavs, was seized by Italy in 1923 but was ceded to Yugoslavia in 1947 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 99). As for Trieste, during the Second World War, Yugoslavia occupied the Italian territory of Trieste and established a local government and, after an agreement between the UK and Yugoslav generals, Trieste was partitioned to the UK-US occupied area (Zone A) and the Yugoslav occupied one (Zone B), which constituted the Free Territory (M.K.G. 1954, 7). It seems that Yugoslavia was satisfied with the possession of Zone B, given the explanation by M.K.G. (1954, 12) that Yugoslavia signaled to Italy a compromising plan that “the Territory should be placed either under a joint Italo-Yugoslav condominium or under a neutral Governor” while it strongly opposed the Tripartite Declaration proposed by the UK, the US, and France in 1948 that “the whole Free Territory should be returned to Italian sovereignty.” Although Yugoslavia opposed the decision in 1953 by the US and UK to leave Zone A and give the administration back to Italy, tension between Yugoslavia and Italy rose only for a while and decreased in a month (M.K.G. 1954, 14-17). In summary, Yugoslavia had a transstate ethnic issue vis-à-vis Italy until it obtained the Slav ethnic enclave, Fiume, in

1947. On the other hand, as Italy pursued irredentist nationalism for Trieste until it finally annexed it after the First World War (Kunz 1948, 99), "the Tripartite Declaration continued to be the basis of Italian policy regarding the Free Territory" (M.K.G. 1954, 12). When an official Yugoslav news showed the government's dissatisfaction with Italy's attitude toward the issue of Trieste, Italy interpreted this as "a threat by Yugoslavia formally to annex Zone B" and mobilized troops against Yugoslavia (M.K.G. 1954, 13). It can be inferred that, even before the Tripartite Declaration, Italy wanted to get all Trieste back from Yugoslavia, given that Trieste was an ethnic enclave for Italy until its annexation in the First World War and also that, according to M.K.G. (1954, 7n), in the Yugoslav occupied zone approximately a half of the population was Italian (and the remaining half was Slovenes). Thus, Italy kept having a transstate ethnic issue vis-à-vis Yugoslavia during the period of rivalry.

Yugoslavia-Bosnia and Herzegovina

Period: 1992-1994

Transstate ethnic issues: Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia, or more precisely Serbia, sought irredentist policy for its ethnic kin within Bosnia (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 91). Serbia's irredentism culminated in the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims by Serbs (e.g., the infamous genocide in Srebrenica). Hence, Serbia was a grave threat to the majority Bosnian Muslims.

Yugoslavia-Bulgaria

Period: 1946-1952

Transstate ethnic issues: Yugoslavia (1946-1947)

The Yugoslavia-Bulgaria rivalry developed chiefly over territorial claims over Macedonia (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94). Bulgaria had an irredentist claim on Macedonia as "[t]he Bulgarians argued that their claims over Macedonia were legitimate because historically Macedonia and its people belonged to the Bulgarian lands and community" (Mahon 1998, 391). However, its expectation or even actual attempts to obtain Macedonia in the two Balkan Wars and the First World War eventually failed, and as a consequence of the Second Balkan War Macedonia was partitioned among Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, with which Bulgarians were dissatisfied (Mahon 1998, 390-391). During the Second World War, Bulgaria, allied with the Axis Power, again attempted to gain Macedonia, occupied it, and introduced Bulgarian institutions (Mahon 1998, 395). However, this occupation was also short-lived, as "Bulgaria was forced to surrender Yugoslav territory in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1947" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94). Mahon (1998, 397) points out that "Bulgaria had to accept not only that it had lost Macedonia but also that Macedonian identity had been legitimised as a separate nationality" and therefore "the Macedonian question shifted to a debate about the existence of the Macedonian national minority within the Bulgarian borders." Meanwhile, it seems that Yugoslavia had a Slav irredentist claim on Bulgaria-occupied Macedonia, as "[i]n the aftermath of World War II, Yugoslavia pushed aside defeated Bulgaria and took the initiative to raise the national consciousness of the Slav inhabitants of Macedonia" (Zahariadis 1994, 654). Therefore, Yugoslavia had a transstate ethnic issue vis-à-vis Bulgaria till 1947 when Yugoslav part of Macedonia was returned to Yugoslavia. Hence, in combination with Bulgaria's acceptance of the Macedonian nation separate from the Bulgarian nation, the territorial dispute between

Bulgaria and Yugoslavia lost the transstate ethnic aspect afterwards.

America

In America, the nations were mainly framed by the colonial administrative units, which became the basis of a state framework after independence (Anderson 2006, ch.4). This tradition remained in the post-WWII era, as few nationalistic-rivalry dyads had transstate ethnic issues.

Argentina-Britain

Period: 1976-1983

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

The rivalry materialized when Argentina vigorously claimed its sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 124). Britain also insisted on its sovereignty over the islands. The rivalry culminated in the Falkland War in 1982. The islands became more important in the post-WWII era because of Antarctic claims and oil potentials (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 124).

Chile-Argentina

Period: 1952-1984

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

Chile and Argentina experienced rivalry over territorial disputes. While “the conflict situation between Chile and Argentina is at the same time a territorial, resources, and migration conflict” (Grabendorff 1982, 283), the rivalry in the latter half of the 20th

century is characterized as conflicts over the territorial rights of strategically important areas such as Patagonia and the Beagle Channel (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 125).

Colombia-Venezuela

Period: 1982-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

The Colombia-Venezuela rivalry developed over a territorial dispute on a petroleum potential in the Gulf of Venezuela, and also over the infiltration of a Colombian rebel (FARC) since 1994 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 132; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative). Although Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) regard the rivalry as terminated in 2000 because of the temporal limitation of the MID dataset, their rivalry narrative actually says that the dyad experienced a militarized territorial dispute after 2001. Thus, the rivalry is coded as ongoing after 2001.

Ecuador-Peru

Period: 1946-1955, 1977-1998

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

Before 1945, most territorial disputes between Ecuador and Peru were resolved even if at the expense of Ecuador, but territorial disputes over access to the Amazon continued in the post-WWII period (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 132-133).

Venezuela-Guyana

Period: 1966-1999

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

Guyana and Venezuela experienced rivalry largely over the Essequibo territory, where a number of natural resources are available (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 133).

Honduras-El Salvador

Period: 1969-1992

Transstate ethnic issues: El Salvador

The Honduras-El Salvador rivalry in the post-WWII period is characterized as a territorial dispute and migration. Since the 1920s, a number of Salvadorans moved to and lived in Honduras but the Honduras government took a discriminatory policy against them (The ICB Data Viewer; Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 141). Cable (1969, 659) points out that the presence of Salvadorans "aroused resentment among the Hondurans who…faced competition on their own labour market." In this context, the rivalry erupted in the Soccer War in 1969 when, after national-level football matches, Salvadorans harassed Hondurans in El Salvador and in response Hondurans harassed Salvadorans in Honduras, which led the Salvadoran government to send troops, triggering border clashes with Honduras and causing Salvadorans in Honduras to try to flee to their home country (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 141). Given that El Salvador militarily responded to Hondurans' harassment of its ethnic kin in Honduras, the security of ethnic kin in Honduras seems to have been significant for El Salvador foreign policy while Honduras needed to respond to it for its own state security.

Honduras-Nicaragua

Period: 1957-1961

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

Honduras and Nicaragua experienced rivalry over a territorial dispute. According to Thompson and Dreyer (2012, 143), “Honduras’ desire to develop oil deposits in the disputed area led to border incidents in 1957” and “[t]he spatial dispute was then sent to the World Court, and by 1962 the conflict was finally resolved when Nicaragua accepted the court’s ruling.”

Middle-East

In order to consider the dynamics of nationalistic rivalry in the Middle-East, there are two outstanding characteristics to be noted in advance. One is that supra-state identity such as Arabism and Islam powerfully influences state behavior (Hinnebusch 2005, 159-161). Hinnebusch points out that “precisely because boundaries lack the impenetrability of the Westphalian model, with ideological influences readily crossing state lines, each state has been highly sensitive to the actions of others and vulnerable to trans-state movements.” The strong presence of supra-state identity has made transstate ethnic issues ready in the region. Pan-Arab nationalism is a typical example.

Another outstanding character of the region is the Arab-Israeli conflict. From the birth of the Israeli state by the partition of Palestine after WWII, Israel continuously felt a threat from neighboring Arab states (which supported its Arab/Muslim kin Palestinians and opposed the establishment of the Israeli state) and counteracted their aggressive intention and action (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008, ch.1). In this process, Israel consequently expanded its area of control to the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights at the expense of Arab states, and this “had massive logistical, military and political implications for the Israeli government”

(Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008, 16). Thus, the primary motivation of Israel seems to have been to secure nationhood in terms of the existing state framework against external threats from Arab states.

Iraq-Egypt

Period: 1959-1962, 1990-1999

Transstate ethnic issues: both

Egypt and Iraq competed for regional influence in the Arab world (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 149-150). For example, in the first period of rivalry, Iraqi leader Abdel Karim Kassim pursued policy to "challenge Egypt's Arab leadership," and in the second period of rivalry Egypt "chose to support quite strongly the effort to oust Iraq from Kuwait" in order to prevent "Iraq from increasing its regional power at Egyptian expense" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 150). Because both Egypt and Iraq are Arab states and competed for Arab leadership, both shared the same transstate ethnic issue.

Egypt-Israel

Period: 1948-1989

Transstate ethnic issues: Egypt

Egypt supported Arab kin Palestinians against Israel, even though its motivation was more the pursuit of being a regional leader in the Arab world than Palestinian concerns themselves (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 150). After Egypt lost territory as the consequence of the third Arab-Israel war in 1967, redeeming this lost territory was added to the agenda of Egyptian foreign policy framed by transstate ethnicity (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 151). Meanwhile, Israel sought to protect itself from

Egypt's aggression.

Egypt-Jordan

Period: 1948-1962

Transstate ethnic issues: both

Egypt and Jordan were competitors to expand its regional influence (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 152). Thus, they had the common transstate ethnic issue, i.e., a competition for Arab leadership.

Libya-Egypt

Period: 1975-1985

Transstate ethnic issues: both

Libya and Egypt experienced rivalry over regional influence in the Middle East (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 174-175). As the rivalry was over positional competition between Arab states for regional influence on the Arab region, both states shared the same transstate ethnic issue.

Egypt-Saudi Arabia

Period: 1962-1967

Transstate ethnic issues: both

The Egypt-Saudi Arabia rivalry was another competition by two regional powers to obtain regional leadership of the Arab world, but they were based on different ideologies – Egypt's revolutionary claim vs. Saudi's claim on religion (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 153). Egypt was a pan-Arabism seeker, which was a threat to the Saudi

Arabian monarchy since pan-Arabists aimed to overthrow the monarchies (Ahrari 2011). Egypt and Saudi Arabia fought proxy wars in the Yemen civil war in the 1960s. According to Gerges (1995, 293), Egypt intervened in the civil war to reinvigorate its pan-Arabist reputation tarnished by the breakup of the United Arab Republic in 1961, while Saudi Arabia intervened because "the overthrow of the ruling Imamate in Yemen and its replacement with an Egyptian-style revolutionary regime endangered the survival of the kingdom." Thus, these two Arab regional powers experienced rivalry over controlling the composition of regional politics in the Arab world, although Egypt's motivation was pan-Arabist revisionist while Saudi Arabia's incentive was to preserve conservative regime.

Iraq-Israel

Period: 1948-1998

Transstate ethnic issues: Iraq

Iraq supported Palestinians, who are its Arab/Muslim kin, against Israel (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 155). This was a threat to the Israeli state.

Iraq-Syria

Period: 1976-1991

Transstate ethnic issues: both

The Ba'thist Party in both Iraq and Syria competed for Arab leadership. According to Thompson and Dreyer (2012, 156), "[s]ince the Ba'thists were committed to pan-Arabism, the question revolved around which branch of the party could more effectively speak for all Arabs." Milton-Edwards (2000, 64) points out that Ba'thism "is

not just an expression of an Arab nationalist identity, but calls for a wider unity among the Arab people under a socialist agenda." Thus, the two competing pan-Arabist states had transstate ethnic issues against each other.

Jordan-Israel

Period: 1948-1973

Transstate ethnic issues: Jordan (1948-1949), neither (1950-1966), Jordan (1967-1973)

Jordan and Israel experienced rivalry over the territorial rights of Palestine. The newly created state of Israel as a consequence of the partition of Palestine in 1948 was threatened by Jordan's irredentism to annex Palestine to create a "Greater Syria under Hashemite control" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 157). They entered the first Arab-Israel war, ending up with Jordan's annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1949 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 157). Then, "[s]patial conflict between Israel and Jordan came to center primarily on competing claims over the West Bank and east Jerusalem" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 157). The West Bank and East Jerusalem became the target of Jordan's foreign policy based on Arab kinship. Meanwhile, Kaufmann (1998, 146-147) argues that "Gaza, the West Bank, and the Old City of Jerusalem came under control of the Egyptian and Jordanian armies; no Jews remained in these areas." Therefore, these areas did not raise transstate ethnic issues to Israel. After Israel annexed the West Bank and east Jerusalem in the Six-Day War in 1967, these two areas became Jordan's transstate ethnic issues again.

Syria-Israel

Period: 1948-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: Syria

The Syria-Israel rivalry developed as Syria supported its Arab kin of Palestinians (both the PLO and Hamas) and Hezbollah (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 158-159). Israel has had to protect itself from Syria-supported terrorism. The rivalry is ongoing after 2001, as there have been several incidents between the two states. For example, in 2003, after a suicide terrorist attack in Haifa, "Israeli fighter jets struck a suspected terrorist training camp near Damascus used by Islamic Jihad and Hamas" (The ICB Data Viewer).

Syria-Jordan

Period: 1949-1982

Transstate ethnic issues: Jordan (1949-1951), neither (1952-1957), Syria (1958-1982) [both (1979-1980) for robustness check]

The Syria-Jordan rivalry developed with their contending Arab national identities, mainly due to the idea of Greater Syria covering both Syria and Jordan. Ma'oz (1994, 95) argues, "The region of Greater Syria has for centuries been an historical-geographical term and, periodically, has also constituted a political-territorial unit." While Britain supported the Arab nationalist movement against the Ottoman Empire, France and Britain secretly agreed in 1916 that the former would gain the region known as Syria and Lebanon now and the latter would receive Trans-Jordan, Iraq, and Palestine (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 160). This division of borders created a nationalist issue for both Syria and Jordan after their independence. The Hashemite monarchy Jordan sought to integrate Syria for a Greater Syria plan (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 160-161). Jordan's Greater Syria plan was a grave threat to Syria (Landis 2001, 185-187). According to expert sources, the death of King Abdullah in 1951, who

was an ambitious advocate of Greater Syria, apparently led Jordan to cease seeking the Greater Syria plan in the rest of the rivalry period (see Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2001, 29-51; Ma'oz 1994, 95). Yet, the disappearance of an overt ambition for Greater Syria did not mean that the more profound issue of the contending national identities was also resolved, as the two states exchanged hostility in 1957 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative). Moreover, the rise of pan-Arabism in Syria in turn created Syria's transstate ethnic issue vis-à-vis Jordan. After internal political turmoil, pan-Arabist the Syrian Ba'ath party decided to unite with the leading pan-Arabist Nasser's Egypt in 1958, i.e., the birth of the United Arab Republic (Cleveland 2000, 315-317). Along this line, Syria constantly criticized Jordan's pro-Western inclination (Cleveland 2000, 322-323). In the Jordanian Civil War in 1970 between the Hashemite government and the Palestinians, Syria supported the Palestinians (The ICB Data Viewer). Finally, and ironically for Jordan, the idea of Greater Syria was resuscitated by Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad (Ma'oz 1994, 95), who was in office during 1971-2000. Thus, Syria had a transstate ethnic claim of pan-Arabism against Jordan. Meanwhile, it was alleged by Syria that Jordan supported a Syrian Islamic insurgent group the Muslim Brotherhood while Jordan strongly denied it (Ryan 2006, 36). If this were the case, it would make both states have transstate ethnic issues. As for the period of Jordan's support for the Muslim Brotherhood, given Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001, 97) write that "Jordan's ill-disguised role in supporting Syrian Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood [mounting] a challenge to Asad's regime in 1979 and 1980 backfired as Asad crushed his opponents and then turned his army back to the border with Jordan," at least both states should be coded as having transstate ethnic issues during the period of 1979-1980 for robustness check.

Iran-Iraq

Period: 1958-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: both

Iran and Iraq experienced rivalry over rebel supports, territorial disputes, and competition for regional influence (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 164-166), and the presence of ethnic enclaves in both sides and conflicts over them raised transstate ethnic issues to both states. The Khuzestan province in Iran is a key factor for Iraq, because Iraq "wanted to acquire Iran's Khuzestan province, due to *its traditionally Arab population*, its oil wealth, and its location vis-à-vis the Shatt al-Arab outlet to the Gulf" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 165, emphasis added). In other words, Khuzestan was an Iraqi ethnic enclave in Iran. Byman (2001, 154) argues that "Iraqi rulers before Saddam have claimed sovereignty over disputed parts of the Shatt and have even made claims to the Iranian province of Khuzistan," and Swearingen (1988, 414) points out that "[t]he status of Khuzistan has been a point of contention between the two countries for more than sixty years." This means that Iraq's irredentist claim for Khuzestan has a long history even before hardline pan-Arabist Saddam Hussein, who initiated "the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war in order to seize the Shatt al-Arab and Khuzestan" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 165), came to power. Meanwhile, Iran also had its Shia ethnic enclave in southern Iraq. Swearingen (1988, 414) argues that "[h]istorically Iran long laid claim to southern Iraq" and "[a]t Karbala and Najaf are two of the holiest shrines in Shi'i Islam, and the region has the largest concentration of Shi'i, including many Farsi speakers, outside Iran." In 2007, "[i]n a sharp escalation of a dispute over border fighting," Iran "warned that if the Iraqi government cannot stop militants from crossing into Iran and carrying out attacks, the Iranian authorities would respond militarily" (Glanz 2007). This can be

seen as another militarized interstate dispute. Therefore, although Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) regard rivalry as terminated in 1999, the additional source indicates that it is ongoing after 2001.

Iran-Saudi Arabia

Period: 1984-1988

Transstate ethnic issues: both

Iran intended to spread the Islamic revolution and this was a threat to the conservative Arab monarchy of Saudi Arabia, which sought to hinder Iran's influence in the Middle East (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 166). Thus, the rivalry developed over a regional influence in the Middle East along the line of competing Islamic identities.

Iraq-Kuwait

Period: 1961-2001

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

The Iraq-Kuwait rivalry developed over Iraq's intention to annex Kuwait, which was motivated by Kuwait's oil reserves (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 167). It can be inferred that Iraq wanted oil for state wealth, but Kuwait's objection was an obstacle to Iraq's pursuit of this goal. Iraq's intention of invasion was a threat to the state of Kuwait.

Iraq-Saudi Arabia

Period: 1968-2001

Transstate ethnic issues: both

Iraq was a pan-Arabism revisionist while Saudi Arabia was a monarchical status-quo seeker. Their rivalry evolved over competition for a regional interest/influence in the Arab world (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 169). Thus, both states had transstate ethnic issues against each other.

Yemen People's Republic-Oman

Period: 1972-1982

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

The main issues in the South Yemen-Oman rivalry were twofold. Oman had strategically and economically important territories and South Yemen challenged them, and the two states also had ideological conflicts over South Yemen's socialism and Oman's conservatism (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 170).

Saudi Arabia-Yemen

Period: 1994-1998

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

Saudi Arabia and Yemen experienced rivalry due to territorial disputes in strategically/economically important areas (Okruhlik and Conge 1999, 236-239). Although Yemen also challenged Saudi regional hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula, unlike other inter-Arab rivalries Yemen was too weak to compete for regional hegemony in the Arab world, as "Yemen was simply mismatched against Saudi Arabia" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 171). Therefore, the rivalry was not motivated by a regional competition based on Arab transstate ethnicity.

Turkey-Syria

Period: 1955-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

The Turkey-Syria rivalry has a historical context in which Syria became independent with Arab nationalism against the Ottoman rule (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 181). Although the rivalry developed along the line of the Cold-War division as Western ally Turkey and Eastern supporter Syria, it was actually not motivated by the two internationalist ideologies (i.e., liberal capitalism and communism) as neither Turkey championed liberal democracy nor Syria implemented a communist government. Rather, Syrian nationalism and Turkish nationalism are contending over the historical implication of the Ottoman Empire, as Arab nationalism was formed against the Ottoman rule while Turkish national identity was partly based on the history of the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, Turkey "considered itself as *the main successor state [of the Ottoman Empire]* with negative memories of Arabs" (Aras and Köni 2002, 50, emphasis added), and thought that "Arab nationalists in Damascus had once been disloyal subjects who took advantage of World War I to break free from Turkish rule" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 180). On the other hand, for Syria, "Turkey was *the residual of the former Ottoman Empire* against which Arab nationalism was first oriented" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 181, emphasis added). In other words, it is more plausible to argue that the line of the Cold-War division was the consequence of nationalist foreign policy to counteract each other. Rivalry issues later shifted to water sharing of rivers flowing from Turkey to Syria and Syrian supports for Turkey's Kurdish rebels (PKK), and these two issues persisted even after the end of the Cold War (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 180-181). Syria's rebel support is not motivated by

transstate ethnicity as Syria is not a Kurdish state. In 2012, a Turkish airplane was shot down by Syria (*BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, June 25, 2012). This can be seen as another militarized interstate dispute, and therefore, although Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), regards the rivalry as terminated in 1998 because of the temporal limitation of the MID dataset, the additional source indicates that it is ongoing after 2001.

Asia

After long-term colonization by imperial powers, Asian people sought their own national self-determination. However, these new nations were, like other nations, framed by their cultural or ethnic boundaries, whereas state frameworks only sometimes matched them. Thus, transstate ethnic issues have been often observed.

China-Japan

Period: 1996-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

The major sources of the China-Japan rivalry are the rising power of China, the persistent bitter memory of Japanese aggression against China in World War II, and a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 191). The end of the Cold War (i.e., the disappearance of common Soviet threats) and the rise of China's economic and military power created an opportunity for rising regional power China and (at least economically) declining regional power Japan to experience rivalry. The bitter memory of rivalry and war before the end of WWII is a historical source of the current rivalry. The two states had

managed their relationship in a calm and pragmatic way during the Cold-War period. However, Chinese anti-Japan nationalism began to develop in the early 1980s since nationalism replaced communism as a tool of sustaining regime legitimacy (He 2007, 6; see also He 2009, 214-215). Meanwhile, China's nuclear test and the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96 "spelled the end of what Japan called its 'friendship diplomacy' towards China" (Yahuda 2014, 74). The arguably most contentious issue in the dyad is the territorial right of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. The dispute is over natural resource and strategic sea lanes (*BBC News*, August 18, 2012) as well as national identity and pride (McDonald 2012), but not about ethnic kin as no one lives on the islands. Although Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) regards the rivalry as terminated in 1999 because of the temporal limitation of the MID dataset, both states have experienced displays of force occasionally since 2001 over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, including "the most serious and dangerous bilateral incident since 1952" in 2010 (Wan 2011, 73). Thus, the rivalry is seen as ongoing after 2001.

Russia (Soviet Union)-China

Period: 1963-1989

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

During the Cold War, two communist regimes China and Russia began "a contest for ideological leadership within the communist world by the late 1950s" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 193). "Russia's policy toward China…was strongly influenced by positional concerns in which Russia sought to prevent China from regaining the capability to be fully competitive in Asia" whereas China "sought…to establish China as a formidable major power" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 193). The two states began

a territorial dispute in 1963 “when the Chinese government raised the issue of China’s historical claim to territory Russia had acquired.” They clashed along the border of the Usuri River in 1969, and negotiations to end the crisis could not reach a decisive conclusion about setting up clear border lines (The ICB Data Viewer).

China-Taiwan

Period: 1949-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: both (1949-1991), China (1992-2001)

Since China was split into the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), these two states have experienced persistent rivalry. Both states claimed on their legitimacy as the sole Chinese representative government (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 194) and sought to annex the other one (Campbell and Mitchell 2001, 15). Thus, the China-Taiwan rivalry began with reciprocal transstate ethno-nationalist claims. However, as Ku (2002, 61) argues, “[a]s Taiwan became more stable and retaking the mainland became unattainable, the KMT government began to place more emphasis on Taiwan’s economic development in the early 1970s.” The ROC’s realization of difficulty in transstate-ethnic nationalism policy clearly materialized in 1991. In reference to The Republic of China Yearbook 2000, McDevitt (2004, 416) explains that in 1991 “ROC President Lee Teng-hui orchestrated a change in the ROC Constitution,” which “abandoned the vision that the ROC represented the only legitimate government of China and accepted that the PRC was the legitimate government of the part of China that the PRC controlled.” This suggests that the ROC abandoned, or at least put aside, its transstate ethno-nationalist claim on the mainland in 1991. Meanwhile, the PRC kept its transstate ethno-nationalist claim, as the former president of the PRC Jiang Zemin (in

office during 1993-2003) “emphasized the goal of unification,” although the current president Hu Jintao “has emphasized the short-to-medium-term goal of deterring Taiwan independence, postponing unification into the indefinite future” (Saunders and Kastner 2009, 88). The PRC has been highly concerned with Taiwanese independence movements (Chang and Wang 2005, 30, 44n2) as after democratization a choice between unification and independence has been a major issue of Taiwanese politics. In 2005, China enacted the “anti-secession law,” which authorizes “the use of force against Taiwan if it moves toward formal independence” (Pan 2005). This is China’s threat to use force against Taiwan, which compose a militarized interstate dispute. Thus, the rivalry is ongoing after 2001.

North Korea-South Korea

Period: 1949-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: both (1949-1960), North Korea (1961-2001)

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Soviet-stationed North Korea and US-stationed South Korea respectively gained their state sovereignty. However, the two Koreas “claimed legitimacy as the sole Korean state” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 201). Thus, the rivalry started with reciprocal transstate ethno-nationalist claims. In 1960, however, South Korea “formally announced that it would not seek a coerced reunification with the North” although “in the following year the ROK pledged to move into the North should the DPRK attempt to conquer the South” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 201). This means that transstate ethnic issues remained only in North Korea’s side, as South Korea abandoned its transstate ethno-nationalist claim against the North while still feeling a threat from it. The rivalry is ongoing after 2001, as North Korea has kept

threatening South Korea. One of the most serious incidents is that North Korea allegedly sunk South's submarine and they exchanged artillery fires in 2010.

Iran-Afghanistan

Period: 1996-1999

Transstate ethnic issues: Iran

Iran has its Shi'ite ethnic enclave in western Afghanistan, to which the Taliban government embracing a quite conservative form of Sunni Islam posed a threat (including the killing and kidnapping of Iranian diplomats), and the Iranian government responded by mobilizing troops along the border (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 204).

Afghanistan-Pakistan

Period: 1949-1996

Transstate ethnic issues: Afghanistan (1949-1974), both (1975-1996)

The Afghanistan-Pakistan rivalry began when Afghanistan demanded the establishment of a Pashtun independent state "Pashtunistan" integrating a Pakistani Pashtun area along the border (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 205). The Pashtuns are a major ethnic group in Afghanistan (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 205), and according to Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi (2012, 39), "[h]istorically, the idea of being 'Afghan' was tied to being from the Pashtun ethnic group." Hence, Afghans' demand on behalf of Pashtuns can be seen as ethnically motivated, which posed a threat to the Pakistani existing statehood. However, transstate ethnic issues emerged to Pakistan as well when Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began to support Islamic militants inside Afghanistan in the 1970s to counterattack the Afghan government (Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012, 43). Haqqani

(2004, 90) argues that "Pakistan's emphasis on its Islamic identity increased significantly as the civilian semiauthoritarian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977) channeled Pakistan's Islamic aspirations toward foreign policy." Given that Islam is the national identity and state legitimacy of Pakistan (vis-à-vis secularism of its archenemy India) (see Hagerty 1998, 67), Pakistan's support for Islamic militants in Afghanistan was motivated by transstate ethnicity. The year of the beginning of the support can be seen as 1975 when "Pakistan employed its Afghan irregulars in an abortive raid on Afghan government targets in the Panjsher Valley" (Wirsing 1987, 66). In the Afghan civil war, Pakistan supported Islamic militants against the Soviet troops and the communist regime and, after the Soviet withdrawal, assisted the Taliban to take over the regime (Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012, 43; The ICB Data Viewer; Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 205). This finally allowed for the establishment of the Taliban regime in 1996. Although both Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) code the period of 1997-2001 as part of the rivalry period, Pakistan and the Taliban regime actually had a warm relationship (Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012, 43), indicating that the rivalry disappeared. Certainly, in 2001, Pakistan supported the United States to invade Afghanistan and topple the Taliban regime. This is, however, a new and different constellation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict, given Pakistan's past support for Taliban. In addition, recently the Pakistani intelligence agency (the ISI) has been accused of supporting Taliban insurgents against the new Afghan regime and NATO troops. Thus, the 2001 militarized dispute is more an exception than a part of the historical process of rivalry and, therefore, should not be regarded as evidence for the continuity of rivalry.

Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam

Period: 1956-1967

Transstate ethnic issues: Cambodia

The major cause of the Cambodia-South Vietnam rivalry was a territorial dispute in Kampuchea Krom (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 208). Vietnamese annexed it as well as other parts of the Khmer kingdom in the 19th century and "[t]he Khmers were left to adopt the religious practices, customs, and language of [Vietnamese]" (Pouvatchy 1986, 440-441). Cambodia sought to recover lost ethnic territories from South Vietnam, which constituted a threat to South Vietnam's existing state framework.

Cambodia-Vietnam

Period: 1976-1979

Transstate ethnic issues: both

After the end of the Vietnam War, North Vietnam became the government of the whole Vietnam and, therefore, inherited South Vietnam's rivalry over a territorial dispute with Cambodia (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 208-209). This time, however, the rivalry developed with both sides having transstate ethnic issues. Cambodia kept seeking to recover Kampuchea Krom from Vietnam, while Vietnam tried to overthrow Pol Pot in 1976 as the Khmer Rouge government conducted hostile policy toward Vietnamese in Cambodia including a massacre (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 208-209). Hence, Vietnam felt a threat to the security of its ethnic kin and eventually militarily intervened into Cambodia in 1977. Vietnam occupied Cambodia and established a puppet government in 1979 (The ICB Data Viewer), indicating the end of rivalry.

China-Vietnam

Period: 1975-1991

Transstate ethnic issues: neither (1975-1977), China (1978-1986), neither (1987-1991)

China posed a threat to the Vietnamese state, as China "began exploration for oil in the Gulf of Tonkin in violation of boundary agreements reached between China and France in 1887" as well as it seized the Paracel Islands and claimed territorial rights of the Spratly Islands for oil discovery (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 210). However, the ill-treatment of the ethnic Chinese minority called Hoa in Vietnam became a diplomatic issue in 1978 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 210-211). This transstate ethnic issue ended in 1986 when the Vietnamese government's reform policies enabled Hoa to revive in southern Vietnam's economy (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 211). The rivalry ended in 1991 when both states normalized their relationship (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 210). Storey (2008) points out that, although territorial issues remained after the normalization, "[d]espite frequent flare-ups, mutual suspicions and distrust, and political grandstanding, substantial progress was achieved and, most importantly, conflict between their armed forces has been avoided."

Netherlands-Indonesia

Period: 1951-1962

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

Indonesia and the Netherlands experienced rivalry over a territorial dispute in West New Guinea (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 212). The Netherlands had colonized West New Guinea since 1855 (Scott and Tebay 2005, 599) but Indonesia sought to annex it under the cause of anti-colonial nationalism, which was a threat to Dutch sovereignty.

However, West New Guinea itself developed its own national identity as Papuans, and Indonesia's motivation seemed to be not transstate ethnicity but the annexation of West New Guinea under the rule of majority Indonesians, given that, after Indonesia annexed West New Guinea from the Netherlands, it ignored a plebiscite promised by a UN resolution and pursued suppressive policies (Pouwer 1999, 171). Thus, it can be inferred that Indonesia wanted West New Guinea for its own state interest rather than for a transstate ethnic tie.

Vietnam (North Vietnam)-Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)

Period: 1960-1975

Transstate ethnic issues: both

The North Vietnam-South Vietnam rivalry developed with reciprocal transstate ethno-nationalist claims, as "two Vietnams, governed by ideological opposites,…[claimed] that they should rule all of Vietnam" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 214). Interstate violence between the two Vietnamese states eventually escalated to the Vietnam War.

China-India

Period: 1950-1987

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

The sources of the China-India rivalry were territorial disputes in Tibet, China's support for Pakistan (which is India's archenemy), economic interest in the Indian Ocean, and leadership in the third world and particularly in Southeast Asia (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 216-217). In summary, China was a major threat to the Indian state while India

was a major threat to the Chinese state. It seems that there was no transstate-ethnic issue between them. First, Tibetans are neither Indian nor Chinese ethnic kin. India is a multi-ethnic state advocating civic nationalism (and later the rise of Hindu nationalism) and its ruling majority is Hindus. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Indian government had a transstate ethnic claim for Tibet. As for China, citing Goldstein (1989), Hoffmann (2006, 175) points out that "the Tibetans were one of the minority populations sharing the Chinese state with the Han people, and therefore that Tibet was an integral part of China." Thus, China sees Tibetans as a minority rather than Han ethnic kin, although it regards Tibet as a part of the Chinese state. This point may be endorsed more, given that the Chinese government has cracked down Tibetan dissidents harshly. Second, Pakistani is not Chinese ethnic kin either. Pakistan's national identity is Islam while China's is Han. Third, ethnic compositions in Southeast Asia are too complex to simply establish a direct link of India and China with ethnic groups in the whole region of Southeast Asian. For example, China's support for North Vietnam was ideologically rather than ethnically motivated.

India-Pakistan

Period: 1947-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: Pakistan

The conflict between the Hindu majority and a Muslim minority within British India was transformed to the India-Pakistan rivalry by partition in 1947 and the main contentious issue has been the belonging of Kashmir (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 218; Suzuki 2011, 55-57), whose majority is Muslims but part of which was given to, and has been governed by, India. Pakistan has supported Kashmiri insurgency in India and

also directly fought war with India over Kashmir three times (1947, 1965, and 1999). Because Pakistan's national identity (which endorses state legitimacy) is a Muslim homeland in South Asia (Hagerty 1998, 67), it has a transstate ethno-nationalist cause for Muslims in the India-controlled part of Kashmir. On the other hand, the Indian government has generally sought civic secular nationalism as state legitimacy to accommodate the multi-ethnic population (Hagerty 1998, 67) and, therefore, Kashmir is a symbol of successful civic politics. Faced with irredentism by Pakistan, India has had to protect its own statehood. The rivalry is ongoing after 2001, as the two states resorted to uses of force in a crisis over Kashmir again in 2002 (Suzuki and Loizides 2011).

Africa

By the rise of nationalist movements against imperial colonization, people in Africa obtained their own statehood belatedly in comparison to the other regions. However, state frameworks were based on those drawn by imperial powers, which did not match ethnic boundaries. The incongruence of ethnonational groups with state boundaries is prevalent in the region, which makes transstate ethnic issues ready to emerge.

Morocco-Algeria

Period: 1962-1984

Transstate ethnic issues: Morocco

The issues in the Morocco-Algeria rivalry included a territorial dispute over oil and mineral resources in Tindouf and Bechar, ideological conflict between the Algerian socialist-revolutionary regime and the Moroccan monarchy, Morocco's expansionist

policy to establish a Greater Morocco (including Mauritania, the Western Sahara, and parts of Algeria and Mali), and Algeria's support for a rebel movement the Polisario in the Western Sahara (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 173-174). Although Thompson and Dreyer (2012, 174) describes that "[b]eginning in the mid-1970s, Morocco's desire to control the Western Sahara has been at the heart of Algeria and Morocco's positional conflict," given that Morocco had claimed on the idea of a Greater Morocco since independence (Mercer 1976, 503) it can be argued that Morocco had irredentism vis-à-vis Algeria in the first place. Weiner (1979, 22) points out:

> While "Greater Morocco" included far flung territories, all of them had, at one time or another, been under direct Moroccan control. Much of the area had recognized the religious authority of Moroccan sultans for even longer periods. To Moroccans this reinforced their claims to the areas because in Morocco, as throughout the Islamic world, religious and political life are [sic] intricately and inseparably intertwined.

To put differently, Islam plays a role of transstate ethnonational identity to tie Morocco with those "Greater Morocco" areas. Meanwhile, Algeria sought to prevent Morocco from increasing its power and regional influence and for this purpose it supported the Polisario in the Western Sahara (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 173-174). Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011, Appendix A) show that the Polisario was not Algeria's transnational constituency and, therefore, Algeria's support for the group was not motivated by transstate ethnicity.

Sudan-Egypt

Period: 1991-1996

Transstate ethnic issues: Sudan [both for the robustness check]

Sudan and Egypt experienced rivalry over the control of the Nile River basin, which is essential for water access, and also these two states "occasionally encouraged dissent in the adversary's political system" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 175-176). In this rivalry, rebel supports are the key to specify the presence of transstate ethnic issues. On the one hand, Egypt felt a threat from Sudan because it believed that Sudan supported Egyptian Islamic insurgents against the Egyptian regime. Ronen (2003, 95) argues that "[t]he Islamist ideology of the Bashir regime, allied with the radical Muslim and Arab anti-Western camp in the Middle East, was a constant source of concern for Cairo; Egypt accused Sudan of providing a base for anti-Mubarak Egyptian Islamists." Given the Omar al-Bashir regime is an Islamist (O'Fahey 1996, 263-264), its support for Islamic militants in Egypt can be seen as motivated by transstate ethnicity. On the other hand, "[t]he regime in Khartoum, for its part, feared subversion by Egypt, with or without American military backing, and was preoccupied by what it viewed as Egyptian determination to undermine it" (Ronen 2003, 95). It seems that there is no clear evidence to decide whether Egypt supported Sudanese rebels for the reason of transborder ethnic kin; what can be inferred is that, given that the Islamist regime of Sudan was a threat to the Egyptian state, there was a good rationale for Egypt to aim to subvert the Bashir regime in order to cut off rebel supports. In other words, a threat to the existing statehood, such as the survival of regime and the territorial dispute in the Nile River, seemed to be more salient than the security of Sudanese rebels. Nonetheless, for robustness check, transstate ethnic issues are coded as present in both sides of the

dyad as well.

Libya-Sudan

Period: 1973-1984

Transstate ethnic issues: Libya

Libya and Sudan competed for regional influence, engaged in the Cold-War ideological conflict, and mutually attempted to overthrow the adversary's regime (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 176). On the one hand, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi was an advocate of pan-Arabism and "ventured into the geopolitical triangular area of Libya, Sudan, and Egypt, hoping to make the region the center of gravity for his Arab unionist vision" (Ronen 2011, 3). On the other hand, Sudanese President Jaafar Muhhamad al-Numayri "rejected all of [Qaddafi's] unionist proposals, being cautious not to pour more oil on the fire of the Sudanese civil war" while even the end of the civil war "did not change Sudan's reluctance to enter any unity framework with Libya" (Ronen 2011, 4). This tension between Arab expansionist Libya and more conservative Sudan was more embroiled over Egypt's rapprochement with Israel, which Libya harshly opposed and Sudan basically supported (Ronen 2011, 5-6). Libya's pan-Arabism was motivated by transstate ethnicity and posed a threat to the Sudanese state. It can be inferred that the aim of Sudan's attempt to overthrow the Qaddafi regime was to counteract Libyan transstate ethnic policy for the security of the Sudanese state. Neither Thompson and Dreyer (2012) nor an expert source (Ronen 2011, 3-9) shows that Sudan had transstate ethnic issues against Libya. There is also suggestive evidence that Sudan wanted to remove Qaddafi from office due to a threat to the existing statehood. Faced with Libya's announcement to unite Chad, Numayri as well as Egyptian President Sadat "intensified

their opposition to Libyan machinations, the Sudanese leader calling openly for [Qaddafi's] overthrow" (Brewer 1982, 211). Prior to this event, Qaddafi was thought to be involved in a failed coup of 1976 by Islamic insurgents (Brewer 1982, 209-210). Libya's seizure of Chad, the country sharing the problem of Islamic insurgents (Brewer 1982, 210), could have escalated Islamic insurgency in the region and threatened the Numayri regime. Brewer (1982, 206) quotes from Los Angeles Times on October 18, 1981, a Sudanese spokesman's ominous warning of "taking all the necessary defensive measures to safeguard the security and stability of our country." Given these points, it can be inferred that Sudan's motivation to topple the Qaddafi regime was a threat from Islamic insurgency to the regime.

Spain-Morocco

Period: 1957-1975

Transstate ethnic issues: Morocco

The Spain-Morocco rivalry developed over territorial disputes over the Western Sahara (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 177). The Western Sahara was a part of a "Greater Morocco" idea, firstly proposed in 1956 when Morocco became independent (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 173-174; Mercer 1976, 503). Weiner (1979, 22) points out:

> While "Greater Morocco" included far flung territories, all of them had, at one time or another, been under direct Moroccan control. Much of the area had recognized the religious authority of Moroccan sultans for even longer periods. To Moroccans this reinforced their claims to the areas because in Morocco, as throughout the Islamic world, religious and

political life are [sic] intricately and inseparably intertwined.

To put differently, Islam plays a role of transstate ethno-national identity to tie Morocco with those "Greater Morocco" areas. Hence, as in the Morocco-Algeria rivalry, it can be inferred that Morocco had a transstate ethnic claim against the Spanish-controlled Sahara. Meanwhile, Spain ceded the Spanish Sahara to Morocco in 1975 but did not pull out of the Spanish-populated and controlled enclaves there (Martinez 2003, 875). The Spanish government responded by sending gunboats to Morocco's claim that enclaves Ceuta and Melilla belong to Morocco's control (Martinez 2003, 875). Because those enclaves are under Spanish control, they are regarded as within the framework of the Spanish state according to the coding scheme of nationalistic rivalry. While both Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) include 1976-1980 as the rivalry period, 1975 would be a more plausible end year, given that one expert source (Martinez 2003, 875) states that "[t]he transfer of the Spanish Sahara gave the enclaves a respite from Moroccan claims for at least a decade" (i.e., 1985). After 1987, it seems that hostility over the enclaves resumed (Martinez 2003, 875-876); however this is outside Klein, Goertz, and Diehl's (2006) coding of rivalry years. Thus, the rivalry period is coded as 1957-1975.

Mali-Burkina Faso

Period: 1974-1986

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

Burkina Faso and Mali experienced rivalry due to a territorial dispute in the Agacher Strip, which was thought to be rich in natural resources, and due to ideological conflict

between Mali's conservative regime and Burkina Faso's revolutionary and expansionist regime (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 225). In 1985, the two states clashed in the Agacher Strip and it is estimated that 400 people died (The ICB Data Viewer).

Cameroon-Nigeria

Period: 1981-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

The major issue in the Cameroon-Nigeria rivalry is a territorial dispute in the Bakassi peninsula, which has various natural resources such as offshore oil, natural gas, and fish (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 226). Thus, the rivalry has been mainly over economic interest. In 2002, both states mobilized their troops over the dispute in the Bakassi peninsula (*Africa News*, July 28, 2002). This can be seen as another militarized interstate dispute. Thus, although Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) regard the rivalry as terminated in 1998 because of the temporal limitation of the MID dataset, the additional source indicates that it is ongoing after 2001.

Ghana-Togo

Period: 1961-1994

Transstate ethnic issues: both (1961-1963), Togo (1964-1966), neither (1967-1994)

The Ghana-Togo rivalry developed over post-colonial territorial arrangements and dissident supports (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 227). In 1959, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah claimed that Togo should be integrated into Ghana (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 227). Brown (1980, 583) points out that this "reflected his concern to win the support of Ghanaian Ewes by promoting the pan-Ewe cause." Ewes were an ethnic

group living across the Ghana-Togo border (see Brown 1980, 577). Thus, Ghana had a transstate ethnic issue vis-à-vis Togo. It seems that this issue disappeared after the removal of Nkrumah from power in 1966. Togo also pursued transstate ethnic policy at first and called for "the transfer of British Togoland to Togo," but this policy "came to an end in 1963" (Brown 1980, 583). Although Togo covertly supported a Ghanaian dissident group the National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland (Tolimo), it had "no commitment to the ideal of Ewe nationalism" and its support had "been, rather, on the regime's dominant concerns of fostering economic growth and inhibiting political unrest amongst its Ewe populace" (Brown 1980, 586). Ghana also allegedly supported the Togolese rebel group MTD, which was not Ghana's transnational constituency (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A).

Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda

Period: 1996-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: Rwanda

Rwanda invaded the DRC to suppress Hutu rebels who fled from Rwanda to the DRC since the ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, and Rwanda occupied eastern Congo while the DRC required Rwanda to leave the country (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 231-232). Kalron (2010, 31) points out that "the Rwandans' ethnic solidarity with the Banyamulenge [Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsi pastoralists] and their helplessness against the attacking government supporters served as justification for their consecutive interventions in the Congo." In other words, Rwanda had a transstate ethnic issue against the DRC. Although Rwanda also had an economic incentive to intervene (Kalron 2010, 32), the coding scheme prioritizes the presence of ethnic solidarity (i.e.,

transstate ethnic issues) to economic incentives. Meanwhile, eastern part of the DRC was a safe haven for Rwandan Hutu rebels (most notoriously the FDLR), and the DRC even directly supported them to fight with militias assisted by Rwanda (Rodriguez 2011, 178); however, it is doubtful to regard this as the DRC's transstate ethnic issue. Neither Thompson and Dreyer (2012) nor two expert sources (Kalron 2010; Rodriguez 2011) show that the DRC supported Hutu rebels *due to their ethnic tie and beyond its borders* (these two are the necessary conditions for qualifying an issue as a transstate ethnic one). Rather, as noted above, it was for the strategic purpose of counteracting militias backed by Rwanda, and actually the FDLR was "a barrier to the Congolese government in its efforts to reestablish its authority and an obstacle to the transparent exploitation of the DRC's natural resources that could help the national economy" (Rodriguez 2011, 178). Both the DRC and Rwandan governments even "committed to reinforce their collaboration on the issue of Rwandan armed groups in the DRC" since 2007 (Rodriguez 2011, 179). This suggests that the DRC government does not feel ethnic sympathy with the FDLR and temporarily supported it only for the strategic purpose. The rivalry is ongoing after 2001, as the two states experienced a crisis in 2004 which was triggered by a Banyamulenge rebel, causing minor clashes (The ICB Data Viewer).

Democratic Republic of the Congo-Uganda

Period: 1996-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

Uganda invaded the DRC to suppress Ugandan rebels who were operating from the DRC, and like Rwanda, it occupied eastern Congo whereas the DCR tried to evict it. Kalron (2010, 32) argues that "Uganda's motives to enter the wars in the Congo seem to

be less apparent and have little, if no, real moral justification (as may be the case with Rwanda)" and "Uganda's intervention in the Congo was more likely to be a way of establishing regional power" and also it "enjoyed the extraction of economic wealth from Congo as a means of empowering and enriching specific individuals." Meanwhile, Ugandan rebels (most notably the ADF) used eastern part of the DRC as a "rear base" (Scorgie 2011, 85). The DRC government did not have a substantial control of the region (Scorgie 2011, 85-88). According to Scorgie (2011, 87), ex-combatants stated that, although they were welcomed by local Congolese, this may have been partly because the locals "preferred being in the territory of a rebel group such as the ADF to being under the so-called protection of the Congolese government forces." Given these points, it seems unlikely that the DRC government actively supported Ugandan rebels as it could not establish even control in the region after all. Still, the rebels were a threat to the Ugandan state. The two states clashed in Lake Albert, their border lake in 2007, causing casualties (*Africa News*, September 26, 2007). Thus, the rivalry is ongoing after 2001.

Burundi-Rwanda

Period: 1964-1966

Transstate ethnic issues: Burundi

The Burundi-Rwanda rivalry emerged due to ethnic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 236). Tutsi-led Burundi supported Tutsi rebels against the Hutu-led Rwandan government (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative). Burundi's support for its ethnic kin Tutsi rebels posed a threat to the Rwandan state.

Chad-Libya

Period: 1976-1979, 1983-1994

Transstate ethnic issues: Libya [both for robustness check] (1976-1979, 1983-1987), neither [Chad for robustness check] (1988-1994)

Chad and Libya experienced rivalry in the context of Chad's internal ethnic conflict, where Northern Muslims revolted against Southern non-Muslims (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237). As Libya "shared a common Muslim-Arabic identity with northern Chadians and accused Chad's central government of suppressing Islam, persecuting Arabs, and discrimination against the Arab language and culture," it supported its ethnic kin Northern Muslims (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237). The northern rebel group FROLINAT finally overthrew the government and took power in 1979 (Decalo 1980, 506). However, this new government of Chad was also "overthrown by rebels supported by Sudan and Egypt" in 1983, which consequently resulted in the virtual partition of the state to the South and the North (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237). Libya kept supporting ethnic kin in the North, but the South eventually forced Libyans out of Chad in 1987 and Libya's support for the North ended (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237). Given that ethnic groups in the North are largely different from those in the South (see Decalo 1980, 492-494), it can be inferred that Chad's attempt to reestablish governance in the North was not motivated by transstate ethnicity. Libya and Chad also had territorial disputes in the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad with uranium deposits and in Fezzan in Libya with Chad's supporting "Libyan dissidents to develop Chadian bases" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237). After 1987, those territorial disputes were the source of Libya's hostility towards Chad. It is not clear whether Chad had transstate ethnic issues in those disputes. The Aouzou Strip dispute does not seem to have been

motivated by transstate ethnicity, given that it is over economic interest of uranium deposits. As for the Fezzan dispute, no evidence could be found that Chad got involved in it due to transstate ethnicity. For robustness checks, it is coded that Chad had a transstate ethnic issue in the Fezzan dispute. Although both Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) code the period of 1980-1982 as the rivalry period, it should actually be excluded, given that after the FROLINAT took power, "Libya and Chad temporarily no longer engaged in conflict" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237).

Djibouti-Eritrea

Period: 1996-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

The issues in the Djibouti-Eritrea rivalry were the territorial dispute over a Djibouti town (Ras Doumeira), and possibly the proxy conflict of Eritrea against Ethiopia as Djibouti is Ethiopia's important trade partner and Ethiopia is Eritrea's enemy (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative; Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 239). Ras Doumeira is "home to the Afar, an ethnic group living in the disputed area" (Mesfin 2008, 2). The Afar have been oppressed by the Djiboutian government of the Issa-Somali ethnic group and have formed an insurgency group against it (Yasin 2010, 90, 92). According to Yasin (2010), "the Afar in Djibouti…are occasionally aided by relatives residing in Ethiopia and Eritrea" (86), but it seems unlikely that the Eritrean government itself has a reason to support the Afar in Djibouti in terms of a transstate ethnic tie. This is because "due to their unionist sentiment (aiming at reunification with Ethiopia) and opposition to Eritrean independence, the Afar in Dankalia (the Afar region

of Eritrea) are in deadly conflict with the Eritrean government" (Yasin 2010, 90). In other words, if the government is hostile to the ethnic group, there should be no reason that it is worried about the security of the transborder ethnic kin of the group. The reason for Eritrea's territorial ambition for Ras Doumeira is unclear from either Thompson and Dreyer (2012) or an expert source (Mesfin 2008). Eritrea's aggression was a threat to Djibouti. In 2008 Eritrea and Djibouti clashed in Ras Doumeira (*BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, June 13, 2008), which can be seen as another militarized interstate dispute. Thus, although Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) regard the rivalry as terminated in 1998 due to the temporal limitation of the MID dataset, the additional resource indicates that it is ongoing after 2001.

Eritrea-Sudan

Period: 1994-1999

Transstate ethnic issues: both

Insurgents based in Sudan infiltrated to Eritrea and Sudan supported the Islamic militant group Jihad Eritrea while Eritrea supported Sudanese rebels (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 241). According to Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011, Appendix A), Sudan explicitly supports the Eritrean rebel group EIJM (an alias of Jihad Eritrea; see START Terrorist Organization Profiles), which is Sudan's transnational constituency as an Islamic group, whereas Eritrea also explicitly assists the Sudanese rebel group SPLM, which is Eritrea's transnational constituency as ethnic kin (a church group).

Ethiopia-Eritrea

Period: 1998-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

After Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, these two states began rivalry with a border conflict, primarily on the town of Badme (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 240). The border conflict did not involve ethnic issues (The ICB Data Viewer). While Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) classifies this dyad as an isolated conflict because of the temporal limitation of the MID dataset, the ICB Data Viewer reports that the dyad experienced two crises, which resulted in minor military clashes, on the same issue in 2005 and 2007 respectively after the initial border war in 1998. Given these events, the dyad now meets the criterion of Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) for rivalry.

Somalia-Ethiopia

Period: 1960-1985

Transstate ethnic issues: Somalia

The major issue of the Somalia-Ethiopia rivalry was a territorial conflict in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 242). Somalia pursued irredentist policy to “encompass the Ogaden and its Somali population” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 242). This was a threat to the Ethiopian state.

Kenya-Somalia

Period: 1963-1981

Transstate ethnic issues: Somalia

The Kenya-Somalia rivalry developed over Somalia’s irredentist policy to annex “Kenya’s Northern Frontier District, which was dominated by ethnic Somalis and Oromo, many of whom wished to secede from Kenya” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012,

243). This Somalian irredentism was a threat to the Kenyan state.

Ethiopia-Sudan

Period: 1967-1997

Transstate ethnic issues: Sudan (1967-1982), both (1983-1997)

The Ethiopia-Sudan rivalry developed over their support of ethnic kin in the other state. Sudan supported its Arab Muslim kin in Eritrea for independence from Ethiopia (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 242), which was a threat to the Ethiopian state. Even after the independence of Eritrea, Sudan kept supporting Islamic militants in Ethiopia (as well as in Eritrea) (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 243). Ethiopia also began to support Sudanese rebels in southern Sudan (SPLA) in 1983, which are mainly non-Muslims and non-Arabs (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 242-243). According to Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011, Appendix A), the SPLM (an alias of SPLA; see START Terrorist Organization Profiles) is Ethiopia's transnational constituency as ethnic kin (a church group).

Uganda-Kenya

Period: 1987-1995

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

Kenya and Uganda accused each other of rebel supports (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 244). Kenya's support for the Ugandan rebel group LRA was not based on Kenya's transnational constituency (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). Meanwhile, according to Tekle (1996, 502), the Kenyan dissident group "The February 18 Movement (FEM) is allegedly based in Uganda." No evidence could be found that

the group had a transnational ethnic tie with Uganda.

Uganda-Sudan

Period: 1968-1972, 1994-2001 [ongoing]

Transstate ethnic issues: neither (1968-1972), Uganda (1994-1999), neither (2000-2001)

Uganda "viewed Sudan's first civil war as a war of Arabs against Africans" and "[a]s a consequence, relations between Sudan and Uganda deteriorated as soon as Uganda gained its independence in 1962" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 244). Thus, their national identities in terms of ethnicity were conflicting. In the first period of rivalry, Uganda supported the rebel group Anya Nya in the first Sudanese civil war but without a transnational ethnic tie (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). South Sudanese rebels went back and forth through the border between Uganda and Sudan, which caused the Sudanese government to invade Uganda (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative). During the second period of the rivalry, the Ugandan government supported non-Arab southern Sudanese rebels (SPLA) against the Arab-Islamic Sudanese government whereas the Sudanese government also supported the Ugandan rebel group LRA (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 245). According to Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011, Appendix A), the SPLM (an alias of SPLA; see START Terrorist Organization Profiles) is Uganda's transnational constituency as ethnic kin (a church group) while the LRA is not Sudan's transnational constituency. In 1999, both governments agreed to stop supporting rebels, but Uganda was not convinced that Sudan ceased supporting the LRA (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 245). In 2010, the SPLA "attacked a village in the West Nile District of Moyo" in 2010 (*BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, November 11, 2010). This is another militarized interstate

dispute and, therefore, the rivalry can be seen as ongoing after 2001.

Uganda-Tanzania

Period: 1971-1979

Transstate ethnic issues: neither

Tanzania and Uganda experienced rivalry over a territorial dispute in the Kagera River and an ideological difference between Ugandan authoritarianism and Tanzanian socialism (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 245). The territorial dispute was initiated by Ugandan revisionism (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 245). Uganda occupied the Kagera Salient in the October of 1978 but withdrew in the following month in face of Tanzania's counterattack (The ICB Data Viewer). This Tanzania-Uganda war was not irredentist conflict (The ICB Data Viewer; see also Nayenga 1984, 69). Meanwhile, Tanzania supported Ugandan dissidents (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 245), the UPA and the UNLA, which were not Tanzania's transnational constituency (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). Thus, no issues in the Tanzania-Uganda rivalry were over transborder ethnic kin.

Mozambique-South Africa

Period: 1983-1987

Transstate ethnic issues: both (1983-1984), South Africa (1985-1987)

Mozambique sought anti-apartheid transstate-ethnic nationalist policy against South Africa, as Mozambique "opposed South Africa's exclusionary apartheid regime and supported African National Congress (ANC) rebels intent on destabilizing South Africa's central government" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 249). Meanwhile, "South

Africa opposed Mozambique's multiracial socialist government and supported the Mozambican RENAMO opposition" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 249). According to Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011, Appendix A), the ANC is Mozambique's transnational constituency (black nationalists) while the RENAMO is South Africa's one (a church group). While "Mozambique and South Africa signed an accord in which Mozambique pledged to no longer provide sanctuary for ANC rebels" in 1984, South Africa kept supporting the RENAMO (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 249).

Zambia-Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)

Period: 1965-1979

Transstate ethnic issues: Zambia

Zambia pursued anti-White policy against white-led Rhodesia, as "Zambia opposed white-minority rule in Rhodesia and…provided support for Zimbabwean guerillas seeking to destabilize the Rhodesian regime" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 249). Zambia had the transnational constituency of black nationalists in Rhodesia (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). In response to this, "Rhodesia in turn attacked bases and pursued insurgents across the border" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 249).

Zambia-South Africa

Period: 1968-1987

Transstate ethnic issues: Zambia

Zambia sought anti-apartheid policy against South Africa, as "Zambia criticized the apartheid government for its racist policies" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 250). Zambia

had the transnational constituency of black nationalists in South Africa (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). Meanwhile, South Africa "was hostile toward Zambia for harboring South African dissidents and supporting groups viewed as terrorists by South Africa" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 250).

Dropped Cases

This section contains the list of rivalries specified by the intersection of Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) but excluded from nationalistic rivalry, and the reasons for this decision.

Yugoslavia (Serbia)-Bulgaria

Period: 1948-1952

Since 1948 the rivalry issue was mainly along intra-communist conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the superpower which had an influence on Communist Bulgaria (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative; Mahon 1998, 398). This means that the rivalry issue was framed in terms of contending internationalist communisms.

United Kingdom-Russia (Soviet Union)

Period: 1946-1956

Both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union experienced rivalry around European great power politics (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 53-56). The rivalry developed along the line of the Cold War in the post-WWII period, as UK Prime Minister Winston

Churchill used the term “Iron Curtain.” Thus, the issue was framed in terms of contending internationalist ideologies (communism vs. liberal capitalism).

United States of America-Russia (Soviet Union)

Period: 1946-1989

In the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, the capitalism-versus-communism ideological competition was the main issue (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 109-114).

United States of America-Cuba

Period: 1959-2001

The United States and Cuba experienced rivalry with several proxy conflicts/wars (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 138-139). Their rivalry developed in the context of the Cold War, i.e. communism vs. liberal capitalism.

Nicaragua-Costa Rica

Period: 1948-1957, 1977-1990

Nicaragua and Costa Rica felt a threat to each other due to ideological rivalry where liberal democratic Costa Rica and authoritarian Nicaragua “actively advocated the overthrow of the political regime of the other state due to their ideological differences” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 137). Thus, the rivalry developed over a threat to the existent regime of each state. The ideological rivalry turned to be the Cold War rivalry after 1979 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 137). In both periods, the rivalry issues are framed in an internationalist term, as the political ideology of democracy and

communism are not specific to one's nation but beyond national borders.

Honduras-Nicaragua

Period: 1980-1987

In the second period of the rivalry, the cause of the Honduras-Nicaragua rivalry was that both states advocated "regime change in the opposing state" mainly because of ideological conflict between Marxist Nicaragua and anti-Marxist Honduras (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 143-144).

Russia (Soviet Union)-China

Period: 1958-1962

During the Cold War, two communist regimes China and Russia began "a contest for ideological leadership within the communist world by the late 1950s" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 193). Both states posed to each other a threat, as "Russia's policy toward China…was strongly influenced by positional concerns in which Russia sought to prevent China from regaining the capability to be fully competitive in Asia" whereas China "sought…to establish China as a formidable major power" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 193). Thus, until the two states began a territorial dispute in 1963, their rivalry issues were framed in an internationalist term.

Malaysia-Indonesia

Period: 1963-1965

In the rivalry, Indonesia sought to prevent the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia to keep its regional influence by verbal attacks and then the support of

insurgents' infiltration, while Malaysia resisted these attempts of Indonesia (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 211-212). Indonesia's support for the rebel group the Clandestine Communist Organisation, or CCO, was not motivated by a transstate ethnic tie (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A; see also Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2012). The issues were regional influence and asymmetrical rebel support, thereby not making rivalry as nationalistic rivalry.

Thailand-Vietnam

Period: 1961-1988

Thailand and Vietnam experienced rivalry over the Cold-War ideological differences and regional influences. Thailand felt a threat from communist Vietnam and pursued foreign policy to counteract the spread of communism in the region, such as support for South Vietnam during the Vietnam War (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 214). It also assisted Cambodian resistance during Vietnam's military intervention there (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 214). These actions of Thailand were a threat to the Vietnamese state. The issues were communism and asymmetrical rebel support, thereby not making rivalry as nationalistic rivalry.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) -Angola

Period: 1975-1978, 1994-1997

Zaire supported dissidents (the FNLA and the UNITA) against the MPLA government in Angola, according to a belief that the MPLA was trying to spread communism in Southern Africa and a more right-wing regime would suit Congo's regional interest (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 230-231). Zaire's support for the FNLA and the UNITA

was a threat to the Angolan state, but it was not motivated by a transstate ethnic tie (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). The issues were ideological conflict and asymmetrical rebel support, thereby not making rivalry as nationalistic rivalry.

Uganda-Rwanda

Period: 1999-2001

Uganda and Rwanda experienced rivalry because of "strong disagreements over how best to intervene in the [DRC]" (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 235). Put differently, the DRC was a place where two states' interest clashes. The rivalry issue was for regional influence without transstate ethnicity between the two states, thereby not making rivalry as nationalistic rivalry.

Appendix C

Supplementary Statistics

This appendix lists the results of all supplementary analysis mentioned in Chapter 3.

Table C-1: Probit regression of revisionist behavior in directed dyad-years

	Model C-1	Model C-2	Model C-3	Model C-4
Nationalistic Rivalry	1.896***	0.917***	0.991***	1.410***
	(0.0534)	(0.0600)	(0.0631)	(0.0609)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.254***	0.244***	0.248***
		(0.0482)	(0.0498)	(0.0451)
Other Rivalries			0.546***	
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012)			(0.0750)	
Other Rivalries				1.419***
(Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)				(0.0455)
Contiguity		1.110***	1.047***	0.732***
		(0.0396)	(0.0432)	(0.0415)
Capability Difference		0.252	0.250	0.178
		(0.287)	(0.288)	(0.240)
Capability Difference^2		11.49***	11.65***	9.302***
		(0.870)	(0.872)	(0.929)
Democratic Actor		0.0677*	0.0663*	-0.0454
		(0.0387)	(0.0387)	(0.0354)
Democratic Target		0.253***	0.254***	0.157***
		(0.0364)	(0.0362)	(0.0321)
Democratic Dyad		-0.617***	-0.590***	-0.384***
		(0.0631)	(0.0618)	(0.0576)
Peace Years	-0.108***	-0.105***	-0.104***	-0.0789***
	(0.00733)	(0.00737)	(0.00743)	(0.00688)
Peace Years^2	0.00378***	0.00351***	0.00352***	0.00270***
	(0.000332)	(0.000338)	(0.000341)	(0.000322)
Peace Years^3	-3.60e-05***	-3.10e-05***	-3.12e-05***	-2.32e-05***
	(4.14e-06)	(4.27e-06)	(4.29e-06)	(4.07e-06)
Constant	-2.483***	-2.710***	-2.724***	-2.892***
	(0.0394)	(0.0385)	(0.0391)	(0.0382)
Observations	1,072,540	848,110	848,110	848,110

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table C-2: Probit regression of revisionist behavior in directed-dyad disputes (with peace years)

	Model C-5	Model C-6	Model C-7	Model C-8
Nationalistic Rivalry	0.374***	0.281***	0.265***	0.435***
	(0.0754)	(0.0775)	(0.0794)	(0.0793)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.162**	0.161**	0.160**
		(0.0720)	(0.0717)	(0.0704)
Other Rivalries			-0.0894	
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012)			(0.0992)	
Other Rivalries				0.262***
(Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)				(0.0597)
Contiguity		0.0917	0.105*	0.0318
		(0.0628)	(0.0628)	(0.0622)
Capability Difference		0.658*	0.655*	0.643*
		(0.383)	(0.381)	(0.368)
Capability Difference^2		0.482	0.481	-0.248
		(2.376)	(2.369)	(2.310)
Democratic Actor		-0.304***	-0.299***	-0.347***
		(0.0769)	(0.0762)	(0.0763)
Democratic Target		0.230***	0.235***	0.179***
		(0.0644)	(0.0631)	(0.0648)
Democratic Dyad		0.0997	0.0844	0.185
		(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Peace Years	-0.153***	-0.145***	-0.145***	-0.164***
	(0.0164)	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0170)
Peace Years^2	0.00693***	0.00679***	0.00677***	0.00777***
	(0.000967)	(0.000961)	(0.000962)	(0.00102)
Peace Years^3	-7.90e-05***	-7.95e-05***	-7.92e-05***	-9.24e-05***
	(1.45e-05)	(1.48e-05)	(1.48e-05)	(1.55e-05)
Constant	-0.0520	-0.115*	-0.112*	-0.167***
	(0.0344)	(0.0589)	(0.0590)	(0.0583)
Observations	4,344	4,136	4,136	4,136

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table C-3: GEE regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio (AR1)

	Model C-9	Model C-10	Model C-11
Nationalistic Rivalry	0.107***	0.106***	0.106***
	(0.0298)	(0.0330)	(0.0304)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.120*	0.120*
		(0.0678)	(0.0678)
Other Rivalries		0.00238	
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012)		(0.0370)	
Other Rivalries			0.0194
(Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)			(0.0221)
Democracy		-0.0896***	-0.0897***
		(0.0335)	(0.0334)
Nuclear State		0.167***	0.168***
		(0.0638)	(0.0636)
Real GDP per capita		0.155*	0.156*
		(0.0901)	(0.0901)
Constant	4.061***	3.180***	3.171***
	(0.164)	(0.749)	(0.749)
Observations	6,646	6,133	6,133
Number of Countries	178	158	158

Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table C-4: GEE regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio (AR3)

	Model C-12	Model C-13	Model C-14
Nationalistic Rivalry	0.124***	0.130***	0.126***
	(0.0299)	(0.0309)	(0.0298)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.0834	0.0833
		(0.0686)	(0.0685)
Other Rivalries		0.0132	
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012)		(0.0359)	
Other Rivalries			0.0256
(Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)			(0.0220)
Democracy		-0.114***	-0.114***
		(0.0360)	(0.0358)
Nuclear State		0.128**	0.130**
		(0.0511)	(0.0505)
Real GDP per capita		0.0794	0.0810
		(0.0873)	(0.0872)
Constant	4.037***	3.755***	3.740***
	(0.159)	(0.732)	(0.730)
Observations	6,640	6,130	6,130
Number of Countries	176	157	157

Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table C-5: Fixed-effect regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio (using the one-year lagged dependent variable)[1]

	Model C-15	Model C-16	Model C-17
Nationalistic Rivalry	0.0704***	0.0758***	0.0677***
	(0.0190)	(0.0189)	(0.0185)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		-0.000482	0.00315
		(0.0254)	(0.0262)
Other Rivalries		0.0307	
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012)		(0.0195)	
Other Rivalries			0.0200
(Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)			(0.0193)
Democracy		-0.0270	-0.0318
		(0.0236)	(0.0229)
Nuclear State		-0.0353	-0.0235
		(0.0650)	(0.0674)
Real GDP per capita		0.0246	0.0235
		(0.0214)	(0.0214)
ME-to-GDPpc ratio$_{t-1}$	0.827***	0.835***	0.835***
	(0.0200)	(0.0199)	(0.0200)
Constant	0.811***	0.614***	0.624***
	(0.0919)	(0.160)	(0.162)
Observations	6,430	6,018	6,018
R-squared	0.765	0.772	0.772
Number of Countries	178	158	158

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

[1] Because the dependent variable is at t+1, the one-year lagged dependent variable is actually the original observations (t+/-0). For the sake of simplicity, I use *t-n* signs in the regression tables.

Table C-6: Fixed-effect regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio (using the one-year and two-year lagged dependent variables)

	Model C-18	Model C-19	Model C-20
Nationalistic Rivalry	0.0559***	0.0617***	0.0567***
	(0.0168)	(0.0168)	(0.0169)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		-0.0228	-0.0203
		(0.0259)	(0.0265)
Other Rivalries		0.0212	
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012)		(0.0178)	
Other Rivalries			0.00575
(Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)			(0.0164)
Democracy		-0.0348	-0.0379*
		(0.0222)	(0.0214)
Nuclear State		-0.0391	-0.0296
		(0.0556)	(0.0560)
Real GDP per capita		0.0237	0.0226
		(0.0177)	(0.0179)
ME-to-GDPpc ratio$_{t-1}$	0.810***	0.805***	0.805***
	(0.0193)	(0.0202)	(0.0203)
ME-to-GDPpc ratio$_{t-2}$	0.0471***	0.0561***	0.0560***
	(0.0171)	(0.0179)	(0.0180)
Constant	0.681***	0.517***	0.528***
	(0.0460)	(0.138)	(0.140)
Observations	6,186	5,813	5,813
R-squared	0.779	0.785	0.785
Number of Countries	177	158	158

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table C-7: Fixed-effect regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio (using the one-year, two-year, and three-year lagged dependent variables)

	Model C-21	Model C-22	Model C-23
Nationalistic Rivalry	0.0532***	0.0587***	0.0551***
	(0.0168)	(0.0167)	(0.0169)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		-0.0156	-0.0137
		(0.0264)	(0.0268)
Other Rivalries		0.0135	
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012)		(0.0185)	
Other Rivalries			0.00890
(Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)			(0.0158)
Democracy		-0.0391*	-0.0413*
		(0.0220)	(0.0212)
Nuclear State		-0.0434	-0.0378
		(0.0523)	(0.0507)
Real GDP per capita		0.0271	0.0267
		(0.0172)	(0.0175)
ME-to-GDPpc ratio$_{t-1}$	0.800***	0.794***	0.794***
	(0.0207)	(0.0219)	(0.0220)
ME-to-GDPpc ratio$_{t-2}$	0.0729***	0.0849***	0.0850***
	(0.0209)	(0.0223)	(0.0223)
ME-to-GDPpc ratio$_{t-3}$	-0.0121	-0.0147	-0.0149
	(0.0124)	(0.0136)	(0.0137)
Constant	0.670***	0.476***	0.480***
	(0.0474)	(0.135)	(0.137)
Observations	5,952	5,614	5,614
R-squared	0.777	0.784	0.784
Number of Countries	175	158	158

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table C-8: Probit regression of revisionist behavior in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads (including the dummy variable of hawkish leaders)

	Model C-24	Model C-25
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio	0.0605***	0.0587**
	(0.0190)	(0.0260)
Hawkish Leader	-0.0512	-0.124
	(0.0837)	(0.0964)
Ethnonation-State Incongruence		0.148
		(0.0927)
Contiguity		0.243
		(0.151)
Capability Difference		-0.868
		(0.904)
Capability Difference^2		-4.473
		(12.51)
Democratic Actor		-0.263**
		(0.105)
Democratic Target		0.0160
		(0.101)
Democratic Dyad		0.135
		(0.180)
Peace Years	-0.196***	-0.194***
	(0.0250)	(0.0241)
Peace Years^2	0.00898***	0.00912***
	(0.00170)	(0.00167)
Peace Years^3	-0.000111***	-0.000115***
	(2.82e-05)	(2.75e-05)
Constant	-0.763***	-0.982***
	(0.150)	(0.222)
Observations	2,169	2,121

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table C-9: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in the subset of nationalistic rivalry (monadic models; alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues)

	Model C-26	Model C-27
State-Territorial Nationalism	-0.222***	-0.145
	(0.0846)	(0.0899)
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.0556**
		(0.0249)
Contiguity		0.262
		(0.163)
Capability Difference		-0.642
		(0.833)
Capability Difference^2		3.062
		(10.17)
Democratic Actor		-0.204**
		(0.101)
Democratic Target		0.0256
		(0.107)
Democratic Dyad		0.101
		(0.191)
Constant	-0.292***	-0.890***
	(0.0931)	(0.225)
Observations	2,274	2,121

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table C-10: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in the subset of nationalistic rivalry (dyadic models; alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues)

	Model C-28	Model C-29	Model C-30	Model C-31
Mutually State-Territorial	-0.0813	-0.00327	-0.252**	-0.235*
Nationalisms	(0.0916)	(0.0994)	(0.124)	(0.132)
Mutually Transstate-Ethnic	*baseline*		-0.212*	-0.171
Nationalisms	*category*		(0.119)	(0.121)
State-Territorial vs.	-0.247**	-0.0946	-0.418***	-0.327**
Transstate-Ethnic Nationalisms	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.157)	(0.160)
Transstate-Ethnic vs.	0.171	0.232*	*baseline*	
State-Territorial Nationalisms	(0.121)	(0.131)	*category*	
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.0633***		0.0633***
		(0.0245)		(0.0245)
Contiguity		0.266		0.266
		(0.175)		(0.175)
Capability Difference		-0.755		-0.755
		(0.796)		(0.796)
Capability Difference^2		3.150		3.150
		(9.285)		(9.285)
Democratic Actor		-0.217**		-0.217**
		(0.103)		(0.103)
Democratic Target		-0.0481		-0.0481
		(0.105)		(0.105)
Democratic Dyad		0.182		0.182
		(0.186)		(0.186)
Constant	-0.378***	-1.043***	-0.207	-0.811***
	(0.0874)	(0.242)	(0.129)	(0.238)
Observations	2,274	2,121	2,274	2,121

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table C-11: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on civic nationalism in the subset of nationalistic rivalry (monadic models; alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues)

	Model C-32	Model C-33
State-Territorial Nationalism	-0.180**	-0.146
	(0.0907)	(0.0916)
State-Territorial Nationalism	0.00126	0.00440
* Democratic Actor	(0.196)	(0.202)
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.0556**
		(0.0249)
Contiguity		0.263
		(0.163)
Capability Difference		-0.640
		(0.826)
Capability Difference^2		3.035
		(10.29)
Democratic Actor	-0.193	-0.208
	(0.167)	(0.193)
Democratic Target		0.0257
		(0.107)
Democratic Dyad		0.102
		(0.195)
Constant	-0.272***	-0.890***
	(0.0946)	(0.223)
Observations	2,239	2,121

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

Table C-12: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on civic nationalism in the subset of nationalistic rivalry (dyadic models; alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues)

	Model C-34	Model C-35	Model C-36	Model C-37
Mutually State-Territorial	-0.0492	-0.00315	-0.215*	-0.235*
Nationalism	(0.0981)	(0.104)	(0.129)	(0.133)
Mutually State-Territorial	0.00283	-0.00380	0.00283	-0.00380
Nationalism * Democratic Actor	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.214)
Mutually Transstate-Ethnic	*baseline*		-0.205*	-0.166
Nationalism	*category*		(0.124)	(0.126)
State-Territorial vs. Transstate-Ethnic	-0.200	-0.0904	-0.365**	-0.323*
Nationalisms	(0.149)	(0.161)	(0.179)	(0.179)
State-Territorial vs. Transstate-Ethnic	0.00907	-0.0164	0.00907	-0.0164
Nationalisms * Democratic Actor	(0.253)	(0.262)	(0.253)	(0.262)
Transstate-Ethnic vs.	0.166	0.232*	*baseline*	
State-Territorial Nationalisms	(0.126)	(0.131)	*category*	
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio		0.0634***		0.0634***
		(0.0246)		(0.0246)
Contiguity		0.266		0.266
		(0.175)		(0.175)
Capability Difference		-0.754		-0.754
		(0.793)		(0.793)
Capability Difference^2		3.235		3.235
		(9.338)		(9.338)
Democratic Actor	-0.189	-0.210	-0.189	-0.210
	(0.178)	(0.195)	(0.178)	(0.195)
Democratic Target		-0.0479		-0.0479
		(0.104)		(0.104)
Democratic Dyad		0.179		0.179
		(0.183)		(0.183)
Constant	-0.355***	-1.044***	-0.189	-0.812***
	(0.0897)	(0.239)	(0.133)	(0.235)
Observations	2,239	2,121	2,239	2,121

Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses

Peace year variables suppressed

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests

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